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Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance

Solvency Regulation: The Case for a Meta-Risk
Management Approach to Principles-Based

Reserving
Robert F. Webert

Abstract: This article presents the recent U.S.
"principles-basedreserving" (PBR) reform of life insurance
solvency regulation as a case study of how regulatory
systems can "'drift" from their putative objectives when the
complexity of the regulated market outpaces the capabilities
of traditionalregulatory tools to effectuate those objectives.
As the life insurance industry developed new products and
investment strategies to confront interest rate volatility and
the competitive effects of deregulation, regulatorsperceived
the traditional rigid formula-based methodologies of
statutory accountingfor reserves - which comprise by good
measure life insurers' largest set of liabilities - as
increasingly out of touch with market realities. Under the
PBR reform, the statutory accountingsystem will allowfirms
to account for their reserves based on their own
probabilisticestimates of the future economic value of those
liabilities, taking into accountpast experience andpredictive
statistical models used in the firms' internal risk
management systems. The statutory reserving regime is a
linchpin of life insurance solvency regulation, so regulators
should only change it so drastically if they are certain the
new approach will promote solvency. The article considers
the PBR reform in this context.
The article begins by explaining the purpose of solvency
regulation in the insurance industry (of which statutory
accounting is a central pillar) as a public administrative
intervention into the insurance market to remedy corporate
governance gaps due to insurers' unique capital structures.
It then distinguishes the statutory accounting system from
GAAP accounting by elaborating the former's traditional
conservatism and emphasis on long-term viability and
t Westerfield Fellow, Loyola University New Orleans College of Law. The
author can be reached at rfweber@loyno.edu.
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solvency over short-term optimization metrics such as share
price and earnings. The article then draws on "new
governance" and "reliability" theories to analyze the PBR
reform as an attempt to restore meaning to the statutory
accountingsystem in the face of the new market complexities
and dynamism by tapping into regulatedfirms' proprietary
risk management systems. The article considers, and finds
unlikely, the possibility that firms will themselves adopt a
conservative, reliability-focusedoutlook that privileges longterm solvency over short-term optimization metrics. Under
such circumstances, the central taskfor regulatorsshould be
to create a system of "meta-risk management" that aims to
encourage the institutionalization of social responsibility
and reliability on the part of industry actors. The article
explains how the PBR reform is unlikely to embed
conservative reliability-focused principles into insurers'
corporate governance structures, and recommends several
modifications that might increase PBR's effectiveness.
Whether statutory accounting can in fact recoup its
conservative underpinning is but a single manifestation of a
larger problematic concerning the viability of public
regulatory control in light of the immanent instability of
financial capitalism.
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Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance
Solvency Regulation: The Case for a Meta-Risk
Management Approach to Principles-Based

Reserving
INTRODUCTION

In the aftermath the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009, legislators,
regulators, journalists, and scholars of financial regulation and corporate law
have rightly focused on banks and securities firms. Insurers have received
comparatively less attention.1 While certain aspects of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (the Dodd-Frank Act)
impact the business of insurance, 2 the new law leaves intact the traditional
regulatory framework according to which state insurance commissioners are
the lead regulators for the business of insurance. 3 Nevertheless, the life
insurance industry is massive. It raises acute policy concerns due to its
privileged position as custodian of significant sums of savings, guarantor of
income security, and - during certain periods - the largest financier of
American corporations. 4 To illustrate, consider that U.S. life insurers hold over
$4.9 trillion in assets, which amounts to over one-third of total projected GDP

I. While the bailout of insurance conglomerate American International Group, Inc. (AIG) certainly
received its fair share of attention, commentators focused on AIG Financial Products, Inc., a subsidiary
engaging primarily in derivatives trading - an activity more closely aligned with the contemporary
business models of banks and securities firms.
2. To cite a few provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act that affect the insurance business, the Act forms
the consultative and information-gathering Federal Office of Insurance (FOI), provides for the
possibility of assessments on large insurers to cover costs of liquidating systemically significant noninsurance companies, and imposes new capital and leverage requirements on thrift holding companies
that own insurers. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, H.R.
4173 § 502(a)(3) (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (establishing the FOI); id. §§ 201-210 (providing
for assessments on "financial companies," including insurers, to fund the Orderly Liquidation Fund); id.
§ 616 (requiring Federal Reserve to impose capital and leverage requirements on all thrift holding
companies).
3. For instance, insurers were exempted from both the Volcker Rule, which imposes restrictions on
proprietary trading and hedge fund and private equity fund affiliation, and the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Consumer Financial Protection. See id. § 619 (2010) (adding Section 13(d)(1)(F) to the Bank Holding
Company act to provide exception to Volcker Rule); id. §§ 1002(15)(C)(i) & 1027(f) (providing
exceptions for insurance products and insurance companies subject to state supervision). For a summary
of how insurance remains a state-regulated business, see Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the
United States: Regulatory Federalism and the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 625, 62940 (1999).
4. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2006) ("Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and
taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest .... "); United States
v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 540 (1943) ("Perhaps no modern commercial
enterprise directly affects so many persons in all walks of life as does the insurance business. Insurance
touches the home, the family, and the occupation or the business of almost every person in the United
States.").
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for 2010.5 The total amount of life insurance in force as of year-end 2009 was
$19.1 trillion, which amounts to over 133 percent of total U.S. GDP for that
6
year.
While all may be (relatively) quiet on the federal front, a wide-ranging
insurance regulatory reform proposal is poised to revolutionize a central pillar
of solvency regulation in the life insurance industry. The reform is a U.S.-based
initiative to implement a so-called "principles-based reserving" (PBR) regime.
The PBR regime will rely on life insurers' proprietary statistical models to
estimate risks to which life insurers are exposed in the calculation of their
policy and annuity liabilities, or "reserves," which constitute the vast majority
of life insurers' total liabilities. Very broadly, the reform will allow firms to
calculate reserves based on their own probabilistic estimates of the future
economic value of those liabilities, taking into account past experience and
predictive statistical models.
The reform is emblematic of a trend for financial regulators to resort to
firm-specific risk modeling and risk management technologies - which have
been aptly referred to as the "new financial code" 7 - to gain an "on the ground"
understanding of the regulated industries they supervise. While it offers
potential benefits by providing regulators with access to better information in
dynamic and volatile financial markets, PBR - as currently proposed compromises the conservatism principle that has guided insurance industry
accounting since its inception in the mid-nineteenth century. This article
situates the PBR reform in the context of the objectives of life insurance
solvency regulation and the economic-historic conditions that putatively
resulted in its necessity.
Solvency regulation, the overarching objective of all insurance industry
regulation, 8 is fundamentally a corporate governance matter. Insurance
companies have a unique capital structure in that they are financed primarily by
premium payments rather than equity and debt capital markets. Policyholders
provide capital up front to insurers in exchange for a promise to receive
payment at a later date and, as such, are analogous to lenders and providers of
debt capital to non-insurance firms. However, unlike lenders - who are usually
sophisticated, well-organized financial parties with incentives and capabilities
to monitor their debtors - policyholders are a widely dispersed group of
5. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. Sys., FED. RES. STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.I, FLOW OF
FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FLOWS AND OUTSTANDINGS, FIRST QUARTER 2010, at 77
(2010).
6. AM. COUNCIL LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2009 3 tbl1.2 (2010).
7. Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to
Risk Models and the Global FinancialCrisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009).
8. See TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW & POLICY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 639 (2d ed.
2008) ("Traditionally, solvency regulation has been the most important function of state insurance
regulation. Nearly everything in the insurance field depends on the insurance company having the ability

to honor its commitments.").
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stakeholders with little motivation or ability to keep track of the companies that
insure them. As a result, policyholders do not provide the corporate governance
counterweight to the incentives of shareholders and management to commit
firms to risky projects that are advantageous to those stakeholders but minimize
total firm value. Consequently, insurers are subject to a corporate governance
gap that threatens consumer and taxpayer losses (through failed firms and state
guaranty funds9) as well as systemic risks to the financial system. Solvency
regulation is best conceived as a public administrative intervention into the life
insurance market to provide the disciplining and monitoring effects that lenders
normally would provide.
If solvency regulation is the key pillar of insurance regulation, then
statutory accounting principles (SAP) are - along with capital adequacy - the
cornerstone of solvency regulation. Insurers are, in distinction to industrial and
other financial firms, subject to a sui generis set of accounting rules that flow
directly from public law. Specifically, the rules come from statutes and
regulations enacted or promulgated by state legislators and regulators, usually
based on models published by the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC), the coordinating organization for the state insurance
commissioners within the United States. SAP accounting provides a framework
for insurers to translate quantifiable metrics from their business into statements
representing an insurer's financial position. SAP's internal logic differs in
important respects from the generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP)
system that governs reporting obligations of firms issuing securities registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In particular, the
statutory accounting regime has historically and self-consciously been oriented
to a conservative statement of financial condition and income, meaning that the
regime intentionally understates the value of the finn. By so doing, the
accounting regime ensures prompt regulatory intervention during times of
financial distress through the operation of the capital adequacy regime that
empowers and later requires regulators to seize control of firms based on
trigger points calibrated to net worth as reflected in SAP financial statements.
This regime stands in stark contrast to the SEC's system of GAAP
accounting and mandatory disclosure, which is geared to the "decision
usefulness" of information from the perspective of mostly short-term
institutional investors. To the extent the SAP rules understate firm values,
managers are restricted from transferring funds from the insurer via dividends
to the shareholders or through profitable investment in new business
opportunities. As an inevitable result, insurers' profitability decreases, and their
cost of capital increases, but implicit in the SAP accounting regime was a
normative policy commitment that these costs of solvency are worth the

9. See infra Part 1.
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incremental improvement to the industry's long-term financial solidity.
From the mid-nineteenth century through the end of the twentieth century, a
rigid, formula-based approach to SAP reserve accounting, incorporating
conservative assumptions, remained largely unchanged. Starting in the 1970s,
increased volatility, complexity, and uncertainty in financial markets pushed
life insurers into new product offerings and investment strategies, and the
instrumental relationship between regulatory objectives and regulatory tools that is, between solvency promotion and the traditional SAP rules - was
severed.
In particular, life insurers have increasingly (1) offered a product mix that
competed with banks and mutual funds in markets for investment-oriented
capital accumulation products and (2) invested premiums in higher-risk asset
classes. These changes were enabled by advances in theoretical finance applied
in practice by harnessing growing computer technology throughout the 1980s
and 1990s. Insurers, like all financial firms, used computer technology during
this period to develop elaborate information systems that identified and
assessed risks, and then automated business processes in light of the
systematized results of the risk assessment. The new market conditions and
product mix transformed the goal of insurance regulation - the promotion of
solvency - into a dynamic, reflexive target, disrupting the relatively harmonic
relationship between the reserve accounting rules and the predictable product
mix that had previously existed. In light of this disrupted regulatory dynamic,
regulators and legislators are struggling to reconstruct a coherent regulatory
apparatus by harnessing new financial code and risk management technologies.
It is here that the risk management story merges with the solvency
regulation narrative: the promise that finrs - especially those like life insurers
and depository institutions that face corporate governance gaps and high
negative externalities - can build an informational and operational
infrastructure that keeps risks in check. In order for risk management to serve
as an effective counterbalance to the burgeoning risk profiles of regulated
businesses in dynamic industries, it must be institutionalized and embedded in
the organization's network of communication and authority. Enterprise risk
management seeks to embed the new financial code into defined channels of
corporate authority in a manner that permits the firm - itself a highly
disaggregated set of individuals, commitments, and contracts I° - to identify,
quantify, and manage itself in light of risks uncovered by coded information
technology systems. Institutionalization of a conservative approach to risk
management can only occur when a firm adopts a long-term view of its
viability, premised on continuous self-reflection and improvement as well as

10.

See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL

CORPORATE LAW 1-33 (1991).

R. FISCHEL, THE

ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS

OF
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flexibility in setting the firm's goals. Only by adopting what Professor Bill
Simon has termed a "reliability" perspective - and concomitantly rejecting
undue focus on the optimization of short-term metrics such as earnings targets
and cost minimization - will risk management rise to the challenge presented
by contemporary financial markets."
The present status of the financial services industry is not propitious for the
spread of an authentic "industrial morality" that will institutionalize a reliability
perspective and conservative risk management norms. 12 Financial institutions
can extract rents from the users of finance by collecting fees or profits from
transactions that build systemic risk, which is borne by all users of finance
rather than the financial services firms themselves. Managers' rent-seeking
behavior is exacerbated by the existence of federal safety nets that attenuate the
incentives for counterparties to police financial firms. Moreover, institutional
investors pressure managers to realize short-term profitability goals, and often
prefer that a marginal dollar is invested in profitable business opportunities
rather than risk management systems that may prevent losses well after the
investors have sold their stock. Neil Gunningham and Joseph Rees have
theorized that for an authentic "industrial morality" to emerge, there must be a
convergence of interests between industry and public interests, whether through
organic means or through the threat of intrusive command-and-control diktat if
nothing is done. 13 At present, it is highly unlikely that such a convergence of
interest materializes. First, the public and private relationship is one of conflict
to the extent that safety nets mean firms do not bear the costs of their own
failure. And second, as recently demonstrated by the shortcomings of the
Dodd-Frank financial regulation overhaul, the financial lobby has good reason
to believe that it can fight off any existential threat to its fundamental business.
The task then turns to identifying new modes of deploying public power to
foster the institutionalization of risk management norms. In other words,
regulators must enter the business of what John Braithwaite has called "metarisk management."' 14 The PBR initiative - like much of the recent Basel II
reform for banks - should be evaluated as an attempt to establish such a
system. Financial regulatory reforms, such as these, that aim to bridge widening
information asymmetries by harnessing quality information derived from the
new financial code and risk management systems can be considered "new
governance" initiatives. New governance reforms re-conceptualize the New

11. William H. Simon, Optimization and Its Discontents in Regulatory Design: Bank Regulation as

an Example 2-12 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No.
9180, 2009), availableat http://lsr.nellco.org/columbiajpllt/9180.
12. Neil Gunningham & Joseph Rees, Industry Self-Regulation: An Institutional Perspective, 19
LAW& POL'Y 363, 376-89 (1997).
13. See id. at376-80.
14. John Braithwaite, Meta Risk Management and Responsive Regulationfor Tax System Integrity,
25 LAW & POL'Y 1,1 (2003).
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Deal model of expert public regulators imposing regulation on private firms to
pursue public regulatory objectives. Because financial regulators are no longer
in possession of sufficiently detailed and current information of the complex
and dynamic businesses they regulate, the private-public division ceases to be a
defining characteristic of regulatory governance. The relevant units of inquiry
become the modes of interaction between government and governed, as well as
the tools employed in a public process of regulation in which private industry
actors and other non-state actors play significant roles.
New governance tools aim to address volatility and uncertainty with
flexible lawmaking that emphasizes ready revision in light of experience,
continuous learning, and destabilization of norms through monitoring and
benchmarking. Finally, new governance contemplates a continuing role for
public power, but with a revised role as governance process arranger and,
where necessary, a deterrent threat against defection from regulatory
objectives. New governance thus proposes a decentralized public process
involving both public and private entities that is dynamic, flexible and
revisable, though always bolstered by a credible, risk-sensitive threat of
enforcement.
PBR is an incomplete new governance solution because it fails to embed
reliability principles in regulated firms and, in so failing, distances itself from
the core principle of conservatism that has guided insurance financial reporting
for over a century. The reform is to be applauded for decentralizing governance
by pushing authority for accounting standard-setting down to the regulated firm
level. Firms themselves, with their superior access to and ability to process
information, are enlisted to restore the logical relationship between the
accounting rules and the regulated business that, due to new product mix, had
largely disappeared. However, the effectiveness of the PBR reform is limited
by the lack of (1) a mandate for regulators to deploy risk-sensitive enforcement
threats to encourage an authentic reliability perspective to risk management and
(2) an information-sharing forum for regulators and regulatees permitting best
practices to be identified promptly and presented prospectively as standards,
destabilizing any tendency to focus on easily-quantifiable, short-term metrics
alone. Without including these new governance attributes, the logic of the
internal modeling and the risk management function will remain oriented
toward short-term optimization metrics rather than reliability and conservatism.
This article concludes that the PBR reform is correct to retain a modified,
formula-based "standard scenario" floor in the reserve calculation exercise.
Until life insurers have adequately embedded authentic conservative risk
management norms into their corporate governance infrastructure, a shift to
PBR alone would be imprudent. In concluding, the article also proposes that (1)
the baseline standard scenario be made more conservative, since regulators
have acknowledged its adequacy under most circumstances and (2) the NAIC
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should coordinate its PBR reform with other ongoing initiatives that will
increase its flexibility and provide for a more effective enforcement presence.
That said, this article's purpose is not to make concrete policy proposals, but
rather to elucidate the underappreciated teleological drift of solvency regulation
away from conservatism and towards internal firm estimates of economic value
and to provide a theoretical framework for reconstituting SAP accounting
conservatism through the institutionalization of a reliability perspective.
This article proceeds as follows: Part I of this article explains why solvency
regulation in the life insurance industry is best understood from a corporate
governance standpoint. Specifically, it notes the governance gap resulting from
the absence of lenders and debt holders in the life insurance capital structure,
and shows how consumer and taxpayer losses and systemic financial risks can
be attributed to it. Part II introduces SAP accounting and distinguishes it from
GAAP accounting on the basis of its traditionally conservative internal logic. It
discusses in particular the importance of reserve accounting and provides a
brief history of U.S. SAP reserving laws. Part III describes how increased
competition, interest rate volatility, and financial deregulation combined to
force life insurers to revamp their traditional product mix and change their
investment strategies, in each case subjecting their balance sheets to new risks
that were increasingly not addressed with the traditional SAP reserving
formulae. It also situates the risk management revolution in the context of these
developments and analyzes it along technological, managerial, and legal
dimensions. Within Part III, the risk management function is considered from a
new governance and reliability perspective, and the Part explains why the
existing attempts by legislators, courts, and regulators to foster the integration
of authentic risk management norms into firm culture fall short. Part IV
describes (1) the preliminary attempts to address life insurers' burgeoning risk
profile in the SAP reserving framework and (2) the PBR reform, including its
corporate governance element. It assesses the latter as a potential new
governance strategy and finds it lacking.
I. WHY LIFE INSURANCE SOLVENCY REGULATION MATTERS: A THEORY OF
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND SYSTEMIC RISK PREVENTION THROUGH
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

This Part explains the purposes of life insurance solvency regulation from
the perspective of corporate governance principles. Sub-Part A illustrates how
life insurers, like banks, engage in financial intermediation and are thereby
susceptible to an asset-liability mismatch, though the mismatch is slower to
emerge for life insurers than for banks. Sub-Part B describes the important
disciplining and monitoring role of lenders in corporate governance, and
demonstrates why the corporate governance of life insurers - which are funded
by policyholders rather than loan and debt markets - suffers from the lack of
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lenders in the capital structure. Finally, Sub-Part C illustrates the systemic risks
to the financial system and the potential consumer and taxpayer losses that the
corporate governance failure poses and, in the process, makes the case for
insurance solvency regulation.
A. Life Insurance as FinancialIntermediationand the Asset-Liability Mismatch
Life insurers - like commercial banks, securities firms, and mutual funds are in the business of financial intermediation. Like any financial intermediary,
life insurers intermediate between capital surplus economic units such as
households with savings and capital deficit economic units such as expanding
firms that lack retained earnings. 15 A life insurer obtains revenues from
premium payments and then pools and invests those revenues in securities, real
markets.16
estate, commercial loans, and private and public equity
Nevertheless, since a large portion of the assets supporting life policy and
annuity reserves economically belongs (and eventually will legally belong) to
policyholders, 17 it is appropriate to analogize life insurers with depository
institutions such as banks safeguarding investors' savings. 18 These savings are
transformed in the life insurer's hands into investment capital, which the life
insurer allocates in order to obtain a return without assuming unacceptable
levels of risk. While the life insurer performs this capital allocation function on
the asset side of its balance sheet, it is subject to claims liability in amounts that
are unrelated to fluctuations in its asset portfolio. In other words, life insurers
must pay claims when policyholders die irrespective of the performance of
their asset portfolios. As such, life insurers suffer, as all financial institutions
do, from an asset-liability mismatch: i.e., when claims come due, there19is no
guarantee that there will be sufficient available funds to honor the claims.
Premiums are to insurance what deposits are to banking: the source of life,
but also a barometer of stability and, when confidence wanes, a fickle reminder
that financial institutions are only as good as their perceived ability to honor
their commitments. When policyholders doubt an insurer's continuing ability to
pay claims, new premium income may dry up, which can result - especially
pressures.20
when combined with asset price declines - in liquidity
15.

RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 33-40

(2009).
16. Id.at 535.

17. In the case of a mutual insurer, over the long run nearly all of the assets supporting the reserves
belong to the policyholders. See Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 248 N.Y.S. 2d 559,
567-68 (1963) (explaining how New York law requires distribution of surplus to mutual policyholders

on an annual basis).
18. See Aigbe Akhigc, Stephen F. Borde & Jeff Madura, Dividend Policy and Signaling by
Insurance Companies, 60 J. RISK & INS. 413, 413-14 (1993).
19. See, e.g., METLIFE INC., ANNUAL REPORT 82 (Form 10-K) (Feb. 26, 2010) (describing
importance of asset-liability matching to MetLife's life insurance business).
20. David F. Babbel & Craig Merrill, Real and Illusory Value Creation by Insurance Companies,
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Furthermore, insurance policies often carry policy loan privileges requiring life
insurers to lend their capital to policyholders against the accumulated cash
value of the policies. 21 When interest rates rise and policyholders rush to
"surrender"22 their policies, let their policies "lapse, 23 or call their policy loan
privileges, a life insurer may face a liquidity crunch.
That said, the prevention of liquidity shortages is not the primary objective
of insurance solvency regulation because the asset-liability mismatch in the
insurance industry is less pronounced than in the banking industry. 24 Life
insurers have traditionally been pre-funded through premium payments. 25 In
return, they promise to pay claims on insured events that tend to occur
according to predictable pattems and often decades hence. Moreover, insurers
surrenders, which decrease the likelihood of a
apply penalty charges on
26
contagion of withdrawals.
Banks, by contrast, have a much more fickle funding base of overnight
interbank lending and demand deposits that support a fundamentally illiquid
asset portfolio consisting predominantly of long-term loans. When
policyholders perceive weakness in an insurer, they can surrender their policies
or let them lapse, but surrender and lapse charges are often high and slow the
contagion of funds withdrawal. "Runs" on life insurers are therefore less of an
immediate phenomenon than bank runs. For life insurers, it is more accurate to
describe the danger as a tendency for a growing asset-liability mismatch to
emerge over a longer time horizon.27 Accordingly, solvency regulation is best
conceived as operating along this longer time horizon and along corporate
governance dimensions, as a legal regime designed to impose a specific view of
corporate stewardship that protects the firm against the emergence of a

72 J. RISK& INS. 1, 18-19 (2005).
21. See DICTIONARY OF FINANCE & INVESTMENT TERMS 522 (John Downes& Jordan E. Goodman
eds., 2006).

22. Id. at 103 (explaining that "cash surrender rate" is amount insurer will return to the policyholder
upon cancellation of policy).
23. Id. at 376 (explaining that policyholders let their policies "lapse" when they do not make their
required premium payments and lose the policy's protection).
24. In other words, the temporal divergence between the maturity of assets in insurers' investment
portfolio and the expected payout of claims is less pronounced than the divergence between the shortterm deposit liabilities and long-term loan assets of banks. See RAY BENNETT ET AL., HOW VALUABLE
at
(2008),
available
14
fig.6.1
IS
LIQUIDITY?

http://www.actuaries.org.uk/sites/all/files/documents/pdf/Stanworth_tcxt.pdf.
25. MARY A. WEISS, SYSTEMIC RISK AND THE U.S. INSURANCE SECTOR at 5, available at
http://www.naic.org/documents/cipr weisssystemic risk 100223.pdf
26. See id. at 32-33; Kenneth M. Wright, The Structure, Conduct, and Regulation of the Life
InsuranceIndustry, in THE FINANCIAL CONDITION AND REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 73, 76
(Fed. Res. Bank of Boston, Conf. Ser. No. 35 1991) [hereinafter REGULATION OF INSURANCE
COMPANIES] ("Liquidity was not thought to be a problem, since the steady inflow of contractual
premium payments was far in excess of cash surrenders or requests for policy loans.").
27. See GUILLAUME PLANTIN & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, WHEN INSURERS GO BUST: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE AND DESIGN OF PRUDENTIAL REGULATION 90-93 (2007).
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B. The Lender Gap in Insurer CorporateGovernance (and Why Policyholders
Cannot FillIt)
Solvency regulation in the insurance industry is better conceived as an
artificial stand-in for the disciplining and monitoring effects of debt that are
largely absent in the insurance industry, and without which both shareholders
and managers can more easily bind the firm to value-reducing transactions.
Non-financial firms are funded through debt and equity capital. These firms'
shareholders and lenders - whether banks or bondholders - have interests in
monitoring the firms' performance. Lenders, which receive fixed returns in the
form of interest payments, are relatively uninterested in the firm's profitability;
instead, they are focused on the firm's solvency and long-term viability. As
long as the firm remains solvent, lenders expect to be paid and have a senior
claim on the firm's assets in the event of nonpayment. 29 Shareholders, on the
other hand, care deeply about profitability. When a firm approaches insolvency,
its net worth evaporates and the value of the shareholders' equity stake falls.
Under such circumstances, a share is the economic equivalent of an out-of-themoney put option on the firm and the cardinal rule of option pricing impacts
shareholder motivations (i.e., an option's value increases as the volatility of the
underlying reference asset increases). Shareholders therefore begin to prefer
risky projects that, despite having a negative net present expected value for the
firm, offer the possibility of large profits to redeem their equity investment. For
this reason, as the firm approaches insolvency, managers and directors
30
but also to creditors.
generally owe fiduciary duties not only to shareholders,
31
The legal duties are no different for life insurers.

28. This view of corporate stewardship is at bottom a political reflection of the optimal social
balance between increased costs of capital and insurance on the one hand and the economic costs of
insolvency on the other. See infra note 77 and accompanying text. While theoretically regulators could
conduct cost-benefit analyses to determine an objective optimal trade-off point, such analyses are in
practice impossible to perform with precision for all but the simplest of problems. See Guido Calabresi,
Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation, and Liability Rules - A Comment, II J. L. & ECON. 67, 70-71
(1968).
29. Given the nature of credit relationships, banks can also expect future revenues from borrowers
arising out of future lending facilities, advisory business, and underwriting, syndication and other fee
income. See Adam Feibelman, Commercial Lending and the Separation of Banking and Commerce, 75
U. CIN. L. REV. 943, 948-49 (2007).
30. See Frederick Tung, The New Death of Contract: Creeping Corporate Fiduciary Duties for
Creditors, 57 EMORY L. J. 809, 820 (2008).
31. See, e.g., N.Y. INS. L. § 1202 (2008) (providing that directors of insurance companies owe same
duties as directors of business corporations); 18 DEL. CODE § 4903 (2008) ("Domestic stock and mutual
insurers shall be governed by the applicable provisions of the general statutes of this State relating to
private corporations except where such general statutes are in conflict with the express provisions of this
title .... "); cf Fiala v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 776 N.Y.S. 2d 29, 32 (App. Div. 2004) ("[Aln insurance
company does not owe its policyholder a common-law fiduciary duty except when it is called upon to
defend its insured.").
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But boards and managers have closer ties with shareholders than lenders,
and the threat of opportunistic behavior requires lenders to monitor the firm's
solvency. Where lenders are able to assert a governance role in this "zone of
insolvency," 32 they counteract shareholders' high risk preferences and enhance
total firm value.
Typically, the terms of the monitoring are described in the loan
documentation or indenture and often include compliance with mandatory debt
and coverage ratios, observation rights, and negative covenants prohibiting
certain transaction such as non-ordinary course capital expenditures, mergers,
fundamental changes in business, and changes of corporate control.33 Banks
(acting either for their own account or as administrative agents in connection
with syndicated loans) and indenture trustees monitor compliance with the
documented restrictions and conditions. These restrictions not only protect
lenders against equity's tendency to "bet the house" when a firm approaches
insolvency; they also can inure to the benefit of other stakeholders (including
shareholders themselves) by circumscribing management's ability to engage in
empire-building, rent-seeking, and fraud.34 Finally, if managers need to access
debt markets regularly, they will be subject to market discipline by creditors,
who will calibrate a firm's cost of capital for new bond issues or corporate
35
loans to risk levels.
Moreover, as a functional matter many lenders are better equipped than
shareholders to exercise a monitoring role. Unlike widely dispersed
shareholders, lenders consolidate the monitoring responsibilities in a single
actor. Lenders also enjoy informational advantages over shareholders owing to
both institutional reasons such as access to a borrower's other accounts and
superior analytical capabilities, and contractual reasons such as frequent and
granular reporting obligations required in loan documentation. Where the legal
system does not empower creditors to exert influence over firm management,
monitoring creditors may signal to empowered stakeholders to take corrective
action. 36 Empirical evidence shows that, notwithstanding the demonstrable
32. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 215, at *108 (Del. Ch. 1991).
33. See Frederick Tung, Leverage in the BoardRoom: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in
Corporate Governance, 57 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 115, 135-38 (2009); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1209,
1227-28 (2006). As a practical matter, these rights may be waived, so they function as consent rights.
34. See John Armour ct al., The EssentialElements of CorporateLaw I I (Univ. Oxford Leg. Stud.
Res. Paper No. 20/2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1436551.
Since insurers are contractually committed to pay claims, these disciplining effects are present for
insurers in the same manner as debt-funded enterprises.
35. See DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REGULATION 231-35 (2008); Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, CorporateFinance
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323, 324 (1986); Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency Cost
Explanationsof Dividends, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 650, 654 (1984).
36. See George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate
Governance, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (1995).
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debt-equity conflicts of37interest, announcement of a bank loan is followed by
abnormal stock returns.
The foregoing lender-shareholder-firm relationship is inapposite in the case
of an insurer, which has a different capital structure. As noted earlier, insurers
are funded primarily through policyholder premiums. 38 Insurers are net
providers, rather than users, of debt finance. 39 While insurers can offer socalled surplus notes - deeply subordinated debt-like securities that pay interest
and principle, but with a veto right of the relevant insurance regulators to any
such payments - through the Regulation S and Rule 144A markets, these notes
are too risky to likely ever comprise a substantial portion of an insurer's capital
41
structure. 40 The market for guaranteed investment contracts (GICs) is large,
reserves.4 2
industry
but it comprises less than 5 percent of total life insurance
Thus, policyholders are the insurance analogs of lenders: the party with
incentives to monitor the firm's solvency and counteract perverse incentives of
management. In the insurance context, these incentives can result in riskier
investment strategies, expansion of new business lines, and attenuation of
underwriting standards. However, policyholders, in distinction to banks and
indenture trustees, are often financially unsophisticated and unable to credibly
assess the risk of claims nonpayment by their insurers. They therefore face a
wider information asymmetry that impedes their ability to monitor and exert
price pressure on the insurer.
Moreover, policyholders are frustrated by a collective action problem: no
single policyholder is in a position to assume the monitoring burden and
associated costs.4 3 A capital market failure arises due to the imperfect
information exchange between policyholders (in their role as providers of
capital) and firms, which results in the disappearance of a key actor in the
37. See Tung, supranote 33 at 125-26 & n.37. These observations arc limited to private bank loans.
There is no evidence that shareholders value public debt.
38. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
39. While insurers are legally empowered (as other corporations are) to incur indebtedness, state
law typically restricts the amount they incur. See, e.g., 68 N.Y. JUR. INS. § 145 (2010). Holding
companies may issue debt, but the ready supply of investment capital from insurance premiums and
annuity considerations minimizes the need for debt capital. For example, as of June 30, 2010, the two
largest U.S. life insurance holding companies - MetLife Inc. and Prudential Financial Inc. - had $452.0
billion and $410.5 billion, respectively, of reserve liabilities and $24.7 billion and $24.6 billion,
respectively, of debt outstanding. See METLIFE INC., QUARTERLY REPORT (Form 10-Q) (Aug. 2, 2010);
PRUDENTIAL FINANCIAL, INC., QUARTERLY REPORT (Form I0-Q) (Aug. 6, 2010).
40. ROSEMARIE SANGIUOLO & LESLIE F. SEIDMAN, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 2009:
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING 16.27 (2009).

A

41. A GIC is a deposit-like contract without mortality or morbidity risk pursuant to which a life
insurer guarantees to an investor, typically a pension fund or 401-k plan operator, a specified rate of
return over the life of the contract. See DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS, supra note
21 at 301.
42. See AM. COUNCIL LIFE INSURERS, ACLI LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 2009, 29 tbl. 3.3
(reporting $181 billion in GIC reserves as of December 31, 2008); id. at 28 tbl. 3.2 (reporting $3.471
trillion in life insurers' policy reserves as of December 31, 2008).
43. See Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing Financial Regulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11 -1 3 (2010).
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corporate governance equilibrium. 44 Insurance solvency regulation is designed
to minimize insolvency risk by imposing a set of restrictions on an insurer's
business analogous to covenant protections in privately negotiated credit
documentation, and monitoring the insurer's compliance with those restrictions
through regular prudential examinations.
C. Why It Is Important to Address the CorporateGovernance Gap: Consumer
and Taxpayer Losses, and Systemic Risks to FinancialStability
Establishing that insurers lack the monitoring discipline of debt holders
does not, on its own, justify a system of solvency regulation. Other industry
segments continue to flourish without robust monitoring by debt holders. 45 In
what respects does life insurance merit special attention? The preliminary point
to be made in this context is a background empirical observation: the presence
of banks as monitoring agents likely increases firm values. 46 But more
fundamentally, life insurers pose two distinct additional policy concerns. The
first concern regards consumer protection. Life insurers are custodians of
significant sums of savings. The second concern regards systemic risk: given
their central role as purchaser in the fixed income market, a failure of an insurer
could trigger fire sales in fixed income securities that results in asset price
implosions and credit retrenchment by other intermediaries seeking to recover
from their losses. 47 In recognition of these special policy concerns, the law
impliedly views insurance managers as agents of society at large in addition to
their traditional role as agents of the corporation.
First, solvency regulation is at bottom about consumer protection. Given
the implacable trend away from the defined benefit world of job and retirement
security and toward the defined contribution world of greater dependence on
individual retirement and bequest planning, its importance cannot be
overstated. 48 For over half a century, modern portfolio theory has taught that
44. A similar corporate governance gap exacerbated the losses for Lehman Brothers and Bear
Steams. Amendments to the bankruptcy laws operated to insulate these firms' sources of short-term
funding from credit risk, removing any incentive to monitor them as they piled on unsafe risks. See
Mark J.Roe, Bankruptcy's FinancialCrisis Accelerator: The Derivatives Players' Prioritiesin Chapter
11 7-9 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1567075. Professor
Henry Hu has referred to such counterparties as "empty creditors." Henry T.C. Hu, "Empty Creditors"
and the Crisis, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2009, at A13 ("Empty creditors have weaker incentives to
cooperate with troubled companies to avoid collapse and, if collapse occurs, can cause substantive and
disclosure complexities in bankruptcy.").
45. For instance, start-up companies without established cash flows are usually unable to access
debt financing and are accordingly 100% equity financed.
46. See Joanna M. Shepherd et al., What Else Matters for Corporate Governance?: The Case of
Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991, 996 (2008) (demonstrating empirically the value-enhancing
effect of bank monitoring).
47. See ROBERT E. LITAN & JONATHAN RAUCH, AMERICAN FINANCE FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY 108-

12(1997).
48. See, e.g., 148 CONG. REC. 12, 914 (daily ed. July 15, 2002) (statement of Sen. John Corzine)
(noting that the number of employer-sponsored pension plans where employers bear investment risks
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capital market investors that diversify their holdings can eliminate firm-specific
risks. 4 9 If investors can diversify risk associated with any particular firm, then a
firm's bankruptcy does not compromise the investor's overall returns. Most
policyholders have no such luxury. Furthermore, financial intermediaries like
to suffer from fraud due to their
insurers are more likely than other businesses
50
assets.
financial
liquid
ready supply of
Starting in the early 1970s, U.S. states - which due to political and
historical factors are currently the principal regulators of the insurance
business 51 - have sought to shore up consumer confidence by establishing
insurance guaranty funds. 52 These funds, much like the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation's (FDIC) backstop of bank and thrift deposits, provide a
limited backstop to cover an insolvent insurer's claims. 53 However, unlike the
(partially) pre-funded FDIC, the guaranty funds are funded by ex post industry
assessments. 54 While the guaranty fund mechanism ensures that no claim will
be completely unexhausted, it imposes significant assessment costs that result
in higher premiums and, more troublingly, in tough market conditions might
even threaten the insolvency of the contributing surviving firms.55 Moreover,
guaranty fund assessments are applied on a risk-neutral basis, so firms with
strong risk and operational management are charged the same assessments as a
shaky firm that could very well be the next insolvent firm. 56 Another limitation
is that guaranty fund assessments may be offset against future premium tax
payments, so in effect state taxpayers bear much of the burden. 57 Thus, state
guaranty funds are an incomplete solution to solving the consumer protection
issues of insurance solvency.
declined from 175,000 to 50,000 from 1983 to 2002 and lamenting the political movement to "privatize
Social Security"). As a result of this trend, employees qua consumers of financial services - rather than
larger, more sophisticated employers - bear risks associated with their retirement assets, including
insurance assets.
49. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 18794 (2003).
50. See Whitehead, supra note 43 at 10.
51. See Randall, supranote 3 at 629-40.
52. Prior to the establishment of the guaranty funds, insurance companies would sometimes
organize private bail-outs for insolvent companies in the interests of preserving public confidence in the
industry at large. See Spencer L. Kimball, The Purposeof Insurance Regulation: A PreliminaryInquiry
in the Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 483 n. 47 (1964).
53. See CARNELL ET AL., supra note 15 at 547.
54. Id. (describing ex post assessments of guaranty funds). The FDIC's total exposure is over $4
trillion, but only a small fraction of it is pre-funded. In fact, the FDIC's minimum target reserve is only
1.35%. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 2 § 33 1.
55. Thus the surviving firms pay twice, in effect. First, they lose business to the now insolvent firm,
and second, they must fund the obligations of the insolvent firm as well. In fact, the only firm that pays
no assessment is the insolvent firm itselfl
56. See NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS, 520-1 LIFE & HEALTH INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION

MODEL ACT § 9.C(2) (2010) (providing that assessments are based on the volume of business written on
a risk-neutral basis).
57. See Gerard M. Brannon, Public Policy and Life Insurance, in REGULATION OF INSURANCE
COMPANIES, supra note 26 at 199, 236.
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Second, life insurers pose systemic risks that can spill over into the larger
economy via capital markets. Life insurers are the largest purchasers of
corporate bonds in the United States. 58 They also are significant players in the
equity and commercial mortgage markets. If a struggling firm needs to sell off
significant chunks of holdings, or if a large insurer is placed in receivership and
its portfolio is liquidated, any resulting fire sale could result in lower prices and
higher yields for the sold securities. 59 As yields rise, corporate borrowers and
commercial property developers might cancel projects due to the higher cost of
debt capital, and the downward pressure on the prices of outstanding bonds
could compromise the balance sheets of other solvent institutions including, in
addition to insurers, banks, mutual funds, and pension funds. Risk management
technologies such as value-at-risk (VaR) techniques exacerbate the systemic
effects of unexpected asset price decreases, as trading units are literally
programmed according to largely standardized stop-loss algorithms to dump
predictions. 60
assets that experience price declines out of step with the model's
6
A downward spiral of the relevant asset class might result. 1
This dynamic never occurs in a neatly isolated laboratory. In interconnected
financial markets, the conditions requiring the fire sale of the insurer's assets
are likely contributing to other fire sales in other comers of the market, in
which case the effects of an insolvent insurer's sell-off are likely to be
unpredictable. At a minimum, it would be expected that securities markets
would lose much of their depth, which would decrease the likelihood that
markets could absorb the sell-off without registering steep price declines of the
sold securities.
To summarize briefly, life insurance solvency regulation should be
conceptualized as a public regulatory intervention into the life insurance market
to promote the welfare-enhancing corporate governance benefits that lenders
typically provide. In the process, regulation minimizes consumer protection
threats, protects taxpayers against bailouts, and curbs systemic risks.
II. STATUTORY RESERVE ACCOUNTING: WHAT IT Is, HOW IT WORKS, AND
WHY IT IS "CONSERVATIVE"

SAP accounting rules, along with capital adequacy regulation, form the

58. See BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYSTEM, FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES
71-83 (June 2010).
59. See Scott E. Harrington, The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance

Regulation, 76 J. RISK & INS. 785 (2009); Weiss, supranote 25 at 8 (noting that life insurers are subject
to runs on their capital accumulation products that complicate efforts to achieve a quick resolution of
insolvency and result in funding shortfalls).
60. See Whitehead, supra note 43 at 39-40.
61. See id.; SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS 29 (2010) (referring to this vicious
cycle as the "financial accelerator").
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central pillar of insurance solvency regulation. 62 The recent PBR reform
proposes fundamental changes to the mechanics of the accounting rules
applicable to insurers and therefore strikes at the structural integrity of the
whole solvency regulation apparatus. The objective of a system of accounting
rules and public disclosure obligations is to facilitate the flow of financial
information so as to permit the recipients of the information, whether markets
or regulators, to process it in a socially optimal manner. Mandatory disclosure
rules open the flow of information to designated stakeholders - e.g., potential
and current debt and equity investors, regulators, tax authorities, and
counterparties - and accounting rules dictate the manner in which the
information is presented. There is no a priori set of accounting and disclosure
rules that reproduces economic reality like a score measures the notes of a
concerto. Rather, each selection of accounting and disclosure rules implies a set
of regulatory objectives and a conception of the internal logic of the rules how they interact with each other and with other rules in the regime, and how
the markets will process information or how the regulators will respond to the
law constructs and legitimates markets
information. In this way, public
63
priorities.
public
to
according
Accounting and disclosure rules, by defining the metes and bounds of the
information package that is to be disclosed to markets or regulators, are
instruments or tools in pursuit of normative commitments as to how markets
should allocate capital and its returns, or how regulators in possession of
information should be empowered to intervene. As the example of regulatory
accounting principles in the thrift industry in the 1980s shows,64 sometimes the
objectives pursued can be the product of misguided political motivations. The
point here is simply that the design of such a system of rules is necessarily a
political or strategic endeavor that privileges certain commitments over
others.65 When assessing the effectiveness of an accounting and disclosure
62. It might be objected that legal investment portfolio restrictions are equally important to
insurance solvency regulation. Because the reserve regulation requires reserves be backed with assets,
the investment restrictions can be thought of as a sub-component of the regulation of reserves. See
Brannon, supra note 57 at 212 ("The most long-standing government policy toward life insurance is
reserve regulation, including the control of investment quality.").
63. See Christopher Arup, The Global FinancialCrisis:Learningfrom Regulatory and Governance
Studies, 32 LAW & POL'Y 363, 365 (2010); NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO
RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BEI7ER AND COSTS LESS 62 (1993) (describing

"governance" as "setting priorities, then using the federal government's immense power to steer what
happens in the private sector"). This assertion is subject to the public choice theorists' proviso that not
all nominally "public" priorities result from a public deliberative process.
64. See LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS FOR BANK AND
THRIFT REGULATION 83-87 (1991).
65. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR

LAWYERS 29 (4th ed. 2004) ("The principles of accounting are selected not by some scientific process
of deduction but rather with a view toward the purpose for which the process is designed, much as the
common law."); William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public Governance: A New Look at the
Financial Accounting Standards Board, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1, 8 (2007) ("[D]espite the FASB's stated
objective to reveal hard economic truth about preparer firms, no hard science of financial reporting
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regime - such as that of statutory reserve accounting in the insurance industry it is necessary to individuate its goals and ask whether the examined rules in
66
fact promote those goals.
Sub-Part A describes the statutory objectives and internal logic of the U.S.
federal securities law system of GAAP accounting and mandatory disclosure
rules. It will demonstrate that the objective of that system is to allocate capital
efficiently on a short-term basis and the internal logic of the system is premised
on the assumption that securities markets are informationally efficient. Sub-Part
B contrasts GAAP accounting with the SAP regime that is applicable to
insurers and which constitutes a central pillar of life insurer solvency
regulation. In particular, it highlights SAP accounting's commitment to
conservatism in financial reporting and the long-term viability of regulated
insurers, in distinction to GAAP's preference for fair value accounting and
other accounting methods that are more meaningful to short-term capital
markets investors. Sub-Part C explains the importance of reserve accounting to
insurance solvency regulation and provides a brief introduction to the concept
of reserves. Sub-Part D provides a brief summary of the history of SAP reserve
accounting and applicable legal rules.
A. The U.S. Securities Law Accounting and Disclosure Regime and "Decision
Usefulness "
Before the mandatory disclosure system of the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Securities Acts), financial reporting
was viewed primarily from the perspective of management in its "stewardship"
role: that is, the responsibility for properly allocating income among a firm's
various stakeholders and preserving the value of a firm's assets. 67 When it
came to disseminating information to investors, managerial control over
accounting and the lack of standardized, legally-binding accounting norms
would often result in sub-optimal accounting disclosures. 68 With the passage of
exists to import definitive justification to a given standard. Accounting standards are conventions and
financial truth is subject to interpretive shading. The standard setter, no matter how well informed,
makes a judgment call."); William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE
L. J. 439, 447 (2003) ("Just as politics informs a legislative judgment when conflicting interest groups
compete for regulation, politics informs the choice of instructions respecting a system of financial
reporting.").
66. See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem. Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100-03 (1995) (noting how GAAP
accounting's emphasis on conservatism and understatement of income and assets did not coincide with
the bookkeeping objectives of the Medicare reimbursement program at issue in litigation; upholding
government's selection of alternative accounting methods); Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r, 439 U.S.
522, 545 (1979) ("The accountant's conservatism cannot bind the Commissioner [of Internal Revenue]
in his efforts to collect taxes.").
67. See Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, The Demand for and Supply of Accounting
Theories: The Market for Excuses, 54 ACc. REV. 273, 295-96 (1979).
68. See ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE

PROPERTY 182-83, 271-74 (2d ed. 1968) (describing management incentives and practices in using
accounting discretion to misrepresent financial information to investors); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
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the Securities Acts, companies raising capital in public debt or equity markets
were required by federal law to make public disclosures of financial
information. 69 The SEC was charged with setting the terms of the information
packet that issuers and funds were to disclose.7 °
The SEC vested the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) with
authority to set legally binding accounting standards for purposes of the
Securities Acts financial reports and disclosures. 71 The FASB, in sharp contrast
to the pre-Securities Acts stewardship paradigm, has articulated a goal of
"decision usefulness" for investors 72 as its guiding principle: "Financial
reporting should provide information that is useful to present and potential
investors and creditors and other users in making rational investment, credit,
and similar decisions. 73 At the time it issued the statement, FASB stood on
firm ground: the efficient capital markets hypothesis (ECMH) - which
maintained in its various formulations that security prices reflected all publicly
available information - dominated the theoretical and policy discussion among
securities markets stakeholders. 74 According to the ECMH, the primary role for
accountants and securities regulators was to ensure a proper flow of
information to markets, which would quickly reflect, via pricing, the impact of

TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 48-49 (1995). Of course, shareholders could look toan auditor to
verify the accounts. Nevertheless, shareholders arc a widely dispersed constituency and auditors knew
that management was selecting and paying them. In the absence of formal standards, accountants lacked
an authority to appeal to when opposing management accounting practices.
69. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 39-40, 99 (1982) (describing
the disclosure philosophy of the Securities Acts).
70. See id.at 100.
71. The FASB, a private non-profit entity, issues GAAP standards. See Bratton, supra note 65 at
444 n.20. Since 1973, the SEC has required that any public financial disclosures required under U.S.
securities laws be made in accordance with FASB standards. See STATEMENT OF POLICY ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS, ACCOUNTING

SERIES RELEASE No. 150, 3 SEC Docket 275 (Dec. 20, 1973) (providing that "principles, standards, and
practices" of FASB have "substantial authoritative support" and standards contrary to such
promulgations are to be considered lacking such support); ADMINISTRATIVE POLICY ON FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS, ACCOUNTING RELEASE NO. 4, 1I Fed. Reg. 10,913 (Apr. 25, 1938) (stating that in cases
of disagreement between issuer and SEC as to an accounting item, issuer's interpretation would be
accepted only if it was backed by "substantial authoritative support"); see also COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF POLICY REAFFIRMING THE STATUS OF THE FASB AS A DESIGNATED PRIVATE-SECTOR
STANDARD SETTER, SECURITIES ACT RELEASE NO. 8221, EXCHANGE ACT RELEASE No. 47,743, 80
SEC Docket 139 (Apr. 25, 2003) (restating formal recognition of FASB pursuant to a directive of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).

72. See Bratton, supra note 65 at 28-30; Watts & Zimmerman, supra note 67 at 295-98.
73. FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 1:
OBJECTIVES OF FINANCIAL REPORTING By BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 34 (1978).
74. See ROBERT J.SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 177-79 (2000); Lynn A. Stout, The
Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities
Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 615-16 n.2-n.6 (1988) (citing judicial, administrative, and political
sources advocating for informationally efficient securities markets during the 1970s and 1980s); Ronald

J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 550
(1984) (describing the ECMH as "the context in which serious discussion of the regulation of financial
markets takes place").

Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance Solvency Regulation
the information on the fundamental value of the disclosing firm's securities.
Contemporary capital markets are dominated by institutions with short-term
investment time horizons, and FASB standards accordingly aim to ensure a
flow of information from reporting companies that such short-term investors
find useful. Nowhere is this more evident than in GAAP's consistent preference
for fair-value accounting, usually over strong objections from management. It
suffices for the moment to note that FASB's choices of standards, guided by
the mantra of decision usefulness, have allocative consequences and are
undergirded by commitments - either implicit or explicit - to certain
perceptions of corporations, U.S. capital markets, and the optimization of
capital allocation. Specifically, the standards reflect a faith in the abilities of
capital market investors to process fair market 76value data and regulators'
75
acquiescence to short-term optimization metrics.
Notwithstanding the ample objections to the notion that allocative
efficiency can be achieved through short-term informational efficiency, the
commitment of FASB and the SEC to short-term informational efficiency, even
today, is hardly up for debate. 77 It is a regulatory system premised on an
objective (efficient capital allocation), an instrument (disclosure and GAAP
accounting), and a set of assumptions on how the instruments conduce to the
objective (ECMH).
B. An Introduction to the InternalLogic of Statutory Accounting
Traditionally, the system of accounting rules applicable to insurers has
utilized a distinctive internal logic to promote the distinctive goal of
conservative financial reporting. Insurance operating companies - in distinction
to holding companies such as MetLife and AIG - are subject to neither the
securities law mandatory disclosure system nor FASB's GAAP accounting
rules. 78 Instead, insurers are subject to a sui generis set of conservative
accounting rules and standards known as "statutory accounting," or "SAP." The
system is statutory because its source of authority is located directly in the
realm of public law (specifically, legislation and regulations), as distinguished

75.

See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55

DUKE L.J. 711, 746 (2006) (describing the problem of short-termism among equity investors as
"fundamental" but ultimately irremediable through securities regulation).
76. Professor Bill Simon has characterized the focus on short-term unitary metrics such as cost

minimization and meeting short-term earnings targets, often without a longer-term view of changing
systems, as a "vulgar optimization" perspective to corporate management. See Simon, supra note I I at

7.
77.

See, e.g., Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 75, at 713 ('[S]cholarly analysis of securities

regulation must proceed on the assumption that the ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain
efficient financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the economy.").
78. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (exempting from the periodic disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act
any securities issued by insurance companies filing reports with, and subject to regulation by, state

insurance regulators).
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which are
from GAAP and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS),
79
boards.
setting
standard
private
by
pronounced on authoritatively
SAP's primary objective is solvency protection, rather than accurate
estimation of market value or proper income allocation. Accordingly, statutory
80
accounting is generally perceived to be more conservative than GAAP. This
last point is crucial and bears emphasis: by focusing on solvency, SAP
accounting responds to a different internal logic than GAAP accounting and
other forms of financial analysis that focus on market valuation. 81 Stated more
technically, SAP's financial reporting logic incorporates informational inputs
from the reporting firm's business in a manner to represent the firm's ability to
satisfy its obligations at all times. Under SAP, assets are generally valued
conservatively and certain illiquid assets such as fixtures are not included at all
in the construction of the balance sheet. 82 As for reserves, the mortality and
interest rate assumptions are set at levels that are conservative relative to
83
expectations.
To take another example, consider the SAP rule that acquisition costs (i.e.,
the expenses associated with underwriting new insurance policies, such as
agent and producer commissions) are to be expensed when incurred. Because
acquisition costs are naturally highest when new policies are underwritten, this
policy results in underreporting net income from an economic perspective for
4
periods in which an insurer is expanding or starting new business.8 Under
85
GAAP, these costs would be expensed as premiums are earned. Thus, the
SAP policy of immediate expensing of acquisition costs does not present an
accurate picture of a firm's profitability during such period. 6 From the
regulators' perspective, though, the inherent conservatism of the rule results in
reduced net worth and income and thereby prevents newly formed, or rapidly
expanding, insurers from distributing GAAP profits to policyholders or
79. It might be argued that GAAP, too, derives its authority from public law by virtue of the SEC's
imprimatur of FASB promulgations in the form of Accounting Release No. 150. See supra note 71 and
accompanying text. While the SEC's role was critical in the development of GAAP, FASB governs the

accounting rules for non-SEC-registered firms as well; by contrast, the system of state statutory
accounting for insurers flows directly from state law.
80. See STEPHEN G. RYAN, FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: ACCOUNTING AND

DISCLOSURE RULES 429 (2007).
81. 3-34 NEW APPLEMAN NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW § 34.02[2] (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter NEW
YORK INSURANCE LAW] (distinguishing GAAP from SAP on the basis of the wider range of concerns of
users of GAAP financial statements); cf Edward W. Frees & Siu-Wai Lai, Examining Changes in
Reserves Using Stochastic Interest Models, 62 J. RISK & INS. 535, 536 (1995) (distinguishing a
valuation perspective to statutory reserve accounting, which presumes a sale of book of business on the
open market, from a financial strength perspective, which takes a conservative approach).
82. See Robert W. Klein, Insurance Regulation in Transition, 62 J. RISK & INS. 363, 369 (1995).
83. See 3-41 NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW § 41.09[2], supra note 81; Brannon, supra note 57 at
206.
84. Reynolds Griffith, A Note on Life Insurance Accounting, 31 J. RISK & INS. 207, 207-09, 211-12
(1964).
85. See id.
86. See id.
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investors without establishing a track record of solvent profitability. 8 7 Again,
the distinctive internal logic of the SAP rules conceptualizes the financial
reporting exercise as an instrument to promote the solidity of the insurance
enterprise.
Since conservative accounting rules shrink the amount of funds available to
pursue new business or to distribute to beneficial equity holders via dividends,
they necessarily increase the cost of the insurance group's equity capital, which
under most circumstances will result in higher prices for insurance
consumers. 88 Statutory accounting and its conservatism imply a trade-off
between an increase in the cost of capital and insurance prices on the one hand,
and the possibility of systemic market disruptions, consumer losses, and
taxpayer-funded bail-outs on the other. Writing in the context of bank capital
adequacy, Federal Reserve Governor Daniel Tarullo makes a point that is
equally applicable to insurance solvency regulation: such a regulatory system
"must be defended on the grounds that it produces the optimal social trade-off
between the cost of capital and the economic risks of . . . failure."8 9 If the
insurer's net worth falls below certain thresholds (each representing a "social
trade-off'), the insurance commissioner is, depending on the degree of
90
insolvency, permitted or required to suspend or revoke the insurer's license.
By adopting conservative accounting rules, the SAP system ensures prompt
regulatory intervention during times of financial distress.
The SAP rules delineate the contours of the information package that the
commissioner is to use when making this determination. SAP financial
statements are also publicly disclosed, and insurance industry rating agencies
publish financial strength ratings that take into account, among other things,
SAP financial statements. 9 1 Typically, insurance consumers do not review the
SAP reports, but take into account financial strength ratings when pricing
insurance.92 By contrast, GAAP accounting is geared to decision usefulness
from the perspective of "present and potential investors and creditors and other
users" 93 - a wider array of stakeholders that includes policyholders,
bondholders, intermediaries, analysts and other counterparties and creditors. To

87. See Brannon, supra note 57 at 206.
88. Insurers themselves do not raise equity in capital markets and instead are capitalized by holding
company parents. The holding company parents then can issue equity through public and private capital
markets. Though the holding companies are not themselves subject to SAP, the conservative SAP rules
tie up surplus at the operating company level and in effect restrict the amount of distributable surplus to
shareholders at the holding company level.
89. TARULLO, supra note 35, at 26.
90. See infra notes 102-103, and accompanying text.
91. See A.M. BEST CO., INC., BEST'S CREDIT RATING METHODOLOGIES: GLOBAL LIFE AND NONLIFE INSURANCE EDITION 2 (2010), available at http://www.ambest.com/ratings/methodology/bcrm.pdf.

92. See Jennifer J. Gaver & Steven W. Pottier, The Role of Holding Company Financial
Information in the Insurer-RatingProcess: Evidence, 72 J. RISK & INS. 77, 78 (2005).

93. See supra note 73.
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summarize, the internal logic of SAP is oriented to a conservative assessment
of solvency by insurance regulators and rating agencies, and the internal logic
of GAAP is oriented to investors assessing market value.
C. Life Insurance Reserves: Why They Are Important,and How They Are
Accountedfor
The general conservatism of insurance solvency regulation results primarily
from the conservative assumptions and methodologies embedded in the SAP
reserve accounting rules. The main liabilities life insurers incur are life
insurance policy reserves and annuity reserves. U.S.-domiciled insurers also
must account for other reserves - such as the unearned premium reserve 94 and
the asset valuation reserve 95 - but these reserves, while important, are smaller
in magnitude. 96 Policy and annuity reserves are balance sheet liabilities, the
value of which is equal to that sum of money which together with interest and
future premium payments will be just sufficient to pay the expected future
death claims on an insurer's contracts. 97 Stated another way, reserves measure
the extent to which the present value of future obligations exceeds the present
value of future expected premiums. 98 Calculating life insurance reserve
amounts depends on (1) expectations of when policyholders will die, (2) the
applicable interest rates by which the reserve will be discounted, and (3)
expectations of99future premiums and expenses, taking into account lapse and
surrender rates.
When calculating expectations of policyholder deaths, insurers and
regulators utilize standardized mortality tables, which show, with respect to
policyholders of any age, the expected remaining years of life.' 00 The insurer
can then estimate the amounts required to fund a reserve for a given
policyholder by discounting the death benefit amount by the applicable interest

94. The unearned premium reserve arises when policyholders purchase insurance with a bulk
premium payment that is earned over the course of the policy, with successive amortization from the
unearned premium reserve.
95. Life, accident, and health insurers must establish an asset valuation reserve "to offset potential
credit-related investment losses on all invested asset categories" subject to limited exclusions.
STATEMENT OF STATUTORY ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES No. 7, ASSET VALUATION RESERVE AND
INTEREST MAINTENANCE RESERVE (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 2009)

96. 3-34 NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW § 34.09[l], supranote 81, Liabilities-Life Insurers.
97. See J.D. HAMMOND & ARTHUR L. WILLIAMS: ESSENTIALS OF LIFE INSURANCE 80 (1968).
Notably, the reserve is meant to capture only expected claims. Most contingent policy liabilities (e.g.,
larger-than-expected loss amounts or punitive damages) are not recognized as liabilities on an insurer's
balance sheet, except to the extent they are impliedly the underlying reason for an insurer's capital
cushion.
98. See 820-1 STANDARD VALUATION LAW, § 5 (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 2009) [hereinafter
STANDARD VALUATION LAW]; JAMES L. ATHEARN, RISK AND INSURANCE 463 (1977).
99. For a description of lapse and surrender, see supranotes 22-23.
100. HAMMOND & WILLIAMS, supranote 97, at 74.
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rate over the expected remaining years of the policyholder's life.10 1 If the
average holder of a traditional policy is expected to live until age eighty-five,
then ceteris paribus the insurer must maintain a smaller reserve associated with
such policies than it would if the average policyholder were expected to live
until age seventy. Similarly, if long-term interest rates are expected to be 6
percent instead of 4 percent, then by applying a higher discount rate, reserves
will shrink dramatically.
The statutory calculation of reserve liabilities is a crucial element of
regulatory compliance for insurers and carries with it economic and corporate
governance implications through the operation of the capital adequacy regime.
Specifically, fluctuations in reserves affect an insurer's net worth as measured
under the statutory accounting rules (known as the "total adjusted surplus")
and, by implication, the minimum amount of assets necessary to meet an
insurer's required capital levels under the capital adequacy regime. 10 2 If an
insurer's total adjusted capital falls low enough relative to its risk-based capital
(RBC), its regulator might be permitted, or even required, to suspend
operations or liquidate the insurer. 1 3 Accordingly, if an insurer experiences an
increase in reserves, its total adjusted capital will decrease by that same amount
and it will have to replenish its capital base to avoid regulatory intervention.
One way of doing so is to retain funds that otherwise would be invested in
profitable investment opportunities. Since the return on investment for new
business is higher than the return on assets held to support reserves, any
decrease in new business due to higher reserve requirements will result in lower
total firm returns. Moreover, an insurer might have to suspend distributions to
its holding company, thereby inhibiting profitable deployment of funds
elsewhere in the group.
D. A Brief History ofSAP Reserving Laws
The most long-standing government policy toward life insurance is reserve
101. As a simplified illustrative example, consider a 62-year-old life insurance policyholder that
applicable mortality tables predict will live 15 more years. Assuming (1) the policyholder is entitled to a

$200,000 death benefit, (2) the applicable interest rate is 5%, and (3) the policyholder owes no further
premiums on the policy, the insurer must establish a reserve in the amount of $87,259 (i.e., $200,000 x
(I / 1.0515). Reserves are calculated for groups of policies rather than for each policy separately, but the
concepts involved are easier to illustrate by reference to a single policy.
102. See ATHEARN, supra note 98, at 463. More specifically, the reserve calculations flow directly
through to the calculation of an insurer's "total adjusted capital," which is defined in the NAIC model
law to include statutory capital and surplus as determined in accordance with applicable SAP. 312-1
RIsK-BASED CAPITAL (RBC) FOR INSURERS MODEL ACT, § I (M) (Nat'l Ass'n Ins. Comm'rs 2009).

103. An insurer's total adjusted capital level is calculated by subtracting reserves and other
liabilities from total assets. The total adjusted capital is then compared to the RBC, which is a
hypothetical minimum level of capital at which an insurer should be able to retain its license as a matter
of right, all other conditions being satisfied. The steps along the regulator's ladder of intervention are
calibrated to minimum ratios of actual capital to RBC (e.g., a ratio of total adjusted capital to RBC of
150% places the insurer at "company action level," which triggers remedial and supplementary reporting
obligations on part of the insurer).
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regulation. 1' 4 Due to its inherent conservatism and its primary concern with
solvency, statutory accounting has never treated the reserve valuation exercise
as an effort to construct the best estimate of the economic value of claims
liabilities. Instead, the accounting rules have required computation of policy
and annuity reserves based on statutory and administrative formulae that have
remained largely unchanged since the mid-nineteenth century. The statutory
formulae dictate the applicable mortality tables, discount rates, and
assumptions to use when estimating future expenses and premiums.
in 1858.105
Massachusetts enacted the first statutory reserve calculation law
The newly appointed insurance commissioner Elizur Wright - a noted
abolitionist and reformer who had spent much of the 1840s and early 1850s
pursuing a newfound interest in insurance by compiling policy valuation tables
- set a 4 percent interest rate assumption and selected as the base mortality
table an English table published in 1843.106 Most states followed
Massachusetts' lead during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth
law. 10 7
century; by the 1940s, nearly all states had adopted a reserve valuation
In 1943, the NAIC entered the fray by adopting a model standard valuation
law (SVL) that prescribed the mortality tables and the methods by which future
premiums, expenses, and interest rates would be estimated in the calculation of
statutory reserves.108 Under the SVL, an insurer must hold a specified level of
reserves and annually file a certified valuation of its liabilities with insurance
regulators in states where it is licensed. 0 9 To date, all U.S. states have adopted
some form of the SVL.1 0 The SVL provides that an insurer must establish a
minimum reserve computed pursuant to a rigid statutory formula prescribing
which mortality tables and interests rates to apply, and which assumptions to
use when estimating future expenses and premiums. I1
The SVL has been amended only sporadically. Remarkably, a table
published in 1868 - which differed little from the English 1843 mortality table
that Wright utilized in compiling his valuation tables - served as the primary
table for calculating individual life insurance statutory reserves in the United
States until 1948, when the NAIC replaced it with another standard mortality
table published in 1941.112 Since 1948, the SVL has updated mortality tables
roughly every two decades.1 3 In the early years, the conservative nature of the
104. Brannon, supranote 57 at 212.
105. David B. Houston, Elizur Wright: The Man and His Work, 26 J. INS. 11, 21-22 (1959).

106. Id. at 22-24.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See Randall, supra note 3, at 632 n.35.
See STANDARD VALUATION LAW, supra note 98, Legislative History.
Larry Bruning, PBR: A Regulator's Perspective,24 J. INS. REG. 3, 3 (2006).
See STANDARD VALUATION LAW, supra note 98, State Adoption.

111.

Id. §§ 3.A(2) & 6.

112. See Edwin C. Hustead, The History of Actuarial Mortality Tables in the United States, 20 J.
INS. MED. 12, 13 (1988).
113. Id. at 14 (noting 1958 and 1980 updates).
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mortality tables arose as much by accident as by design. Since mortality rates
declined steadily during this period, any snapshot of mortality rates was bound
to overstate the rates on a prospective basis." 4 Industry actuaries learned that
115
mortality experience was different across broad categories of product lines,
and separate tables were created for industrial life insurance, group life
insurance, and individual and group annuities.' 16 The interest rates are re-set
annually for most annuities and policies pursuant to formulae set forth in the
118
SVL, 117 though interest rates remain fixed for large categories of business.
Similarly, the assumptions for policyholder lapse and surrender rates remained
static. Though mortality tables and applicable interest rates have changed
intermittently over the years, the basic formula for calculating the minimum
reserve for a book of business has remained the same.
As long as exposures remained relatively "vanilla," the rigid formulaic
approach worked well for its purpose, which was the establishment of a balance
sheet liability that did not understate an insurer's exposure and ensured timely
regulatory intervention if the insurer was approaching insolvency. Throughout
the 1970s and until the late 1980s, life insurer insolvencies were infrequent and
small in magnitude.1 9 That there was a safety margin that likely resulted in the
establishment of a reserve in excess of the actual economic market value of the
claims exposure was not a cause for concern; in fact, it was instrumental to the
achievement of statutory accounting's goal of conservatism.
III.

INCREASED MARKET COMPLEXITY AND VOLATILITY RESULTS IN

OBSOLESCENCE OF STATUTORY RESERVE ACCOUNTING RULES: IS RISK
MANAGEMENT THE SOLUTION?

Starting in the 1970s and continuing into the 21st century, the insurance
sector - like all sectors of the financial industry - has been subject to jarring
technological and competitive upheaval. First, when inflation and interest rates
rose dramatically in the 1970s and 1980s, traditional insurance policies lost
market share to new savings aggregators - such as money market mutual funds,
full-service brokerage accounts, and bank deposit accounts with deregulated
interest rates - that made life insurance policies and their relatively modest

114. See LOUIS J. LOMBARDI, VALUATION OF LIFE INSURANCE LIABILITIES 53 (4th ed. 2009);
Juliette M. Burden et al., XXX Implications, REINS. NEWS (Soc'y of Actuaries), Aug. 2004, at 1.

115. For instance, an average annuitant has a longer lifespan than an average life insurance
policyholder due to a phenomenon economists describe as adverse selection: those who expect to live
long naturally are more likely to purchase an annuity.
116. See Hustead, supranote 112, at 12 chart 1.
117. See STANDARD VALUATION LAW, supra note 108, § 4b.
118. Seeid.§§4&4a.
119. See U.S. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE SOLVENCY
REGULATION OF PROPERTY-CASUALTY AND LIFE INSURANCE COMPANIES 67-68 (1,992) [hereinafter
STATE SOLVENCY REPORT]; Wright, supranote 26, at 91.
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returns less attractive to consumers. As a result, insurers lost access to a reliable
low-cost premium funding base. Second, rate volatility ramped up the market
risk associated with the assets in insurers' investment portfolios, subjecting
them to new sources of risk and uncertainty in their asset portfolios. They
responded by altering their business model in fundamental respects. In
particular, life insurers (1) increasingly offered a product mix 120 that competed
with banks, securities firms, and mutual funds in markets for investmentoriented capital accumulation products and (2) invested premiums in higherrisk asset classes.
As a result, the internal logic of the longstanding system of reserve
accounting, which relied on rigid, static formulae that were increasingly
unconnected to new business realities, became unraveled, leaving regulators to
adopt ad hoc, piecemeal fixes to accommodate new dynamic market conditions
and risks. In the process, the overarching public goals of regulation seemed
only arbitrarily connected to the system of rules. This upheaval-innovation-12 1
regulatory crisis dialectic is by no means unique to the insurance industry,
but the life insurance industry provides a clear case study to observe the
connection between complex, dynamic markets and regulatory dysfunction.
Sub-Part A outlines in broad strokes the competitive and deregulatory
developments that destabilized the insurance industry starting in the 1970s. It
also recounts how the industry responded, with particular focus on the changing
product mix, and it further describes the resulting new risks and instability and
their effects on the internal logic of the traditional SAP reserving regime. SubPart B analyzes the risk management technologies - which emerged in the
1990s and were offered as a potential solution to market instability - along
technological, managerial, and legal dimensions. It presents the task of
embedding risk management into firm culture as a corporate governance
concern and considers it as a possible antidote to the regulatory dysfunction,
recalling that insurance solvency regulation is best conceived from a corporate
governance perspective. In the process, it draws on new governance theory to
identify two challenges. The first is a managerial challenge: how can managers
institutionalize a "reliability" perspective on risk management by focusing on
stability and long-term viability in corporate culture in spite of considerable
pressures to optimize only short-term measurable metrics? And the second is a
legal challenge: to the extent industry is unable to create an adequate selfregulatory system to institutionalize a reliability-focused risk management
infrastructure, what governance tools can public regulators use to construct a
120. The use of the term "product" to describe life insurers' offerings - as distinguished from
"policy" - is itself evidence of the revolution in business practices. See BERTRAM HARNETT & IRVING I.
LESNICK, THE LAW OF HEALTH & LIFE INSURANCE § 1.03[8] (2007).
121. See, e.g., Robert F. Weber, New Governance, Financial Regulation, and Challenges to
Legitimacy: The Example of the Internal Models Approach to CapitalAdequacy Regulation, 62 ADMIN.
L. REV. 101 (2010).
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legal regime that fosters risk management and appropriates it for public use?
A. Complexity and CompetitionResults in New ProductMix
1. IncreasedInter-Sectoral Competition, Interest Rate Volatility, and
DeregulatoryZeal
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the bulk of U.S. finance was supplied by
banks lending money and insurance companies buying bonds, though banks'
and insurers' market shares in their traditional assets classes began to wane at
the end of this period. 122 Starting in the 1970s, an increasing array of
institutional investors such as money market mutual funds began to acquire
23
market share and channel funds to corporations through new capital markets. 4
Insurers themselves began to market mutual funds to their policyholders.1
Mutual fund mania accelerated a phenomenon of greater retail investment in
the stock markets, as a sustained bull equity market in the 1950s continued
through most of the 1960s and convinced policyholders that they could obtain
better returns outside their whole life insurance policies. 125 As other financial
intermediaries cut into life insurers' share of the U.S. savings dollar, these
than insurers, and new capital markets
institutions invested funds differently
12 6
developed while old ones changed.
122. Banks and insurers together accounted for 80% of financial assets in the U.S. as of 1946 and
just under 60% as of 1970. See ROBERT E. LITAN, WHAT SHOULD BANKS Do? 46 fig. 2-8 (1987). By
1985, their combined share was less than half. Id. The drop in banks' share is attributable in large part to
their loss in market share in the short- and medium-term credit market to commercial paper and bon
markets. See id. at 45 fig. 2-7 (registering fall in banks' share of short- and intermediate-term
nonfinancial corporate credit from nearly 90% in mid-1950s to below 80% by 1970 and around 60% by
1980). As for insurers, their predominant presence in the corporate bond market waned as public
pension funds and thrift lenders acquired market share. Compare BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS.,
FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1955-1964 56 tbl. L.101 & 68 tbl. L. 117 (the ratio
of life insurers' bond holdings ($34.1 billion) to the amount of corporate bonds outstanding ($54.6
billion) in 1955 was 68%) with BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE

UNITED STATES, 1965-1974 56 tbl. L.101 & 68 tbl. L. 117 (by 1970, the ratio of life insurers' bond
holdings ($74.1 billion) to the amount of corporate bonds outstanding ($226.6 billion) had fallen to
44%).
123. The first year that money market mutual funds were registered in the Federal Reserve's flow
of funds data is 1974, when these funds accounted for under $3 billion in assets under management. BD.
GOVERNORS FED. RES. Sys., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1965-1974 70 tbl.
L.121 ($2.4 billion). By 1981, that figure had ballooned to over $185 billion. BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES.
Sys., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1975-1984 70 tbl. L.121 ($186.3 billion);
William M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future: Life without Glass-Steagall, 37 CATH. U. L.
REV. 281, 293 (1988).
124. See Wright, supra note 26, at 73, 79-80.
125. See infra notes 153 & 156 and accompanying text.
126. For instance, the explosive growth of money market mutual funds - which are funded on a
very short-term basis and therefore require a short-term asset base - gave birth to the commercial paper
market, which allowed corporate borrowers better access to short-term funding. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revisionist Role of the Courts in
Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 679 (1987) (discussing the advent of the
commercial paper market and its attractiveness to corporate borrowers).
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The most wrenching development for the life insurance industry, however,
was the dramatic increase in interest rate volatility ushered in by the Nixon
administration's decision to jettison the Bretton Woods system of managed
currency exchange rates. In the early 1970s, the United States, buckling under
burgeoning deficits due to Vietnam War expenditures and a surge in domestic
127
No longer would
fiscal commitments, abandoned managed exchange rates.
world trade and finance be conducted by reference to exchange rates firmly
tethered to a (largely) fixed amount of gold reserves. As a result, exchange
rates floated freely and central banks made frequent recourse to interest rate
balances. 128
policy to manage the resulting instability of capital flows and trade
Inflation, too, was stoked by the abolition of managed exchange rates, and the
1970s witnessed sustained double-digit inflation. 12 From 1979-1982, the U.S.
Federal Reserve tightened interest rates dramatically (the prime rate eventually
peaked at a record 21 percent) to stem persistent inflation. 130 Financial
risk profile to which they were
institutions were ill equipped to manage the new
31
subjected, and profit margins were squeezed.
Meanwhile, policymakers subjected firms to increased inter-sectoral
competition as they gradually relinquished public restraint over the financial
sector over the course of the quarter century following the collapse of Bretton
Woods. Starting in the 1970s, federal financial regulators embraced a
deregulatory philosophy, enabling regulated financial institutions to shift into
new riskier lines of business to recoup the profitability that new market
conditions undermined. 132 In the process, though, inter-sectoral competition
drove down margins further. 133
Congress and federal bank regulators dismantled brick-by-brick the Glass
Steagall wall that separated commercial banking from nonbanking financial
lines of business. 134 Moreover, federal bank regulators relaxed deposit reserve
127. See Duncan Wood, GOVERNING GLOBAL BANKING: THE BASEL COMMITTEE AND THE
POLITICS OF FINANCIAL GLOBALISATION 33-39 (2005). In 1971, the United States suspended the gold
convertibility of the U.S. dollar. See GEORGE A. WALKER, INTERNATIONAL BANKING REGULATION:
LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE 24 (2001). In 1973, the system of pegged exchange rates, which relied on the
dollar as a reference currency, collapsed altogether. See id. at 25.
128. See CHARLES W. SMITHSON, MANAGING FINANCIAL RISK: A GUIDE TO DERIVATIVE
PRODUCTS, FINANCIAL ENGINEERING, AND VALUE MAXIMIZATION (1998); HAROLD JAMES,
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION SINCE BRET7ON WOODS (1996).
129. See Alan S. Blinder, The Anatomy of Double-Digit Inflation in the 1970s, in INFLATION:
CAUSES AND EFFECTS 261 (1982).
130. See CARNELL ET AL., supranote 16, at 24.
13 1. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry,
1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation,and IncreasedRisks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 225-27, 408-16
(2002).
132. See id.
133. See id. at 227-41 (highlighting how banks lost (I) asset market share due to sccuritization
markets and (2) funding advantages due to the commercial paper market); id. at 412 (discussing
competitive effects on securities firms of commercial banks entry into underwriting market), id. at 18-21
(discussing increased presence of bank and securities firms in the annuity and life insurance markets).
134. Though the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 formerly abrogated the Glass-

Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance Solvency Regulation
requirements and Congress removed restrictions on interest rates earned on
deposits,1 35 permitting banks to compete aggressively for savings by offering
investment-oriented products like certificates of deposit.' 36 On the asset side of
their balance sheet, banks faced intense competition as their corporate

borrowers could look to raise money with increasing facility directly from
securities markets, which had become deeper in large part due to securities
firms' newfound zeal for underwriting fee income. 137 In the process, banks (1)

expanded into new business lines such as securitization, insurance sales, loan
syndication and, later, derivatives, Sand
138 (2) increasingly relied on fee-based
income rather than credit extension.
Bank regulators permitted - indeed,
enthusiastically encouraged - these developments to combat what they

perceived 39as a secular decline in profitability of the traditional business of
banking. 1
Furthermore, Congress and bank regulators freed up restrictions that had
previously limited the extension of credit to riskier borrowers. Congress, for
instance, exercised its preemptive authority in 1980 to exempt any FDICinsured bank from state interest rate caps on mortgages.' 40 Two years later,
Congress passed the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, which
authorized adjustable-rate mortgages, allowed the thrift industry to take on new
risks (which it did), and granted the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
the authority to remove restrictions on loan-to-value ratios, maturities, and
amortization schedules (which it, too, did). 14 1 For its part, the Federal Reserve
Steagall Act, regulators had by that point already greatly attenuated the force of Glass-Steagall. See, e.g.,
Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the "Business of Banking", 64
U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009) (chronicling how the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
authorized banks to deal and trade in many derivatives that had tangential connections to the business of
banking); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking Financial Conglomerates and
the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 972 (2009) ("During the 1980s and
1990s, federal regulators opened loopholes in the Glass-Steagall wall in response to growing
competitive pressures in the financial marketplace.").
135. Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., The Expansion of State Bank Powers, the Federal Response, and the
Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 1133, 1143-44 (1990).
136. See Wilmarth, supra note 131, at 240.
137. Franklin R. Edwards & Frederic S. Mishkin, The Decline of Traditional Banking: Implications
for Financial Stability and Regulatory Policy, I FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL'Y REV. 27, 31
(1995) ("Improvements in information technology, which have made it easier for households,
corporations, and financial institutions to evaluate the quality of securities, have made it easier for
business firms to borrow directly from the public by issuing securities.").
138. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FINANCIAL REGULATION: INDUSTRY CHANGES
PROMPT NEED TO RECONSIDER U.S. REGULATORY STRUCTURE, GAO-05-6 1, at 51 (Oct. 2004).

139. See Weber, supra note 121, at 811-20 (documenting Federal Reserve's commitment to foster
competitiveness through financial innovation and complexity backstopped by sound risk management);
Testimony before the U.S. Sen. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urb. Affairs, 103d Cong. 26 (1990)
(statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), available at
("Increased
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/historicaldocs/782/download/27814/Greenspan_19900712.pdf
activities are also required to sustain the profitability needed if banking firms are to attract capital.").
140. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96221, §§ 101-108, 94 Stat. 132, 132-41(1980).
141. Ronald Reagan, Remarks on Signing the Garin-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of
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dismantled the selective credit control regime that had imposed margin
requirements on housing and consumer loans, facilitating the free flow of credit
at high interest rates. 142 The net effect of these developments was increased
volatility of rates and asset prices, and increased competition among financial
institutions. The latter prevented insurers from offsetting the former through
higher prices, though it is probably more accurate to see the two phenomena as
concurrent3 effects of the deregulatory policies and globalized financial
t4
markets.
2. The ProductShift: From TraditionalWhole Life to Investment-Oriented
CapitalAccumulation Products & Annuities
Interest rate volatility can affect insurers on three levels. First, unexpected
swings in interest rates significantly complicate the chief task of an insurer:
asset-liability matching. Insurers match assets to long-term liabilities to ensure
they are able to pay claims as they come due. Prevailing interest rates have
effects on the value of assets 144 (bonds, mortgages, and even equities), and
these frequent rate movements complicate insurers' efforts to price their
products to ensure there will be adequate assets to satisfy future liabilities.
Second, interest rate volatility affects the cash value of the savings components
of life insurance and annuity products and, from the insurer's perspective,
thereby introduces new uncertainties with respect to consumer behavior - that
is, how policyholders and annuitants elect to use their lapse, surrender, or
policy loan options. 145 Recalling from Part II that one of the key determinants
of reserve amounts is an estimation of future premiums, these uncertainties
complicate assessments of their reserve requirements. The third problem results

1982 (Oct. 15, 1982) (referring to the Act as "the first step in our administration's comprehensive
program of financial deregulation").
142. See Timothy A. Canova, Financial Market Failure as a Crisis in the Rule of Law: From
Market Fundamentalismto a New Keynesian Regulatory Model, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 369, 376-77

(2008).
143. All the blame for financial instability cannot be placed on the shoulders of the deregulatory

policies (except to the extent that much of financial globalization - e.g., abandonment of capital controls
- is itself deregulatory) because lawmakers were concerned of the ever-present risk of flight or arbitrage
in global financial markets. It is an open question whether financial services firms would direct

operations away from the U.S. or engage in arbitrage strategies to controvert the purposes of regulation.
With global financial markets, this issue arises in connection with all financial regulation, and it

underscores the importance of international cooperation in this area. See, e.g., Colleen M. Baker,
Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287,

1319-21 (2010).
144. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 49, at 674-78; Burton G. Malkiel, Risk and Return: A
New Look, in THE CHANGING ROLES OF DEBT AND EQUITY FINANCING U.S. CAPITAL FORMATION 27,

37 (Benjamin M. Friedman, ed. 1986).
145. These "options," like all options, increase in value as volatility of the underlying reference

asset (in this context, the insurance contract) increases. Therefore, rate volatility increases the likelihood
that contract holders will exercise their contract options. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RISKBASED CAPITAL: REGULATORY AND INDUSTRY APPROACHES TO CAPITAL AND RISK, GAO/GGD-98153, at 87-88 (1998).
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from an inherent drawback of the traditional fixed-dollar insurance policy
during periods of interest rate swings. Interest rate volatility creates uncertainty
regarding the long-term purchasing power of traditional life insurance policies.
Insurance consumers want their insurance assets - that is, their claim to
retirement income under an annuity or a bequest under a life insurance policy to be sufficient to fund future consumption. If the yields on shorter-term assets
classes such as bank bills, certificates of deposit, and bonds are higher,
consumer savings will migrate away from traditional life insurance and toward
these asset classes. Due to the rampant interest rate volatility and inflation of
the 1970s and early 1980s, savers had to become investors or risk the erosion of
their wealth. And as investors, they came to prefer higher-yielding and interestsensitive assets over life insurance assets.
To counteract these problems, insurers developed new investment-oriented
life insurance products pegged to inflation or interest rates, or otherwise linked
to capital markets.146 Insurance products began to compete with, and resemble,
bank and securities products. 147
(a) Life Insurance Products
Investment-oriented life insurance products competed directly with mutual
funds, brokerage accounts, and bank certificates of deposit. Prior to the advent
of interest-oriented products, life insurers generally offered life insurance
coverage with or without a savings component. Their primary business lines
consisted of level-premium whole life insurance policies (with savings) and
term life policies (without savings).148 A whole life policy required a large upfront premium payment with continuing payments of unchanging periodic
premiums. 49 A policyholder, in addition to receiving a death benefit, would
accumulate cash value in the whole life policy and could typically borrow

146. See Low Risk Insurers-An Analyst Tells Why Life Stocks Are Cheap, BARRON'S, Jul. 13,
1987 ("The life insurance industry was very staid and conservative until the late 1970s. And in a high
interest rate and inflationary environment, it found itself unable to compete with new financial
instruments. As a result, the consumer savings dollar, which had been flowing to a fairly significant
extent to the life insurance industry, began to go elsewhere. At the same time, new upstarts, more
aggressive competitors, came into the business in the late 1970s. In fact, they revolutionized a very
traditional industry .... in terms of product.").
147. See Elizabeth F. Brown, The Fatal Flaw of Proposals to Federalize Insurance 8 (Univ. St.
Thomas Sch. L. Leg. Stud. Res. Paper No. 07-25), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract 1008993
("Both consumers and regulators find it increasingly difficult to discern meaningful differences among
insurance, banking and securities products."); Peter J. Wallison, Am. Enter. Inst., Convergence in
Financial Services Markets: Likely Effects on Insurance Regulation 17-22, available at
http://www.bipac.net/afc/peter wallison.pdf; Elizabeth Brown, E Pluribus Unum- Out of Many, One:
Why the United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMt BUS. L. REV. 1, 11
(2005) ("In the latter half of the twentieth century, market forces increasingly pushed banks to offer
more securities and insurance products and pushed securities and insurance firms to devise new products
that were in direct competition with banking products.").
148. See Brannon, supranote 57, at 200.
149. See Wright, supranote 26, at 74.
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money through so-called "policy loans" against the policy's accumulated cash
value. 150 As long as interest rates were predictable, an insurer could fund the
death benefit reserve and invest the premiums at a profit, typically by
purchasing long maturity bonds and commercial mortgages - and there was
little risk of policyholders exercising their policy loan options or causing their
policies to lapse in unpredictable ways.' 5 1 During the 1950s, the industry
enjoyed a period of profitability as predictable interest rates allowed insurers to
earn investment income, and favorable mortality experience enhanced
152
underwriting income.
The profitable 1950s, during which stock markets entered a long and
sustained period of high returns, witnessed a shift in consumer preferences, as
term life insurance assumed a greater share of total premiums. 53 Term life
insurance offers lower premium payments and no cash value or policy loan
component; in effect, it dissociates the savings component of life insurance
from the bequest component. The oft-echoed mantra of investment advisers
during this period was "buy term and invest the rest."' 154 Usually, the "rest" was
invested in one or more of the proliferating mutual funds. Term life insurance
increased steadily as a proportion of total ordinary life insurance from 16.2
percent in 1954 to 48.4 percent in 1989.155 Not surprisingly, life insurance
reserves as a percentage of household financial assets decreased over this time
period, reflecting that, after purchasing term life insurance, policyholders were
indeed "investing the rest" elsewhere. 156 Even with the increased popularity of
term life, life insurance product offerings were relatively straightforward: a
prospective life insurance consumer could either invest her savings into a
whole life policy and receive a death benefit, or invest her savings elsewhere
and pay yearly term life premiums and receive a death benefit alone. The
advent of investment-oriented products changed this.
There are two broad categories of investment-oriented products: variable
life insurance and universal life insurance. Both policy variants are comparable
to traditional whole life products in that they accumulate a cash value in the
contract's early years, when the premiums typically exceed the cost of
insurance. 57 Universal life insurance, developed in the early 1980s, is a
flexible arrangement permitting the policyholder to vary premium payments

150. See id. at 80-81.
151. See Terence Lcnnon, Discussion, in REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, supra note 26,

at 97.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See Wright, supra note 26, at 77.
See id.at 79.
Lennon, supra note 151, at 98.
AM.COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 27 (1990).
See Brannon, supra note 57, at 203.
See 1-9 NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW § 9.02[2][c], supra note 83, Types of Life Insurance.

Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance Solvency Regulation
and death benefits on a periodic basis.' 58 The cash value is unbundled from the
death benefit, and each period expense and mortality charges are deducted, and
premiums credited, to the cash value account. 59 Interest is credited on the net
amount to yield the period-ending cash value. 16 Insurers may vary both the
mortality charge and interest crediting rate over time.16 1 The interest rate
flexibility permits universal life products to compete by offering interest rates
162
that keep pace with rises in prevailing interest rates and inflation.
Economically, the universal life policy can be thought of as a renewable term
163
life insurance policy with a sort of money market account for its cash value.
Variable life insurance products, developed in the late 1970s, provide for
death benefits and cash values that vary according to the experience of a
portfolio of investments. 64 The policyholder may allocate her premiums
among different investments as well as insurance accounts providing for
guaranteed principal and interest. 65 Though the cash value component and
death benefits may vary with a variable life policy, the insurer typically
provides minimum guaranteed death benefits.1 66 Because the policyholder
bears a sizable investment risk, variable life products are considered securities
67
for purposes of the U.S. securities laws and must be registered with the SEC.
A hybrid category - the variable universal life policy - combines universal
and death benefit amounts with variable
life's flexibility to choose premium
68
life's investment discretion. 1
The new products quickly came to dominate the market, and by the late
1990s traditional whole life insurance had become a marginal component of
life insurance sales.169 The amounts of variable life and universal life insurance
in force in the U.S. increased steadily from their introduction until the late
1990s. U.S. life insurers had $47 million of variable life insurance in force in
158. Id. § 9.02[2][c][ii].
159. See Lennon, supra note 151, at 97-98.
160. 1-9 NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW § 9.02[21[c][ii], supranote 83, Types of Life Insurance.
161. Id.
162. 1-9 NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW § 9.02[2][c], supra note 72, Types of Life Insurance.
163. HARNETT & LESNICK, supra note 120, § 1.03[8].
164. See AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 174 (2003).
165. 1-9 NEW YORK INSURANCE LAW § 9.02[2][c][iii][I ], supranote 83, Types of Life Insurance.
166. Id.

167. See Revised Procedures for Processing Post-Effective Amendments Filed by Separate
Accounts of Insurance Companies, Securities Act Release No. 33-6376 (Jan. 11, 1982).
168. Id. § 9.02[2][c][iii][2], supra note 72, Types of Life Insurance.
169. See AM. COUNCIL LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 6 tbl.l.2 (2000) [hereinafter
2000 ACLI Fact Book] (documenting that traditional whole life comprised 12.8% of life insurance
purchases, by face amount, in 1999); AM. COUNCIL LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 12

(1988) (documenting that amount of traditional whole life insurance as a percentage of total face amount
decreased from 33% to 18% from 1977 to 1987, which not coincidentally spanned the period of
dramatic interest rate volatility); see also Brannon, supra note 57 at 208 ("The experience with sharply
fluctuating interest rates in the past 30 years has led to the virtual disappearance of the old, [traditional
whole life] policy under which the insurance carrier was insuring a minimum rate of return as well as
against mortality.").
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1976.'70 By 1981, after the federal funds rate peaked at 20 percent, the amount
in force stood just under $4 billion.'17 Variable life in force continued to grow
largely without interruption until 1997, at which point the figure exceeded $105
billion.' Universal life amounts in force and growth rates dwarfed even the
impressive variable life figures. By 1981 - the first year for which data are
available - life insurers had written just under $5 billion in universal life
coverage. 73 By 1985, that number had increased to $564 billion. 74 Total
amounts in force peaked around $2.171 trillion in 1995, a level at which they
75
roughly remained for the remainder of the decade. 1
In New York, where policy forms are submitted to the insurance
department for approval, 176 insurance regulators approved the sale of these new
insurance products with little commotion. In 1980, the department issued
Circular Letter No. 18, which approved for sale life insurance policies for
which "indeterminate" premiums would be determined on an ongoing basis,
based on current projected assumptions for investment earnings, mortality,
lapse rates, and expenses. 177 "Traditionally," the letter provided, "life insurance
policies have had fixed guaranteed premiums established by the policy at
issuance."'1 78 The letter also required reserves to be computed on the basis of
the initial premium scale. 79 Three years letter, in Circular Letter No. 4, the
department authorized the sale of universal life insurance.' 80 The letter itself
evidences the nascent tension in integrating the new universal life insurance
product into the extant reserve regulatory regime. For example, the letter notes
that "[a]t this time, some of the reserving procedures [for these products] are
indefinite and rules may be adopted as experience develops."' l 8 In the event
that the insurer fails to earn investment income sufficient to cover the credited
indexed interest rates, "additional reserves may be required."' 182 Moreover, if
the indexed interest rates would exceed the statutory valuation interest rates
provided for in the SVL, "additional reserves may be necessary. ' In 1986,
the NAIC issued a model regulation on universal life insurance, but states have
only patchily adopted the model, and in any event it does not address reserving

170. 2000 ACLI Fact Book, supra note 169, at 25 tbl. 1.16.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. N.Y. Ins.
L. § 3201 (2008).
177.

N.Y.S. DEP'T INS., CIRCULAR LETrER No. 18 (1980).

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id.
Id.
N.Y.S. DEP'T INS., CIRCULAR LETTER No. 4 (1983).
Id. § (C)(k)(l).
Id. § (C)(k)(2).
Id.

Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance Solvency Regulation
84

at all.'
As these dynamic products entered the market, regulators perceived that the
assumptions undergirding the SVL and the traditional statutory reserving
regime were at best an imperfect fit with the realities of the market.
Nevertheless, regulators permitted insurers to completely transform their
product mix with little regulatory oversight until they discovered that the
in
dynamic risk profile of the new products was causing insurers to invest
185
riskier assets to maintain the promised returns and continue profitability.
(b) Annuity Products
In addition to their bequest-oriented life insurance products - that is, whole
life and term life insurance policies - life insurers also write substantial
amounts of health and annuity business. Since the 1920s the proportion of life
insurer reserves and income associated with life insurance - in distinction to
other related business lines such as health and annuities - has steadily
decreased. 186 In 1920, 99.4 percent of life insurers' income came from life
insurance; by 1985, that figure had fallen to 38.6 percent. 187 From 1945 to
1999, annuity considerations grew at an annualized growth rate of 11.5 percent,
compared to 6.5 percent for life insurance premiums.1 88 The decreased
prevalence of life insurance resulted in large part from the dramatic boom in
sales of pension annuities - and, later, guaranteed investment contracts
(GICs) 189 - after the Seventh Circuit held in 1948 that pension plans were
subject to compulsory collective bargaining in labor contracting. 190 Annuities
are attractive retirement planning vehicles because they protect against the
possibility of outliving financial resources, including one's own human capital.
They also enjoy tax advantages. 191 Annuities compete directly with long-term
bank certificates of deposit; the former offer tax benefits, and the latter offer
deposit insurance. 192 Variable annuities, which provide for payment amounts
that vary according to the investment experience of a separate account, were
developed as the first variable-payout life insurance product, and became

184. NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS, 575-1 UNIVERSAL LIFE INSURANCE MODEL REGULATION
(2010).
185. See infra Part IIIA(3).
186. See KENNETH J. MEIER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGULATION: THE CASE OF INSURANCE

3, tbl.1-2 (1988).
187. Id.

188. Wright, supra note 26, at 80. As a result of annuity growth nearly doubling life insurance
growth, annuity exposures came to predominate life insurers' reserves. Id. (noting that annuity reserves
increased from 25% of life insurance reserves to 220% from 1955 to 1989).
189. See supranote 41.
190.
336 U.S.
191.
192.

See Inland Steel Co. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
960 (1949).
Brannon, supra note 57, at 211.
See Wallison, supra note 147, at 18.
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increasingly popular in the late 1980s and 1990s.193 Fueled in part by tax
advantaged retirement planning, consumers increasingly opted94 for capital
markets-linked income protection over the provision of bequests.,

3. New Productsand New Investments Bring New Risks and Instability
In order to match the promised rates of return or guaranteed payouts on the

newer, investment-oriented product lines, life insurers changed their investment
strategies to embrace riskier assets.' 95 Insurers invested in riskier commercial
mortgages, shorter-term assets, and riskier debt instruments.' 9 6 Debt maturities

decreased, as insurers were chary of tying up their general account with longterm bonds.' 97 The quality of commercial mortgages - which constituted, after
corporate bonds, the second-largest component of insurers' investment

portfolios during the postwar period until the early 1990s - decreased
substantially throughout the 1980s and early 1990s as insurers and other

mortgage lenders suffered from the savings and loan crisis and the 1990
recession. 98 Most notably, life insurers invested more heavily in riskier, highyield corporate bonds (i.e., "junk bonds"). 199 As the assets supporting insurance
liabilities declined in quality, insurance regulators were slow to react to the
problem. In 1987, the New York State Insurance Department became the first
regulator to institute a cap - at 20 percent of total assets - on high-yield

bonds.200 By that point, it was already too late for many insurers.

193. Id. at 32-33 (2000); AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 38 (1994);
AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 40 (1988); AM. COUNCIL OF LIFE
INSURERS, LIFE INSURERS FACT BOOK 36 (1983).
194. Cf Anthony M. Santomero, Life Insurance: The State of the Industry, in CHANGES IN THE
LIFE INSURANCE INDUSTRY: EFFICIENCY, TECHNOLOGY AND RISK MANAGEMENT 1, 2 (J. David

Cummings & Anthony M. Santomero, eds., 1999) (writing in 1999 that "(t]he single largest share of life
insurance premiums is attributable to annuity sales to a generation that is, at least currently, more
concerned about protecting income than bequests").
195. See Wilmarth, supra note 131, at 417 ("Analysts have attributed the sudden rise in failures
among life insurers during 1989-91 to declining profit margins and the decision by many insurers to
assume greater risks on both sides of their balance sheet."); STATE SOLVENCY REPORT, supra note, at
62.
196. See Wright, supra note 26, at 83-86.
197. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 170 (noting that
percentage of life insurer assets held in instruments with maturities less than or equal to 10 years
increased from 15% to 62% from 1980 to 1991).
198.

AM. COUNCIL LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK

101 (1994)

(documenting

mortgage loan delinquency rates of 1.02%, 2.27%, 3.62%, 5.71%, and 6.37% in 1980, 1985, 1990, 1991,
and 1992).
199. See GLENN YAGO & SUSANNE TRIMBATH, BEYOND JUNK BONDS: EXPANDING HIGH YIELD
MARKETS 36 (2003) (documenting that 15% of life insurer asset purchases in the first six months of
1990 were in below investment grade debt); Wright, supra note 26, at 89-90; The Failures of Four
Large Life Insurers: Hearing before the U.S.S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 2
(1992) (statement of Richard L. Fogel, Ass't Comptroller Gen., Gen. Gov't Programs), available at

http://www.legistorm.com/showFilc/L2xzX3Njb3JIL2dhby9wZGYvMTk5Mi8y/ful2I262.pdf
[hereinafter Fogel Testimony].
200. See II N.Y.C.R.R. § 176.4 (2010) (codifying Insurance Department's Regulation 130).
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In the late 1980s and 1990s, the life insurance industry was roiled by its
first ever widespread incidence of insolvencies. From 1975 to 1983, the number
of life and health insurer insolvencies averaged about five per year.2° ' From
1983 to 1992, the average number increased to 18 per year, with a high of 47 in
1989. 202 In 1990, more than a quarter of all life insurers displayed
financial
20 3
problems that historically required prompt regulatory attention.
Prominent, large insurers were not immune from the wave of insolvencies.
In April 1991, insurance regulators seized control of Executive Life Insurance
Company (ELIC) and Executive Life Insurance Company of New York
(ELICNY), each of which had become insolvent on account of spectacularly
improvident investment strategies resulting in each firm holding over 60
percent of total assets in junk bonds. 2 04 In July 1991, New Jersey insurance
regulators placed Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company in rehabilitation
proceedings in the largest-ever life insurer insolvency proceeding, as it dipped
below required capitalization levels due to concentrations in risky real estate
loans. 205 The life insurance industry losses, in the aggregate, were dwarfed by
the collapse of the thrift industry during the same period,20 6 but the frequency
and magnitude of life insurer insolvencies were unmistakable signs of infirmity
in this formerly solid industry. New products and new investments had created
a new challenge for the industry and its regulators.
The old statutory reserving rules had been drafted when traditional whole
life insurance represented the overwhelming majority of business. As late as
1970, the majority of life insurance in force consisted of these traditional whole
life products. 2 07 In light of the new product mix, insurance regulators
increasingly perceived the statutory reserve accounting rules as obsolete. As
former Iowa insurance commissioner and current NAIC CEO Terri Vaughn put
201. See Fogel Testimony, supranote 199, at 2.
202. Id.
203. See Warren R. Wise, Discussion, in REGULATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES, supra note 26,
at 231,233-34.
204. See id. at 5 (documenting ELIC and ELICNY held, respectively, 63% and 64% of total assets
in junk bonds); Lennon, supra note 159 at 100 (stating that according to the New York Insurance
Department ELICNY had in fact increased its concentration of junk bonds in 1987 to 70-75% of total
assets). The discrepancy in the figures is likely due to differing definitions of "junk bonds."
205. See Frederick Rose, Executive Life's Bailout Nears the End as Court Approves Transfer of
Policies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1993, at A4 (noting that Mutual Benefit's insolvency was the largest
ever in the industry, and that Mutual Benefit had 700,000 policyholders and $8.8 billion in assets
supporting $11 billion in liabilities); Susan Pulliman, Plan Expected by New Jersey Officials To
Rehabilitate Mutual Benefit Life, WALL ST. J., May 11, 1992, at A5E (reporting that Mutual Benefit
Life's "assets are to a large degree tied up in illiquid real estate investments" and that its real estate
portfolio suffered losses of $1.3 billion in 1991).
206. See Elijah Brewer III et al., Why the Life Insurance Industry Did Not Face an "'S&L-Type"
Crisis, 1993 ECON. PERSPECTIVES FED. RES. BANK CHI. 12, 13 (1993), available at
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital assets/publications/economicpcrspectives/1993/ep sep oct 1993pa
rt2_brewer.pdf.
207. See AM. COUNCIL LIFE INSURERS, LIFE INS. FACT BOOK 30 (1972) (documenting 60.4% of
insurance in force consisted of traditional whole life policies).
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it:
The old rules failed to properly account for the risks in the new products, and the
traditional rules-based approach to calculating reserves had to be modified for each
new product. After attempting to modify the rules with each product evolution, the
regulators concluded a more comprehensive change was needed.20 8

B. Searchfor Stability in Risk Management & the New FinancialCode
Regulators were not alone in struggling to adapt to this new risk profile. By
the 1990s, large financial institutions had revamped their information
technology systems, which had become unrecognizable from the formerly
crude data systems. Regulators began to look to these new systems as a
potential solution to solving the perennial obsolescence of their understanding.
The principles-based reserving (PBR) reform can be considered an attempt to
tether the insurance solvency regime to insurers' risk management systems.
Advances in information technology enabled statisticians and financial
209
across aggregates of
economists to apply modem financial theory
associated with any
the
risk
transactions or events to quantify mathematically
210
A new discourse of "risk management"
particular position or strategy.
developed along technological, managerial, and legal dimensions, premised on
the newfound confidence of risk managers to collect, organize, and analyze
data in a systematized manner using this "new financial code." 2 11 Professor
Ken Bamberger aptly invokes Heidegger's usage of Gestell to connote the
the
extent to which these risk measurement systems enframed and altered
2 12
perceptions of stakeholders in the financial industry, including regulators.
This new theoretical framework provided the launching pad for the rapid
proliferation of new financial products, including derivatives and, in the case of
life insurers, investment-oriented life insurance products. 213 While many of
208. Therese M. Vaughn, The Implications of Solvency H for U.S. Insurance Regulation, Networks
15 (2009),
available at
Fin. Inst., Ind. S. Univ., Policy Brief 2009-PB-03, at 8,

http://www.naic.org/Releascs/2009_docs/090305_vaughan-Prescntation.pdf

(discussing

greater

expected incidence of"Type I errors," where a firm destined to fail will be treated as healthy, and Type

II errors," where firms are incorrectly identified as troubled).
209. For a discussion of the major theoretical building blocks of risk management, see Steven A.
Ramirez & Betty Simkins, Enterprise Risk Management and CorporateGovernance, 39 LOY. U. CHI.
L.J. 571, 579 (2008) and Weber, supra note 12 1, at 807-11.
210. See DONALD R. VAN DEVENTER ET AL., ADVANCED FINANCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT 6-11

(2005).
211. Gerding, supra note 7.
212. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a DigitalAge,
88 TEXAS L. REV. 669, 676 (2010).
213. See Robert C. Merton, Future Possibilities in Finance Theory and Finance Practice 8-17,

at
available
01-030,
2000),
Paper
No.
Sch.,
Working
(Harv.
Bus.
http://www.signallake.com/innovation/FuturePossibilities.01.030.pdf (predicting that advances in
finance theory will lead to innovations in household financial products such as insurance and annuities);
Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational Failure and the Promise of
Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1503 (1993) [hereinafter Hu, Misunderstood

Derivatives] ("The process of financial innovation that emerged in the late 1980s, like other forms of
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these products were first introduced well before the most advanced risk
management tools, they both can be causally attributed to the same network of
factors, including most prominently increased rate volatility and competition.
Furthermore, the products themselves only further stimulated demand for new
computer technologies that would allow the institutions to better understand
their new risk exposures.
Because risk management grew out of the same complexity that resulted in
the rampant product innovation and novel risk profiles in the financial industry,
regulators and industry actors believed that it offered the possibility of
quantifying, measuring, and implementing responses to uncertain and volatile
market conditions. In 2007, the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors published guidance on capital requirements and risk management
that emphasized insurers' duty to manage risk and regulators' responsibility to
ensure that insurers were fulfilling that duty. 214 NAIC CEO Terri Vaughn
summarized the regulators' hope as follows:
Companies are responding to the new world of increased complexity by enhancing
their risk management systems and doing a better job of assessing risk. They are
developing models aimed at better measuring their capital requirements in light of
their unique risk profiles. The supervisory
2 5 system would benefit from leveraging the
work that companies are already doing.

By embedding sound risk management practices solidly into their corporate
governance infrastructure, firms could ostensibly take calculated and managed
risks in light of their objectives without threatening systemic spillovers and
other negative externalities. Federal Reserve Governor Dan Tarullo has noted
that "risks associated with the complexity and pace of large bank activities
cannot be effectively contained even with sophisticated rules" and that
therefore "the emphasis increasingly has been on fostering robust risk
management systems within the banks themselves." 2 16 While the supervisory
task in the insurance industry differs in important respects from that of the
banking industry, the problem Tarullo introduces - that is, innovation and
complexity outpacing regulatory fiat - applies equally in the insurance context.
While these potential benefits of risk management can hardly be overstated, it
is, as described below, a fool's errand to expect the financial industry as
currently structured to adopt such practices. Instead, if policymakers are to reap
these potential benefits, they need to focus on "meta risk management," or the
modem technological innovation, has resulted in a constant, rapid flow of sophisticated products.");
Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Financial Innovation Process and the Vulnerability of the
Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 337-40 (1989) (comparing financial innovation during the
1980s to computer and bio-tcchnological advances and attributing it to "the increasingly conceptual

nature of the innovation process," including the use of computers and finance theory).
214. INT'L Ass'N INS. SUPERVISORS, THE IAIS COMMON STRUCTURE FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF

14
(Feb.
INSURER
SOLVENCY,
at
=
http://www.iaisweb.org/view/element href.cfm?src 1/85.pdf
215. Vaughn, supra note 208, at 13.
216. TARULLO, supra note 35, at 274.

2007),

available

at
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risk management of risk management. 2 17 Meta risk management resonates with
a broader "new governance" literature that highlights increasing involvement of
non-state actors in the governance tools that shape and constitute public policy
and regulation.
This Sub-Part will (1) explore the information technology dimension of risk
management by describing the new financial code underlying the financial
services industry generally, with specific focus on the life insurance sector; (2)
describe the managerial dimension of risk management with reference to firmlevel attempts to embed risk management into corporate culture, and present a
theoretical argument that effective implementation of conservative risk
management systems depends on firms adopting a long-term reliability
perspective that de-emphasizes short-term optimization metrics such as stock
prices, earnings, and cost minimization; and (3) explain the importance of the
legal dimension of risk management, and why a precondition for effective risk
management in the financial services industry is the installation of an effective
system of meta-risk management.
1. The Technological Dimension: New FinancialCode and Risk
Quantification
Technologically, the perceived capacity to measure financial risks
probabilistically was nothing short of revolutionary. It permitted financial
institutions to develop, alongside their consultants and service-providers,
complex financial modeling technologies that capture, organize, and analyze
massive amounts of information regarding the risks and performance of
218
business units and transactions.
In particular, these institutions used
computer technologies to analyze past experience in order to generate
assumptions about future cash flows, which in turn fostered a perception that
risk managers had achieved real enhancements in their ability to quantify and
manage future risks, including those pertaining to reserve requirements and
capital needs. These informational technologies form part of the broader new
financial code that undergirds the business of financial intermediation and
constitutes a significant repository of wealth and competitive advantage in
today's economy. 219 Institutions invested heavily in new financial code not
only to manage their burgeoning risk profiles, but also to gain a competitive
edge in a market where poor risk management could reduce returns or even
217. Braithwaite, supra note 14, at I.
218. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 145, at 73-91.

219. Cf. Ramirez & Simkins, supra note 209 at 583 (observing that enterprise risk management,
which relies on the use of financial code, "is now developing into a tool that can be used to enhance firm
value"); Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. I, 3, 13-14 (2004) (discussing conflict between
democratization of digital conflict and the "increasing importance of digital content as a source of
wealth and economic power").
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threaten insolvency.
Once the new financial code allowed business and risk managers to identify
and quantify future risks, business processes could be automated by
implementing firm-wide or unit-wide rules based on the systematized results of
the risk assessment. 22 1 Business processes that were automated according to
designed rules could then be tracked ex post in an audit capacity so that senior
management could obtain a comprehensive view of risk management. 222 This
dynamic system of identification-quantification-automation-audit constitutes
the conceptual architecture of risk management technology applied to business
on an ongoing basis. As the marginal cost of data processing dropped, data
production and data analysis achieved higher degrees of sophistication. 223 The
post-Bretton Woods financial complexity paradigm had met its match. Or so it
appeared.
These new technologies originated to support the trading desks of Wall
Street firms but were quickly applied to other financial business lines, including
the life insurance business. Actuarial firms such as Towers Perrin and
Milliman, as well as pure software companies, supplied financial modeling
software programs that captured, systematized, and organized massive amounts
of information regarding the experience of, and the impact of future trends on,
insurers' new risk profiles. 4 With a more textured understanding of risks,
insurers could implement hedging, product pricing, and capital programs that
were more neatly tailored to the risks they faced.225 Much of the work in
implementing a new model consists of data mining from past experience to
build a better understanding of the parameters that impact the economic outputs
the model tests. For instance, a model estimating economic - as opposed to
statutory - reserve requirements will require assumptions regarding
policyholder behavior (e.g., lapse and surrender rates) and the expense amounts
deployed to write the business. Some software models even gauge firm-specific
and
mortality experience, so that an insurer might discover distinctive
226
significant patterns in the expected lifespans of its policyholder base.
The new financial code embedded in the insurance industry's financial
220. See James Fanto, Anticipating the Unthinkable: The Adequacy of Risk Management in
Finance and Environmental Studies, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 731, 739 ("[R]isk management could

give a firm a competitive advantage over similarly situated institutions and could become a profit center
for the firm.").
221. See Bambcrger, supra note 212, at 688-93.
222. See id.
223. Lower information costs also fueled the increased competition across financial sectors, as
competing firms could more confidently cross-sell products formerly the exclusive preserve of other
sectors with local trade knowledge. The capital intensiveness of building a financial code architecture
also created economies of scale in the financial services industry.
224. See Anthony O'Donnell, Actuaries Adopt New Risk-Modeling Technologies, INS. & TECH.,
Aug. 1, 2007, available at http://www.insurancetech.com/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=201200822.
225. See id.
226. See id.
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models was not focused exclusively on past experience. In the words of
industry consultant Ed Robbins, insurers must "have a good sense not only of
[their] experience assumptions, but also where they're headed and how they
link to each other." 227 With a set of assumptions regarding past and future
experience, insurers - in cooperation with their software developers and
consultants - developed stochastic modeling tests, which generate multiple
complex and random scenarios, to gauge how the firm would respond to
various contingencies. 22 As risk factors became more complex and reflexive,
the traditional role of the actuary as an insurance industry mathematician
calculating premiums and reserves based on standardized data gave way to an
actuarial function that required highly technical information technology
229
expertise.
2. The ManagerialDimension: Replacing Short-Term Optimization with a
Reliability Perspective
As risk management technology proliferated, a new field of enterprise risk
management (ERM) grew up alongside it. For complex organizations like life
insurers, a sophisticated risk quantification program is only as good as it can be
successfully implemented or embedded into the organization's communication
and authority networks. ERM seeks to embed the new financial code into
defined channels of corporate authority in a manner that permits the firm itself a highly disaggregated set of individuals, commitments, and contracts - to
identify, quantify, and manage the firm in light of risks uncovered by coded
information technology systems. 23 0 This task differs from the age-old
responsibilities of hedgers - who have been around for as long as economic
actors have navigated risk 2 3 1 - in that the objective is active management of
227. Id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See Michelle M. Hamer, Barriers to Effective Risk Management, at 4, 40 SETON HALL L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010); Ramirez & Simkins, supra note 209, at 581 (highlighting the integrated, ongoing,

and broadly focused aspects of enterprise risk management);

COMMITTEE OF SPONSORING

ORGANIZATIONS OF THE TREADWAY COMMISSION, ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT - INTEGRATED
FRAMEWORK
2
(2004),
available
at

http://www.coso.org/documents/COSOERMExecutiveSummary.pdf
(defining
enterprise
risk
management "a process, effected by an entity's board of directors, management and other personnel,
applied in strategy setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect
the entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
achievement of entity objectives") [hereinafter COSO ERM FRAMEWORK]; CASUALTY ACTUARIAL
SOCIETY,

ENTERPRISE

RISK

MANAGEMENT

COMMITTEE,

OVERVIEW

OF

ENTERPRISE

RISK

MANAGEMENT 8 (2003), available at http://www.casact.org/research/erm/overview.pdf (defining
enterprise risk management as "the the discipline by which an organization in any industry assesses,
controls, exploits, finances, and monitors risks from all sources for the purpose of increasing the
organization's short and long term value to its stakeholders").
231. For a few indicative examples, see PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE
REMARKABLE HISTORY OF RISK 92, 306-07 (1998) (citing provisions of the 1800 B.C. Code of
Hammurabi contemplating insurance-like instruments similar to modem-day catastrophe bonds and the
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risk exposures in light of firm objectives, and not risk avoidance.
A highly influential ERM framework memorandum identified eight
"components" of ERM that amount to a user's manual on how to embed ERM
in an organization: (1) the firm's internal environment must set the tone for
how risk is viewed and addressed; (2) management must identify objectives in
order to properly identify risks that compromise the firm's objectives; (3)
events affecting the achievement of firm goals (both risks and opportunities)
must be identified and communicated to management for purposes of reevaluating firm strategy and objectives; (4) risk must be assessed according to
probability and impact; (5) management must select responses to identified
risks; (6) controls must be established to track firm progress; (7) relevant
information must be identified, captured, and communicated in a form and
timeframe that enables responsible parties to perform, with information flowing
"down, across, and up" the firm; and (8) the entire ERM apparatus must be
subject to monitoring and modifications as necessary. 233 Once embedded, these
ERM components constitute the channels through which risk-related
information flows through the organization. Provided that corporate
constituencies buy into ERM and the danger of cosmetic compliance is
avoided, ERM offers promise to institutionalize risk awareness by empowering
about risk management
corporate stakeholders to become "strategic thinkers
' 234
systems" rather than "rule-following automatons."
ERM's focus on process and constant learning draws parallels with what
Bill Simon, drawing on Japanese methods of industrial production, has referred
to as the "managerialist," or "reliability," theory of production. 235 Globalization
and information technology visited change on industrial production methods as
well as financial services, and the reliability approach to production responded
to the challenge of managing in conditions of volatility.236 Key elements of this
reliability perspective include an emphasis on and formalization of continuous
learning and innovation norms, interdisciplinary collaboration, a preference for
intangible group goals over tangible individual goals, multi-factor judgment,
and openness to destabilization of norms through benchmarking, root cause
use ofproto-futures contracts in Medieval Europe and 17th century Japan).
232. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L.
967, 967 (2009) (stating that ERM "encompasses determining an appetite for risk consistent with the
interests of the firm's equity owners and identifying, preparing for, and responding to risks"); ASWATH
DAMODARAN, STRATEGIC RISK TAKING: A FRAMEWORK FOR RISK MANAGEMENT 8 (2008) (reminding

that "exposures to some risk is an integral part of success").
233. COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 230, at 3-4.
234. Braithwaite, supra note 14 at 2; see also RISK & INS. MGMT. SOC'Y, INC., THE 2008
FINANCIAL CRISIS: A WAKE-UP CALL FOR ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 9 (Bill Coffin ed., 2009),

available at www.RIMS.org/ERMwhitepaper ("Enterprise risk management - to be effective - must
fundamentally change the way organizations think about risk.").
235. See Simon, supranote 11, at 3-11.
236. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 286 (1998).
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analysis, and controlled stress. 2 37 The reliability perspective seeks to develop a
systematized response to markets that, because of their volatility and
dynamism, are no longer susceptible to traditional top-down managerial
control. It aims further to replace management's focus on short-term
optimization of measurable metrics such as share price and cost minimization
with a focus on quality, reliability, resilience, crisis avoidance, and excellence
as primary goals. By shifting the focus in this manner, finns can avoid
preoccupation with static norms and more effectively manage dynamic change
and the business risks it presents.23 8
Nowhere is the utility of the reliability approach as evident as with
organizations with low (or zero) tolerances for failure. Functions for which
constituents have a low tolerance for failure - such as air traffic control, nuclear
aircraft carrier operation, emergency medical treatment, wildfire-fighting, and
hostage negotiation - require what Kathleen Sutcliffe and Karl Weick have
termed a "mindful infrastructure." Such an organizational orientation
emphasizes decentralized decision-making, is preoccupied with the possibilities
and causes of failure, and resists simplification to a greater extent than most
organizations do. 2 39 On this last point, reliability-focused organizations seek
out weak signals and complex interactions between signals that evade firstorder inspections and audits but might nevertheless contain valuable
240
In this manner they problematize the soinformation about growing risks.
called threshold heuristic, which describes the tendency of human actors to
discount entirely the probability of low-likelihood, but potentially high-impact,
events. 241 These organizations embed "near-miss reporting and analysis" in
their organizational culture on the grounds that near misses provide insight into
the background conditions that generate threats to continued viability.2 42 This
mindful infrastructure comprises the nervous system of a reliability-focused
237. See William H. Simon, Toyota Jurisprudence: Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, in
LAW & NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE E.U. & THE U.S. 37, 44-55 (de Burca & Scott cds., 2006). Simon's

scholarship resonates with the "directly deliberative polyarchy" and "democratic experimentalism"
theorized by Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, which also explicitly drew inspiration from Japanese
industrial production methods. See Dorf& Sabel, supra note 236, at 286.
238. See Simon, supra note 11, at 7.
239. See KATHLEEN SUTCLIFFE & KARL WEICK, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED: RESILIENT
PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY 9-17 (2007). Stated another way, reliability-focused
organizations avoid "normalization of the unexpected" by "habitually problematizing" it throughout the
organization. See Simon, supra note 11, at 8. Thus, changes - even if not obviously important - are
investigated and root causes discovered and understood rather than ignored.
240. SUTCLIFFE & WEICK, supra note 239, at 18 ("The overwhelming tendency is to respond to
weak signals with a weak response. Mindfulness preserves the capability to see the significance of weak
signals and to respond vigorously."). Reliability-focused organizations do not necessarily identify weak
signals with greater frequency, but they understand their meaning more fully and can deal with them
more confidently. Id.
241. Richard J. Herring, Credit Risk and Financial Stability, in RATINGS, RATING AGENCIES AND
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 345, 355 (Richard M. Levich et al. eds., 2002).
242. See Charles Sabel, A Real Time Revolution in Routines, in THE CORPORATION AS A
COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY 106, 122-23 (Charles Heckscher & Paul Adler eds., 2006).
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organization that pursues zero failure as an unreachable, but ever-present
goal. 243 The reliability perspective - and its embedded mindful infrastructure provides a useful, if aspirational, management model for financial firms that
present externalities to the broader economy and consumers.
The ERM framework invokes concepts that resonate with this reliability
perspective to managing. Consider the following:
* Flow of Information to Obiective-Setting Management as
and
the identification,
ERM promotes
Destabilization.
communication to management, of risks and opportunities that
impact the objectives that management establishes ex ante. As
experience reveals inadequacies or myopias with the ex ante set of
goals and is communicated through the firm, ERM destabilizes
them through the institutionalization of continuous learning.
* Event Identification as Root Cause Analysis. Reliability theory
utilizes root cause analysis to trace identified problems - whether
"near misses" or actual system failures - backward through the
production process. Practices remote from the perceived problem
can sometimes impact performance. ERM is similarly oriented to
the identification of events that impact the achievement of a firm's
objectives.
* Information and Communication Flow as Collaborative,
Interdisciplinary Exchange. ERM does not provide only for
communication of identified risks and opportunities to
management. Instead, it promotes a diffusion of information
throughout the firm's stakeholders: "Relevant information should
be identified, captured, and communicated in a form and timeframe
that enable people to carry out their responsibilities. Effective
communication also occurs in a broader sense, flowing down,
across, and up the entity., 244 In this manner, possibilities for
productive exchange of ideas and new perspectives ramify
throughout the firm.
* Monitoring as Destabilization. ERM requires that "the entirety of
[ERM] is monitored and modifications [are to] be made as
necessary." 245 In order to harness the productive potential of the
reliability perspective, it is critical that firms engage in selfmonitoring and benchmarking, and remain open to changing

243. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 11, at 8 (describing Toyota's "Just-in-Time" parts delivery, which
eliminates stocks of buffer inventory and end-of-line re-work departments so that all products were
placed immediately in the market, thereby eschewing any tolerance for production errors and ensuring
that all defects would be reported as soon as possible).
244. COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 230, at 4.
245. Id. at 4.
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business routines in light of emerging best practices. ERM is
expressly oriented to management and third party monitoring as
well as modification.
Though this reliability perspective originated in the context of corporate
Japan, its conceptual roots might be traced across the Pacific Ocean in the
American pragmatist tradition and its belief in the reciprocal determinations of
means and ends.246 Professors Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel extol
pragmatism's ability to accommodate the complexities of social organization
by "tak[ing] the pervasiveness of unintended consequences, understood most
generally as the impossibility of defining first principles that survive the effort
to realize them, as a constitutive feature of thought and action, and not as an
unfortunate incident of modem political life. ' 247 The ERM framework is
expressly inclined to pragmatism: "There is a direct relationship between
objectives, which are what an entity strives to achieve, and enterprise risk
248
management components, which represent what is needed to achieve them."
This is the key innovative moment of ERM theory: that a firm may accept the
challenge of new risk profiles only by institutionalizing norms of continual
self-reflection and flexible objective setting.
For all its promise, proponents of risk management must overcome a high
justificatory hurdle: why does risk management matter after 2008's financial
crisis? To take an anecdotal example, how is it that Goldman Sachs' risk
managers were noticing during the summer of 2007 that 25-standard deviation
events - that is, events that according to the risk management models should
have occurred once every several trillion lifetimes of the universe - were
occurring with regularity? 249 While the predictable ideological fault lines shape
the debate about what exactly caused the crisis, there is a consensus concerning
of assessing the risks
firms' collective failure to perceive the difficulty
25
0
assets.
finance
structured
opaque
with
associated
In spite of their risk management systems, financial firms failed to identify
and respond to burgeoning exposure to subprime mortgage related assets. In
particular, purchasers of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs) and

246.

Dorf& Sabel, supranote 237, at 284.

247. Id. at 285.
248. COSO ERM FRAMEWORK, supra note 230, at 4.
249. Peter Thai Larsen, Goldman Pays the Price of Being Big, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, at 37;
Andrew G. Haldane, Why Banks Failed the Stress Test, Speech at Marcus-Evans Conf. on Stress
Testing, at 5, available at http://www.bis.org/rcview/r0902l9d.pdf.
250. See, e.g.. INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING
80-81
(2008), available at
FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS
SYSTEMIC RISK AND RESTORING
http://www.imf.org/Extemal/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf ("[T]he perimeter of risk for financial

institutions - that is, the risk assessment of all of an institution's activities, including its related entities did not adequately take into account the size and opacity of institutions' exposures to SlVs, commercial
paper conduits, and their related funding support.").
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collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) - including many life insurers - suffered
massive write-downs on those assets. 25 1 Banks acting as intermediaries retained
massive exposures in the form of liquidity puts, credit protection, and
reputational obligations. 2 Participants in the credit default swap (CDS) and
financial guarantee markets were equally oblivious: those writing CDS and
financial guarantees ignored the possibility of default on the underlying
reference assets, and those receiving CDS and financial guarantee protection
ignored the massive counterparty exposures.2 5 3 It is not merely a failure to
recognize risk and exit an existing business; large firms with billions of dollars
invested in ERM systems such as Citigroup, UBS, and Merrill Lynch decided
to aggressively pursue subprime-related exposures as the crisis came to a
4
heady.1
In 2006 - two years before the credit market freeze in 2008 - Tim
Geithner, then-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, ordered a
review of how well large banks measured their ability to withstand a severe
market downturn; the results were not encouraging, as firms were failing to
account for worst-case scenarios in their models. 255 A post-crisis report
prepared by a group consisting of major global bank and securities firm
supervisors found serious risk management deficiencies in all eleven firms they
several
report individuated
examined. 6 An
OECD-commissioned
251. See Wilmarth, supra note 134, at 1046 ("While banks and insurers have already reported
$ 1.13 trillion of losses, the IMF estimated that the total writedowns for banks and insurers from 2007
through the end of 2010 would be $3.1 trillion.").
252. See BETHANY MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE 305 (2010) (explaining
how Citigroup, Bank of America and other banks absorbed massive amounts of structured investment
vehicle (SIV) debt that had been thought to reside off-balance sheet); James Crotty, Structural Causes of
the Global FinancialCrisis: A CriticalAssessment of the "New FinancialArchitecture", 33 CAMB. J.
ECON. 563, 567-70 (discussing subprime exposures retained by banks and calling into question the
extent to which banks actually "distributed" risk according to the "originate-to-distribute" model of
securitization).
253. See Houman Shadab, Guilty by Association?: Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 4
ENTREPREN. Bus. L. J.407, 444-52 (2010) (describing how monoline bond insurers and AIG embraced
the mortgage-related security business); MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 252, at 190 (explaining that
bank counterparties were attracted to AIG CDS protection due to AIG's AAA credit rating, despite the
facts that much of AIG's capital reserves were tied up in its subsidiary insurance operating companies
and AIG itself was compromising its financial position by assuming unprecedented amounts of
subprime-related exposure).
254. See infra notes 333-336 and accompanying text (discussing the decision by Swiss bank UBS,
with express approval of its risk management function, to pursue subprime exposures right when signs
of infirmity in the subprime asset market became evident); MCLEAN & NOCERA, supra note 254, at 30910 (reporting that Merrill Lynch had increased its subprime exposure by $45 billion and $50 billion
during a one year period over 2006-2007); Gian Luca Clementi et al., Rethinking Compensation in
FinancialFirms, in RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 197, 198-

200 (Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2008) (documenting how UBS, Merrill Lynch, and
Citigroup aggressively pursued subprime-related assets and by the end of the third quarter of 2007 had
accumulated $175 billion in subprime exposures, excluding conduits and other off-balance sheet items);
Crotty, supra note 254, at 568 (chronicling how Merrill Lynch in 2007 - just as signs of a housing
bubble began to appear - made a bullish bet on CDOs and mortgage bonds, which resulted in an
exposure of $41 billion to subprime assets -more than its entire shareholders' equity of $38 billion).
255. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr. & Jeff Gerth, As Crisis Loomed, GeithnerPressed But Fell Short,
WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2009, at Al.
256. See generally SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS ON RISK MANAGEMENT
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communication-related deficiencies in risk management infrastructure as major
contributors to the financial crisis. 257 A survey of 500 risk managers by KPMG
in October 2008 found that 92 percent of those polled intended to review their
risk management practices. 258 As Rodge Cohen of Sullivan & Cromwell
explained it in the context of his eleventh-hour sessions with the Federal
Reserve and bank executives during the week AIG was nationalized and
Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 protection: "If there is a single factor
absence of
which is the principal source of what has happened, it is the
259
was.
it
where
and
system,
the
in
is
risk
much
how
of
knowledge
And though the banking and securities sectors fared far worse, the life
insurance sector was hardly unscathed. Life insurance groups Lincoln National
and The Hartford required capital infusions of $4.35 billion from the U.S.
Treasury to remain afloat. 260 Yamato Life of Japan filed for bankruptcy due to
its inability to absorb mounting subprime-related asset losses. 26 1 ALICO, an
AIG-affiliated life insurance company in Japan, received large capital infusions
from the AIG parent in what were, in effect, transnational bailouts from the
U.S. Treasury (which had previously re-capitalized AIG in September 2008
262
Dutch insurer AEGON received C3 billion in support
with public funds).
from the Dutch government. 263 Life insurers' exposures to variable annuity
guaranteed minimum death benefits (GMDB) suffered similar fates, though on
a smaller scale, to bank liquidity puts and credit enhancement protection for
structured investment vehicles, as the firms' statistical models failed to predict
that massive declines in asset prices would trigger contingent commitments
these institutions had made. 264 The massive amounts of public capital deployed
to support securities markets and capital flows also served to mitigate the extent
of asset price implosions in insurance companies' asset portfolios. 265 The
PRACTICES DURING THE RECENT MARKET TURBULENCE (2008).

257. In particular, the report highlights deficient transmission of information to board members, a
silo-approach to risk management that inhibits communication across units and stakeholders, and intrafirm hierarchies that privilege risk takers over risk managers. See Grant Kirkpatrick, The Corporate
Governance Lessonsfrom the FinancialCrisis (OECD 2008).
258. Haldane, supranote 249.
259. FT.com, View from the Top, "Interview with Rodgin Cohen," 2:10-2:50.
260. Leslie Scism, Insurers'BankDeals Draw Criticism, WALL ST. J., Dec. I1,2009, at C3.
261. Martin Fackler, Global Anxiety Catches up to Japan'sEconomy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,2008, at
B4.
Oct. 1, 2008, at B2.
262. Juro Osawa & Shawn Schroter, AIG Bolsters Japan Unit, WALL ST. J.,
263. See Bart Koster & Steve McGrath, L&G, Aegon Set Plans on Capital, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19,

2009, at C2.
264. Tom Hamburger & Ralph Vartabedian, AIG Woes Could Be Just the Start, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
30, 2009, at Al (reporting that absent federal bailout funds AIG's largest life insurance subsidiaries
might have been bankrupt on account of their aggressive expansion into GMDB contracts - pursuant to

which life insurers guarantee a variable annuity account value irrespective of the performance of the
underlying assets - that resulted in large liabilities when equity market declines caused account balances
to plummet).
265. See Francesco Guerrero & Aline van Duyn, U.S. Banks Gainfrom Rally in Toxic Assets, FIN.
TIMES, Oct. 18, 2009 (highlighting role of Term Asset-Backed Securities Lending Facility and Public-
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monoline insurance companies, which insure securities against default, spent
nearly all of 2008 and 2009 raising capital in dramatic restructurings. These
companies traditionally insured municipal bonds, but in the pre-crisis years had
aggressively underwritten asset-backed securities and even CDOs, including
subprime-related issuances, bolstered by confidence in their internal risk
models. 266 In 2010, state insurance commissioners forced insured bondholders
to take haircuts because there was not enough capital supporting the monoline
267
insurance contracts.
Viewed from a reliability lens, these recent shortcomings demonstrate the
need for a changed risk management perspective that embraces an emphasis on
long-term reliability and viability over short-term profit optimization and cost
minimization. The central difficulty with achieving such a sea change in
perspective is the current industry system's fixation on short-term optimization
metrics that are only poor indicators of stability in contemporary financial
markets.268
A first set of problems stems from the wide gap between the incentives of
management and employees and the priorities of the policyholders and
taxpayers whom solvency regulation is designed to protect. The price of
defection from the short-term perspective is high, especially in light of current
compensation practices. From the perspective of financial institutions and the
traders, production line managers, and risk managers who work there, it is easy
to generate fee and premium income from transactions that increase risks to
levels that compromise the integrity of specific institutions and the financial
system. This recalls Professor Steve Schwarcz's framing of systemic risk as a
tragedy of the commons problem: because the benefits of exploiting finite
capital allocations accrue disproportionately to financiers performing the
allocation and the costs fall onto the broader class of users of finance,
financiers lack incentives to internalize the negative externalities of their
actions and their misjudgment of risk might cost the real economy in the long
run. 26 9 To the extent that government safety nets - in the form of deposit
insurance, guarantee funds, government guarantees, and in extremis loans shift downside risk away from the actors that originate the risk, all the worse. A
senior official in the Bank of England recounts a pre-crisis meeting with bank
risk managers at which one brazen manager suggested that risk management
Private lnvestmcnt Program in buoying security prices during 2009).
266. A Monoline Meltdown?, THE ECONOMIST, July 28, 2007.
267. Rolfe Winkler& Una Galani, AnA.I.G. Lessonfrom Wisconsin, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 2010.
268. See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 237, at 286 (identifying problem of "organizing decentralized,
collaborative design and development under conditions of volatility and diversity" in markets "that have
become so differentiated and fast changing that prices [and other short-term metrics] can serve as only a
general framework and limit on decisionmaking").
269. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 206 (2008); see also Hu,
Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 213, at 1502 ("Government, rather than the private sector, has
the incentive.., to become informed about systemic risks.").
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teams had no reason to run severe stress tests to test their firms' solvency
because if there were ever a severe shock, they would lose their jobs and
bonuses and the government would likely step in to save the institution and
others suffering from similar difficulties. 270 Tying risk managers' pay to trading
(or even firm-wide) profits might raise the profile of risk managers within the
firm, but would threaten to exacerbate the fundamental problem: financial firms
make more money by taking on more risk, so such compensation practices
incentivize risk managers to acquiesce to greater risk-taking. 271 Thus, the
opportunity cost of adopting the long-term reliability perspective would
272
increase for risk managers too.
In addition to the rent-seeking opportunities for firm personnel, a second set
of problems results from shareholders' interests to impede management's
adoption of an authentic reliability perspective to risk management. In this
respect, it is helpful to situate the reliability challenge in the context of
managerial practice and in particular the pressures managers face from shortterm investors to maximize profits. If a shareholder expects to exit a position
shortly, it might prefer that a marginal.• dollar
•273 is spent on expanding a highmargin business unit rather than improving risk management. Moreover, risk
management investment is expensive, especially given market complexity.
According to rational ignorance theory, the costs of weighing and analyzing
274
information can exceed the benefits to be obtained from that information;
when short-term profits are readily available elsewhere within the group, firm
managers may struggle to justify the substantial information costs to
shareholders in light of the net present value of investing in new business. Life
insurance groups' public disclosure of risk management
practices confirms
275
their focus on shareholder optimization metrics.
Management commitment is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to the
270. Haldane, supra note 249, at 12.
271. Cinderella's Moment, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 2010.

272. In this context, it is helpful to consider that the commitments and priorities of industry actors
are lexically ordered - that is, most industry actors are at once committed to making money and being
socially responsible, but only up to a point, and one priority must be satisfied before another becomes
the primary focus. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING
THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992) (also noting that industry actors have "multiple selves"). As the
opportunity cost of defecting from risk-intensive industry norms increases, non-pecuniary
responsibilities become more expensive and will be expected to receive less corporate attention.
273. See TARULLO, supra note 35, at 176.
274. See Anuj K. Shah & Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Heuristics Made Easy: An Effort-Reduction
Framework, 134 PSYCHOL. BULL. 207, 207 (2008).

275. See, e.g., Lincoln National Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 27, 2009) ("We analyze
and manage the risks arising from market exposures of financial instruments, as well as other risks, in an
integrated asset-liability management process that takes diversification into account. By aggregating the
potential effect of market and other risks on the entire enterprise, we estimate, review and in some cases
manage the risk to our earnings and shareholder value." (emphasis added)); id. ("The Company
evaluates these risks individually and, increasingly, in the aggregate to determine the risk profiles of all
of its products and to judge their potential impacts on financial metrics including U.S. GAAP earnings..
. ." (emphasis added)).

Combating the Teleological Drift of Life Insurance Solvency Regulation
emergence of a reliability perspective. For example, managing in fast-moving
markets may inherently frustrate attempts to focus on long-term goals. The
rapidity and volatility of financial markets result in many events of potential
high impact significance being brought to management's attention. These
events often require quick resolutions, and management's focus on longer-term
goals such as risk management infrastructure can wane. It is also important to
bear in mind the intra-firm compensation-related conflicts of interest, and the
fact that firm constituencies other than senior management control access to
information. Even assuming a sincere commitment of senior management to
risk management, profit center units have little interest in accurate risk profiling
276
of activities that are likely to yield greater compensation.
ERM, then, represents an attractive potential solution, but without adequate
industry buy-in and implementation, it will not help solve the complexity
dilemma of contemporary finance. For the industry to consent to a new risk
management infrastructure absent direct governmental intervention, it must
overcome the problems discussed above and agree to govern itself Neil
Gunningham and Joseph Rees have developed a theory of the conditions
required for effective industry self-regulation: for self-regulation to work, firms
must share an "industrial morality" that, in turn, permits the industry to
"institutionalize responsibility" for the broader societal ramifications of its
conduct. 277 To consent to such a system, industry members often must abandon
optimization-style priorities that result in societal negative externalities such as
systemic risk and consumer losses. For Gunningham and Rees, a necessary
condition for the formation of an industrial morality is a shared set of public
and private interests regarding the regulated event. 278 These shared interests
may arise organically or through the threat of intrusive command-and-control
regulation. In either case, the industry must recognize that it constitutes a
"community of fate" that must bind itself to collective self-restraint in the face
of short-term pressures to optimize profitability and minimize costs. 279
The rent-seeking opportunities, compensation-related incentives, and shortterm investor pressures discussed above are but a few of many examples
demonstrating why the emergence of a community of fate is unlikely among

276. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in FinancialMarkets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV..

211, 224-25 (2009) (describing how in lead up to crisis traders had incentives to allocate assets to
achieve low VaR estimates, notwithstanding the gradual build-up of massive fat tail risk that was not
taken into account in the VaR model); TARULLO, supra note 35, at 101 ("The various bank divisions had
little interest in promoting clear and well-developed risk profiles of their activities, since this might
mean more constraints on the very activities that - at least in the short term - were most likely to yields
the highest profits.").
277. Gunningham & Rees, supra note 12, at 376-89. Stated in traditional economic terms, firms
must internalize the negative externalities that their actions create.
278. Id. at 389-90.
279. Saule Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry SelfRegulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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financial firms. Other factors include industry concentration and, most
importantly, the ever-expanding safety net.28° While public awareness of
systemic risk as a negative externality has certainly increased in recent years,
this awareness is unlikely to translate into credible threats of intrusive
regulation of finance, as the electorate is unsurprisingly focused on highly
salient and uncomplicated issues such as CEO bonuses and "repayment" of
TARP loans. 28' The negotiation and passage of the Dodd-Frank Act has borne
this out; apart from a watered-down variant of the so-called Volcker Rule
requiring divestiture of proprietary trading and fund operations, the Act stopped
short of fundamental transformation of the industry's profit centers. 282 In the
short term, self-regulation of risk management according to a reliability
perspective is unlikely to emerge.
Nevertheless, it might still be possible for regulators to promote a corporate
governance infrastructure that taps the potential of risk management to act as a
counterweight to uncertainty and risk proliferation. As noted above in Part I,
the purpose of insurance solvency regulation is to install a substitute for lender
market discipline. Because the disciplinary effects of debt are, at bottom, a
corporate governance concern, it is here that the risk management story
converges with the solvency regulation narrative: if solvency regulation aims to
correct flaws in corporate governance, and if traditional solvency regulation is
outdated due to market complexity, can corporate law and insurance law and
regulation shape corporate governance norms so as to promote solvency?
3. The Legal Dimension: New Governance & Meta-Risk Management
It is one matter to state a normative case for a reliability perspective on risk
management over short-termism, but it an entirely separate matter to design a
legal system that fosters the emergence of such a perspective. 283 The challenge
is especially pronounced in the context of dynamic markets characterized by
high regulator-regulatee information asymmetries such as the derivatives or
securities markets. In such markets, the only choice for regulators may be to
rely on risk management techniques at the firm-level. Regulators are then
charged with "regulating the exercise of judgment. ' 284 The challenge for
280. See generally JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 6 1.

281. See, e.g., David Lawder, White House Slashes U.S. Bailout Cost Estimate, REUTERS, Sept. 20,
2010,
http://www.reuters.com/articlc/idUSN3013769220100930
(reporting
on
the Obama
Administration's zeal to report near full repayment of TARP funds in advance of 2010 mid-term
elections); [an Bremmer & Scan West, AIG and "PoliticalRisk", WALL ST. J., Mar. 20, 2009, at A15
(chronicling populist uproar over proposed bonuses to AIG employees at expense of more pressing but
technical issues such as stress-testing of banks and reduction of moral hazard).
282. A full examination of the Dodd-Frank Act is outside the scope of this article and much of the
new regulatory structure's force will depend on implementing administrative measures and rules, but it
appears at present that financial firms have called the public's bluff.
283. See Omarova, supranote 279, at 30-31.
284. Bamberger, supranote 212, at 381.
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policymakers is to implement what John Braithwaite, drawing on Peter
Grabosky's concept of "meta-monitoring," has referred to as system of "meta
risk management" - that is, the risk management of risk management. 285 To
meet this challenge, policymakers must take a broad view of causality, and
to individual actions but also to firm
attribute causal significance not only 286
culture, or a firm's "attitudinal setting."
To provide some theoretical context on this point, meta-risk management
resonates with new governance theory, a wide-ranging set of ideas that
highlights increasing involvement of non-state actors in the governance tools
that shape and constitute public policy and regulation. New governance reorients traditional administrative law scholarship by focusing on the tools and
methodologies of governance - by whomever implemented - rather than the
dramatis personae of the regulator-regulatee game. The starting point for
inquiry into regulatory problems is an understanding of the regulatory toolkit
rather than an ex ante distribution of power among purely private and purely
public actors. In the process, it calls into question the New Deal regulatory
paradigm according to which hierarchically-ordered and expert public
regulators exercise legislatively delegated authority to pursue statutorilydefined regulatory objectives by implementing the "best" solutions to
problems. 287 New governance recognizes that contemporary economic and
other social systems are subject to constant evolution; accordingly, expertise
and regulatory objectives must be flexible and shifting rather than static. 288 In
this respect, it is deeply pragmatic and experimental, and it applies a reliabilityfocused perspective to public problem solving. Three attributes of the new
governance literature are of particular relevance to the regulation of complex,
dynamic financial markets: (1) retention of a public role in lawmaking and
enforcement as a background threat, or "benign big gun"; (2) decentralization
of governance through active pursuit of non-state actor knowledge to
supplement, and sometimes replace, public administrative expertise; and (3) a
dynamic, flexible, and dialogic lawmaking process.
First, by retaining residual command-and-control powers, regulators wield

285. See Braithwaitc, supra note 14, at 1.
286. Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the GreasedPig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper s Guide to
the Psychology, Culture and Ethics of FinancialRisk-taking, 95 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2010);
Cristic Ford & David Hess, Corporate Corruption and Reform Undertakings: A New Approach to an
Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 307, 310 (2008); Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really
Responsive Regulation,71 MOD. L. REV. 59, 68-70 (2008) (discussing "attitudinal settings").
287. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 13 (1938) (comparing
administrative agencies to corporate boards of directors on the grounds that "in their essentials they
resemble the powers conferred upon the executive committee of a board of directors in the hope of
building a system which, under the guidance of this committee, may more nearly approximate a given
desideratum").
288. See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 542 (2007) ("[A]II solutions
should be regarded as provisional.").
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what Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite have referred to as a benign big gun: that
is, a background threat in the form of rarely deployed, but available, severe
sanctions, which serves to incentivize regulated market actors to avoid
289
Because new governance vests
defecting from regulatory objectives.
discretion over public regulatory objectives and outcomes to private parties, the
9
legitimacy of the system requires retention of a public regulatory presence.2 0
In other words, the state is not dead; it remains a critical juncture of new
governance networks, just not as an authoritative, directing regulator in a
29
command-and-control system. 1
The concept of penalty defaults from contracts is analogous here. Contract
law provides for penalty defaults, in the form of background sanctions that no
party is likely to prefer, to induce contracting parties to engage in efficient
contracting. 292 The penalty default thus encourages responsible ex ante
contracting and deliberation rather than ex post litigation. In this respect, the
background threat might substitute or supplement the industrial morality that,
as discussed in Part IIIB(2), is unlikely to materialize absent government
involvement. 293 The threat must also be formalized and enforced, which will
give it a salience that general background threats of legislation lack due to
industry's successful lobbying track record.294 Regulators must have access to a
sliding-scale, incremental enforcement toolkit that is itself risk-sensitive so as
to allow regulators to calibrate enforcement efforts based on the reasons for and
consequences of a firm's defection from the regulatory objective.
Second, by enlisting non-state actors' knowledge in the regulatory process,
289. AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 272, at 19-53; see also Cary Coglianesc & David Lazer,
Management-Based Regulation: PrescribingPrivate Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 691, 694-96, 726 (2003) (emphasizing importance of "governmental enforcement presence"
for "management-based regulation" - a new governance-style model under which "firms are expected to

produce plans that comply with general criteria designed to promote the targeted social goal" - to work).
290. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 272, at 19-53.
291. See, e.g., Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Soft Law in Health Care Reform, 3 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 137, 159-60 (2006) (describing the state's role in new governance initiatives as
"disaggregated but necessary").
292. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE L. J. 87, 97-98 (1989) (characterizing the common law rule that courts will
enforce only contracts with certain and definite terms as an incentive for contracting parties to make
their expectations express in their contract).
293. Note, however, that a benign big gun comprises more than a system of sanctions designed to
make actors responsible for negative externalities. It is an institution that appeals to and encourages the
professional integrity and law-abidingness of industry actors rather than assumes that they all require
heavy-handed sanctioning and supervision. See KEITH HAWKINS, LAW AS LAST RESORT: PROSECUTION
DECISION-MAKING IN A REGULATORY AGENCY 253-55 (2002) (describing how most regulatory

inspectors believe that regulatees pursue "principled compliance"); AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note
272, at 19-27 (describing a benign big gun approach to regulation that aims to appeal to the social
responsibility of actors to obtain voluntary compliance, but also stands ready to deploy deterrent threat
sanctions of increasing severity to motivate purely economically motivated "rational actors" and
incapacitate chronic law violators). To borrow Justice Holmes' construction, it engages both "good
men" and "bad men" as such.
294. In 2007, there were five financial services industry lobbyists per member of Congress. John
Plender, How to Tame the Animal Spirits, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at 11.
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the role of centralized agency expertise is marginalized, as the nodes of
governance ramify throughout the regulated markets. Policymaking and
regulation are thus conceived "not as [a top-down ordering process] to be done
by autonomous regulators but rather as a process of mutual problem-solving
among stakeholders from government and the private sector." 295 The expertise
and knowledge of private actors can be "hamess[ed] . . . to serve public
goals"'296 and public lawmaking is oriented toward a collaborative, consensusseeking form of governance. 297 In new governance, there are multiple public
and private legal entities, but there is one public process.298 The dynamic
financial system is a paradigmatic example of a market that is susceptible to
governance improvements by involving regulatees - who, after all, enjoy
superior access to information and analytical capabilities - to a greater
extent. 299 The decentralization of governance also brings more perspectives to
the fore, especially if third-party non-state actors participate, and in the process
formalizes a forum at the governance level where the reliability principle of
norm destabilization can flourish.3 °0
Finally, new governance - again picking up on reliability themes emphasizes flexibility, process revision, continuous learning, monitoring
through error detection and benchmarking, and peer review. Flexible systems
of regulation must be "open to diverse forms of articulation" 30 1 and

295. Joanne Scott & David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches to Governance in
the European Union, 8 EUR. L.J. 1, 5 (2002).
296. Jody Freeman, The PrivateRole in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 549 (2000).
297. Bradley C. Karkkaincn, Reply: "New Governance" in Legal Thought and in the World: Some
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 474 (2004) (referring to new
governance as "consensus-oriented"); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 236, at 355 (explaining
"experimentalist" governance as "link[ing] benchmarking, rulemaking, and revision so closely with
operating experience that rulemakers and operating-world actors work literally side-by-side - but, to
repeat, in plain view of the public - and thus, largely overcome the distinction between the detached
staff of honest but imperfectly informed experts and the knowledgeable but devious insiders they
regulate").
298. See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 452-53 (2004) ("[T]he governance model offers a
framework that enables us to view the different sectors-state, market, and civil society-as part of one
comprehensive, interlocking system. The focus is on government interactions with private actors in
public action."); Freeman, supra note 296 at 564 (lamenting that traditional accounts of administrative
law rely on "the illusion of a public realm" defined in contraposition to the private realm of markets).
299. The issue of compensation arises again in connection with new governance's emphasis on
tapping analytical capabilities of private firms. At present, private firms - especially financial firms offer compensation packages that can be multiples of the salaries of public regulators. Even if, however,
the variance between regulatory and industry compensation fell, the proximity problem would remain:
no matter how well-equipped the regulators are, if markets that pose systemic risks are constantly
changing, there will always exist an epistemic gap between what regulators know and what they need to
know to pursue their objectives.
300. See supra Part IllB(2); see also Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, DestabilizationRights:
How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015 (2004) (advocating for the
"destabilization" of chronically underperforming public institutions to, among other things, induce
participation of wider array of stakeholders in decision making processes).
301. Lobel, supra note 298, at 391.
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"conversational" in nature. 30 2 As Professors Julia Black and Robert Baldwin
put it, regulation must be "really responsive" not only to changing market
dynamics, but also to the institutional and functional contexts within which
regulation operates, including firm attitudes, internal logics of regulatory tools
and strategies, institutional environments, performance indicators, and changes
in all of these factors. 30 3 If regulatory tools and strategies in current use are
proving unsuccessful in achieving desired objectives, they must be modified.30 4
Importantly, if implemented effectively, this perspective allows for a one-way
ratchet in the direction of continuous improvement and adoption of rolling best
practices. 30 5 By pairing an amplified set of perspectives with an openness to
continual re-assessment of process and objectives, all facilitated through
effective government inducement, new governance provides a useful
theoretical framework within which to situate attempts to construct a system of
meta-risk management in the financial services industry.
However, the new governance approach to risk management is fraught with
normative complications regarding the utilization of firm-specific financial
modeling technologies for public regulatory purposes. 30 6 These difficulties can
be roughly categorized into two sets of concerns. First are the inherent
shortcomings of risk management systems (and the statistical models
undergirding them) that result from the disjoint between what we know and
what we think we know. Part of this problem relates to cognitive biases and
intellectual limitations, 30 7 and part of it relates to the limits of predictive
mathematics in a world of uncertainty. 30 8 Life insurance groups themselves
recognize the limitations of their risk management systems. 3° 9 Second, in
addition to the ever-present specter of industry capture, regulators themselves
302. JULIA BLACK, RULES AND REGULATORS 37-44 (1997).

303. See Baldwin & Black, supra note 286, at 68-69.
304. See Robert Baldwin & Julia Black, Really Responsive Risk-Based Regulation, 32 LAW &
POL'Y 181,200 (2010).
305. See Robert A. Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does
Regulation Matter?, 37 LAW & POL'Y 51, 52 (2003) (advocating a regulatory praxis that emphasizes the
encouragement of "beyond compliance" over compliance enforcement); Dorf& Sabcl, supra note 237 at
350-54 (describing the promise of "prospective rolling best-practice rule[s]" because "the best
alternative solution available by a distant date would (re)set the standard from that time on").
306. See Weber, supra note 121, at 850-55.
307. Evidence suggests that human intellection abhors uncertainty and will more readily act based
on knowledge systems that privilege the measurable and mask uncertainty. Under these circumstances,
we are inclined to "normalize the unexpected." Simon, supra note 1I,at 4-5. In this context, see also
Herring, supranote 241, at 355 (discussing the "availability heuristic" and the "threshold heuristic").
308. See Weber, supra note 121, at 857-58.
309. See, e.g., HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K) (Feb.
12, 2009) (highlighting to investors the risk that "unanticipated policyholder behavior, combined with
adverse market events, produces economic losses beyond the scope of the risk management techniques
employed, which . . .may have a material adverse effect on our consolidated results of operations,
financial condition and cash flows"); LINCOLN NATIONAL CORP., ANNUAL REPORT (Form 10-K) (Feb.
27, 2009) (including as a separate "risk factor" pursuant to Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K the possibility
that "risk management policies and procedures may leave us exposed to unidentified or unanticipated
risk, which could negatively affect our businesses or result in losses").
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are subject to cognitive biases that impede their realization of regulatory
objectives when dealing with complex regulated markets. 31 0 These concerns are
real, but this Part - and this article in general - is concerned with a broader
issue: whether public law can encourage the embedment of a reliability
perspective to risk management such that the difficulties described here can be
managed with a view to the long-term viability of both the firm and the
financial system.
The international bank capital adequacy framework is the most far-reaching
effort by regulators to engage in meta-risk management, but its track record,
while still relatively undeveloped, has not been impressive. In 2004, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (the Basel Committee) published its most
recent comprehensive framework for bank capital adequacy rules (known as
"Basel II1"). 311 Enhancing risk management best practices was a key objective
of the Basel II reform. 3 12 Basel II is comprised of three "pillars": Pillar 1, which
is a precursor to the PBR reform, specifies minimum capital requirements;
Pillar 2 concerns the supervisory review process; and Pillar 3 sets forth new
market disclosure requirements intended to enhance market discipline
alongside regulation and supervision. 313 Pillar 1 allows banks to adopt an
"internal ratings based" (IRB) approach when determining their regulatory
capital requirements, pursuant to which banks are permitted to use proprietary
statistical models to estimate the magnitude and probability of losses associated
with loan book positions in light of credit risks. 3 14 Eligibility for the IRB
approach, which generally results in lower capital requirements and compliance
costs, is contingent on banks satisfying certain criteria related to, among other
things, risk management. 3 15 Pillar 3 is premised on the idea that modest
results of models will
disclosure of assumptions, mechanics, and backtesting
31 6
discipline."
"market
to
banks
expose disclosing
But more important for purposes of this article is Pillar 2, which sets out the

310. Weber, supra note 121, at 850-55, 860-63 (discussing regulators' susceptibility to certain
cognitive biases, such as "social contagion," excessive faith in market efficiency, and a tendency to
privilege information derived from systems purporting to quantify risk rather than accurately describe
uncertainty); Avinash Persaud, Regulatory Capture, Remarks at Gresham College (June 28, 2005)
("[Riegulatory capture today is .... much more subtle and sophisticated than in the past.... It's about
big business persuading regulators about certain principles that seem eminently sensible, although on
further examination .. . are hollow and bankrupt."); cf Stephen Choi & Adam Pritchard, Behavioral
Economic and the SEC, 57 STAN, L. REV. 1 (2003) (explaining how the SEC can be gripped by

cognitive biases that inhibit its effectiveness).
311.

See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL

MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS - A REVISED FRAMEWORK (COMPREHENSIVE VERSION)

(2006), availableat http://www.bis.org/publlbcbs 128.htm [hereinafter BASEL I1FRAMEWORK].
312. See TARULLO, supra note 35, at 174-76; Richard Herring, The Rocky Road to Implementation
of Basel 1 in the United States, 35 ATL. ECON. J. 411 (2007).
313. See BASEL 11FRAMEWORK, supra note 311, at 1-11.

314. See Weber, supra note 121, at 827-29.
315. See BASEL 11FRAMEWORK, supra note 311, at 88-120.
316. See Weber, supra note 109, at 829-30.
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supervisory framework for the Basel II regime. 3 17 To borrow from Bamberger,
Pillar 2 regulates the exercise of management'sjudgment in implementing an
IRB approach. 3 18 Specifically, it sets forth four principles to guide bank
regulators when supervising the adequacy of a bank's risk management
infrastructure:
* Principle 1: Banks should have a process for assessing their overall
risk profile and a strategy for
capital adequacy in relation to 3their
19
maintaining their capital levels.
*

Principle 2: Supervisors should review and evaluate banks' intemal
capital adequacy assessments and strategies, as well as the ability
to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital
ratios. Supervisors should take appropriate supervisory
action if
32
they are not satisfied with the result of this process. 0

*

Principle 3: Supervisors should expect banks to operate above the
minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to
require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum.3
Principle 4: Supervisors should seek to intervene at an early stage
to prevent capital from falling below the minimum levels required
to support the risk characteristics of a particular bank and should
require rapid remedial action if capital is not maintained or
restored.322

*

The Basel II framework elaborates further on these principles and includes
specific obligations for banks to institute policies to "identify, measure, and
report" all material risks. 3 23 Where a risk cannot be measured precisely, "a
process should be developed to estimate risks." 324 Further, a bank must perform
stress tests to "identify possible events or changes in market conditions that
could adversely impact the bank. 3 25 This requirement is the first generally
applicable legal obligation to perform stress tests, and it embeds a self-critical,
counter-factual analysis in the risk management function. The commentary for
Principle 1 also makes clear that the board of directors has responsibility to
establish systems for assessing risks and monitoring compliance with intemal
317. BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 311, at 158 ("The supervisory review process of the
Framework is intended not only to ensure that banks have adequate capital to support all the risks in
their business, but also to encourage banks to develop and use better risk management techniques in

monitoringand managing their risks." (emphasis added)).
318. See supra note 284.
319. BASEL II FRAMEWORK, supra note 311, at 159.
320. Id. at 162.
321. Id. at 164.
322. Id. at 165.
323. Id. at 160.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 159.
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policies, as well as risk exposures and "how the bank's changing risk profile
affects the need for capital., 326 In performing this latter obligation, the board is
required to conduct periodic reviews to ensure the "integrity, accuracy, and
reasonableness" of the risk management system. 327 Independent review is
necessary and, "where appropriate," internal and external audits should be
conducted.32 8
Among other things, Principle 2 requires bank regulators to evaluate the
degree to which a bank has established and maintained a "sound internal
process to assess capital adequacy" that emphasizes "the quality of the bank's
risk management and controls. ' 329 If supervisory reviews reveal shortcomings,
regulators are instructed to "take appropriate action." 330 Principle 4 addresses
the arsenal of "appropriate actions" that regulators should resort to when
enforcing Pillar 2's supervisory norms. Principle 4 envisages wide
discretionary powers for bank regulators:
Supervisors should consider a range of options if they become concerned that a
bank is not meeting the requirements embodied in the supervisory principles
outlined above. These actions may include intensifying the monitoring of the bank,
restricting the payment of dividends, requiring the bank to prepare and implement a
satisfactory capital adequacy restoration plan, and requiring the bank to raise
additional capital immediately. Supervisors should have the discretion to use3 3the
1
tools best suited to the circumstances of the bank and its operating environment.

Pillar 2 is an early and incomplete attempt at a new governance-style
system of meta-risk management aiming to foster a reliability-focused
approach to risk in firm culture. Principle 1 sets minimum standards for risk
management corporate governance, but leaves the specific articulation of those
standards' fulfillment up to the regulatees' discretion. The provisions relating
to monitoring and reporting, as well as the requirement to conduct self-critical
stress tests, are designed to promote destabilization and flexibility, and a bank's
capital needs are to be continually re-assessed internally in light of observed
experience. The system relies on the background threat of enforcement to
function. The failure of the SEC's similar internal models-based capital
adequacy regime for large securities firms is a case study in the ineffectiveness
of internal models-based capital adequacy regimes when staffing resources are
lacking and agencies are not equipped with a sliding scale of enforcement
authority (that is, the enforcement powers are so draconian that they are never
used at all).332 Pillar 2 of Basel II, by contrast, emphasizes the need for prompt

326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id. at 208.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 163.
Id.at 165.

332. See John C. Coffee Jr. & Hilary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a

Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REv. 707, 741-44 (2009) (pointing out that the SEC assigned only three staff to
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intervention with a sliding scale of enforcement mechanisms. The access to
multiple enforcement tools allows regulators to calibrate enforcement to the
institutional context of each regulated firm, subject of course to applicable due
process and equity norms.
Notwithstanding its potential, the supervisory track record of bank
regulators' Pillar 2 duties, while admittedly undeveloped at this stage, is not
encouraging. For example, in 2005, Swiss bank UBS and its supervisor the
Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (F1NMA) had already
transitioned to Basel II when UBS decided to pursue aggressively the mortgage
securitization business. 333 UBS's risk management department utilized a model
that assumed that the so-called "super senior" risk that UBS retained on its
balance sheet in securitization transactions could only lose 2 percent of its
value. 334 Under the IRB approach, its Basel II capital requirements plunged and
UBS piled on its super senior exposure. By 2007, it had $50 billion in
exposure; 335 not coincidentally, within two years UBS had booked about $50
billion in asset write-downs and was shored up only by a series of taxpayerfunded capital infusions. 336 F1NMA never employed the sliding scale of
sanctions to curb UBS's risk-taking. The experience of UBS and other large
European banks that were already subject to Basel II cautions that the legal
availability of enforcement mechanisms does not necessarily translate into their
effective use. When regulators are captured, either literally or through the
operation of more hegemonic forces, or when there are staffing or expertise
deficiencies, enforcement will be ineffective. The benign big gun will be more
"benign" than "big gun."
A further factor limiting the Basel II framework's effectiveness as a metarisk management tool is its lack of emphasis on continuous learning,
benchmarking, and rolling best practice revision. The regime is flexible for
banks, but not for regulators. The provisions in Pillar 2 specifying the channels
through which information will flow do not contemplate the type of
information gathering and sharing necessary for the emergence of an authentic
new govemance-style regime. Instead, regulators are instructed to cooperate
with regulators from other jurisdictions when a banking group is subject to
regulation in multiple jurisdictions, and to avoid duplicative compliance. 337 The
information will flow between regulated banks and their regulators, but
regulators will only be able to compare risk management techniques and

each CSE firm and that the SEC technically lacked the basic authority to order a firm to increase its
debt-to-equity ratio).
333. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL'S GOLD: How UNRESTRAINED GREED CORRUPTED
SHATTERED GLOBAL MARKETS AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE 161-63 (2009).

A DREAM,

334. Id. at 162.
335. Id. at 242.
336. Goran Miijuk, Prescriptionfor UBS." Hard Work, WALL ST. J., Sept. 2, 2009, at C2.
337. See BASEL 1I FRAMEWORK, supra note 311, at 219.
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internal capital models within that jurisdiction. Though the Basel Committee
has established an Accord Implementation Group and a Capital Interpretation
Group to foster uniformity in the implementation and interpretation of Basel
II,338 at present there is no formal structure for information exchange among
regulators on risk management matters. Moreover, there is no requirement that
a single jurisdiction's bank regulators establish an internal information-sharing
unit; to the extent that bank supervisors are allocated to particular banks (as
occurs in the U.S.), there is a danger that each set of supervisors operates in a
self-contained silo such that the umbrella regulator lacks a forum to compare
risk management best practices from different banking groups. As such, there is
no structural mechanism to ensure the prompt identification and
communication of the most effective risk management techniques among
regulators and regulated firms, preventing any meaningful benchmarking. As a
result, the system is not flexible and it lacks openness to the destabilization of
norms and objectives in light of new experience and knowledge.
Thus, Basel II only addresses one of the three new governance attributes
discussed in this Part adequately: by utilizing regulated firms' financial code
and risk management technologies in the capital adequacy framework, it invites
private actors into the capital adequacy regulatory framework and increases the
quality of information at regulators' disposal. However, notwithstanding its
emphasis on providing such authorities to bank regulators, the regime is not at
present bolstered by a credible commitment to risk-sensitive enforcement.
Moreover, though it is less rigid than the crude Basel I regime, it lacks
structural commitment to process revision, rolling best practices,
benchmarking, and continuous reassessment for which a meta-risk management
regime should provide.
IV. THE NAIC VALUATION MANUAL: TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE PBR
REGIME

In spite of the ample recent experience of faulty risk modeling
technologies, U.S. insurance regulators are poised to transition to a Basel IIstyle approach to statutory reserve accounting. In recent years insurance reserve
accounting has undergone several changes ranging from traditional commandand-control initiatives to nascent new governance-style reforms. These reforms
evince a gradual teleological drift - of which the NAIC's PBR reform is a final
expression - away from conservative understatement of net worth, which had
been the primary means by which regulators promoted a sound and solid
insurance sector. Insurance regulators hope that the PBR reform will reconstitute a logical relationship between the reserve accounting regime and the
newly complex insurance business. However, under the reform the internal
338. Weber, supranote 121, at 865 n. 324.
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logic of that regime will now depend on the regulated firms' financial models
and risk management systems, and will be conservative only to the extent that
those models reflect an institutionalized reliability perspective regarding the
financial reporting function that emphasizes conservatism and long-term
solvency as business objectives. For reasons discussed in Part III, the pressures
to gauge performance by reference to short-term optimization metrics impede
the development of such a perspective.
Since adopting the PBR reform, the NAIC has published draft corporate
governance requirements, which when finalized will be binding on boards of
directors and senior managers of life insurers subject to the PBR reform. The
NAIC is to be applauded for recognizing the fundamental link between
solvency regulation, corporate governance, and risk management, but the
requirements as drafted in current proposals fall well short of the mark. SubPart A summarizes preliminary reforms to remodel the statutory reserve
accounting rules to accommodate new market realities. Sub-Part B will
evaluate the PBR framework, and explain how its corporate governance
requirements represent a welcome, but ultimately incomplete, effort to institute
an effective system of meta-risk management.
A. PreliminaryAttempts to IntegrateNew Productsand Risk Management into
Statutory Reserving Regime
1. Asset Adequacy Test
In response to growing awareness of the riskiness and illiquidity of life
insurers' investment portfolios in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the NAIC in
1991 incorporated an asset adequacy test - modeled on the New York State
Insurance Department's Regulation 126 - into the SVL. 33 9 The asset adequacy
test requires life insurers to submit to regulators an actuarial report certifying
that the insurer's aggregate reserves make "adequate provision for" the likely
benefits and expenses - taking into account the assets held by the company in
support of the reserves - that will emerge from the insurer's business 340 The
test applies in addition to the formulaic reserve calculation. 341 That is, the
baseline formulaic method in effect constitutes a floor: an insurer can establish
greater reserves, if required by the actuarial opinion, but at a minimum it must

339. See STANDARD VALUATION LAW, supra note 98, §3.A(2).

340. Id.
341. In addition to the methodological preference for actuarial discretion over statutory
prescription, two major differences in subject matter distinguish the asset adequacy test from the
baseline formulaic method. First, the asset adequacy test is applied to an insurer's aggregate business
and not on a policy-by-policy (or "seriatim") basis like the formulaic method. Second, under the asset
adequacy test, actuaries are to consider only assets held backing reserves, and not assets comprising the
company's surplus.
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establish reserves under the baseline formulaic method.
The asset adequacy test is essentially a measurement of the insurer's assetliability match. The test eschews formula-based reserving and vests substantial
discretion in the actuary to determine the adequacy of the reserves. The statute
itself does not even specify the time horizon as to which the asset adequacy test
342
is to be performed.
The professional actuarial associations are charged with
interpreting the "adequate provision" requirement on a rolling, ongoing basis in
light of experience. 343 The asset adequacy test thus leaves discretion as to how
to gauge "adequate provision" to the company actuaries in possession of the
best information regarding the assets and liabilities, and for this reason might
be considered an early new governance initiative.
2. Regulation XXX andActuarial Guideline AXAX
While the mortality tables and applicable interest rates have changed
intermittently over the years, the basic formulae for calculating policy and
annuity reserves have remained the same. Most states have adopted the socalled Regulation XXX 3 44 and Actuarial Guideline 345 AXXX, which impose
formula-based reserve calculation methodologies for term life insurance and
universal life insurance policies with secondary death benefit guarantees.
Developed by the NAIC, Regulation XXX and Actuarial Guideline AXXX
were designed to take account of the increasing importance of the term and
universal life insurance markets. 346 The SVL and its assumptions were a poor
fit for these business lines, which posed a different set of risks and required
different reserve valuation techniques.
These new formulaic reserve calculation methods have increasingly come
under attack from the industry and investment bankers for their sui generis
methodologies which correspond to neither the firms' internal risk management
function nor GAAP. Most notably, insurers have been offloading so-called
"excess" or "redundant" reserves required under Regulation XXX and
Actuarial Guideline AXXX onto the capital markets via complex regulatory
arbitrage transactions known as reserve financing transactions.347 Other

342.

CoMM. LIFE INS. FIN. REP. AM. Soc'Y ACTUARIES, LIFE PRACTICE NOTE 1995-1, at 5 (1995),

available at http://www.actuary.org/pdf/practnotes/life I.pdf.
343. See STANDARD VALUATION LAW, supra note 98, §3.A(2).
344. 830-1 VALUATION OF LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES MODEL REGULATION (Nat'l Ass'n Ins.
Comm'rs 2009) [hereinafter REGULATION XXX].
345. Actuarial guidelines are issued by the Life and Health Actuarial Task Force of the NAIC to
address unanticipated issues that are not directly covered by either the SVL or model regulations. See
NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS, ACCOUNTING PRACTICES & PROCEDURES MANUAL, App. C (2009)

(noting that actuarial guidelines "are not intended to be viewed as statutory revisions but merely a guide
in applying the statute"). They are incorporated by reference into, and are thereby given binding effect
by, the SVL. Id.
346. See supra Part IIIA(2).

347. Thomas E. McGuinness et al., Financing XXX Reserves for the Long Term: Focus Turns to
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insurers simply increase rates or decrease business. 348 Industry and the
investment bankers that facilitate XXX and AXXX reserve financing label
them "redundant" because, relative to GAAP and reasonable economic
assumptions, they exceed the extent of the liability. 349 Two lessons can be
learned from the experience with XXX and AXXX reserve accounting rules:
(1) insurers had developed sophisticated regulatory arbitrage capabilities that
allowed them to circumvent the intended effects of the accounting rules; and
(2) implicit in the industry's laments that the reserve requirements were
excessive in light of the economic value of the contractual liabilities was a
different conception of the internal logic of reserve accounting, one that looked
to economic value (rather than conservatism) as the touchstone of reserving.
3. The VA CAR VM (Mini-) Revolution
In 2008, the NAIC approved Actuarial Guideline No. 43, or the Variable
Annuity Commissioners Reserve Valuation Method (VACARVM). 350
VACARVM is a principles-based initiative regarding the SVL standards for the
valuation of reserves for variable annuities and other contracts involving
guaranteed benefits similar to those offered by variable annuities. In issuing
VACARVM, the NAIC framed the issue in terms of the dysfunction that new
product innovation had visited upon the extant statutory reserving regime: "For
many years regulators and the industry have struggled with the issue of
applying a uniform reserve standard to these contracts and in particular some of
the [associated] guaranteed benefits." 35 1 It noted further that the SVL "make[s]
assumptions about product design, contractholder behavior and economic
relationships and conditions," which, in light of "the economic volatility seen
over the last few decade [and the] increase in the complexity
of these
352
accounting.
reserve
statutory
of
results
the
products," can distort
VACARVM requires insurers, for the first time, to compute reserves based
on the results of proprietary statistical model tests designed to gauge how an
insurer's business will respond to designated scenarios. Specifically, reserves
are to be based on a minimum floor determined using a standard scenario, plus
the excess over this minimum floor, if any, of a reserve calculated using a
projection of the assets and estimated liabilities supporting these contracts over
Letters ofCredit, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REPORT I (Winter 2009).
348. Elizabeth K. Brill et al., Modernization of U.S. Life Insurance Regulation: PBR for Life
Insurers, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS REPORT 3, 3 (Oct. 2009).

349. See Alex Cowley & J. David Cummins, Securitization of Life Insurance Assets and Liabilities,
72 J.RISK & INS. 193, 218-19 (2005).
350. NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS, ACTUARIAL GUIDELINE VACARVM - CARVM FOR VARIABLE

ANNUITIES (2008) [hereinafter VACARVM Regulation]. In 2009, the Life and Health Actuarial Task
Force integrated the VACARVM Regulation into the Valuation Manual. See infra notes 369-374, and
accompanying text.
351. VACARVM Regulation, supra note 351, at i.
352. Id.
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a broad range of stochastically generated scenarios and using prudent estimate
353
assumptions.
This latter test is referred to as the Conditional Tail Expectation
354
(CTE).
Under the CTE, an insurer constructs a weighted statistical risk model of
exposure associated with its variable annuity business. The insurer will subject
its asset (investment) and liability (annuity) cash flows to a series of modeled
scenarios regarding, among other things, interest rates, annuitant behavior,
asset performance in light of credit and market risks, and mortality
experience. 355 The insurer then constructs a statistical distribution of outcomes
and determines the Conditional Tail Expected Amount (CTEA), defined as the
numerical average of the largest 30 percent of the outcomes. 35 6 By using only
the largest outcomes, CTE ensures that so-called tail risks, where low
357
probability events can have a large impact, will be taken into account.
Company actuaries will direct the cash flow modeling and conduct the test
without any concrete direction from any public regulatory guidance. In this
respect, VACARVM breaks from the long tradition, dating to the days of Elizur
358
Wright, of statutory formula-based reserving methodologies.
In place of statutory formulae, VACARVM sets forth five principles to
guide company actuaries. 359 Principle 1 sets the risk-focused tone for the other
principles: "The objective of the approach used to determine the [CTEA] is to
quantify the amount of statutory reserves needed by the company to be able to
meet contractual obligations in light of the risks to which the company is
exposed. ,360 Brief descriptions of the other principles follow:
0 Principle 2: Calculation of the CTEA amount is based on analysis
of asset and liability cash flows produced by applying a stochastic
cash flow model to equity return and interest rate scenarios. When
running the scenarios through the model, insurers are to use a
"Prudent Estimate" approach, meaning that company actuaries
should utilize equity returns and interest rates assumptions that are
"at the conservative end of [their] confidence interval as to the true

353. Id., at 1-2. The standard scenario is a formulaic methodology that prescribes assumptions. See
id. at 20-30.
354. Insurers may utilize an "Alternative Methodology" in lieu of the CTE to determine reserves
for certain variable annuity contracts (I) without guaranteed minimum benefits or (2) with only
guaranteed minimum death benefits. See id. at 10.
355. Id. at 3A.
356. Id. at 7. Thus, if outcomes are normally distributed, the CTEA will approximate the 88 1
percentile. Id. at 2. For books of business with fatter tails, the CTEA will exceed the 88"h percentile, and
vice versa.
357. The CTE method differs from the internal models-based methods of Basel I1 and the E.U.'s
Solvency II regime for insurers in that it takes into account the extreme tails of loss distribution.
358. See supra Part liD.
359. See VACARVM Regulation, supranote 350, at 2-3.
360. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
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36
underlying probabilities for the parameter(s) in question.
Principle 3: Principle 3 sets up a conceptual meta-framework for
setting assumptions. Generally, assumptions are to be made
conservatively. But if each parameter is determined conservatively,
the total risk measure may be distorted even more than normal
conservative actuarial practice would require. Actuaries should
therefore try to choose assumptions and modeling technologies that
approximate what would likely be the conservative estimates of the
results over the joint
CTEA were it possible to calculate
362
distribution of all future outcomes.

Principle 4: Principle 4 reminds actuaries that the CTEA is the
result of a model, not a certain prediction of future results. While a
stochastic cash flow model attempts to approximate economic
suffers from the inherent limitations of
reality, it ultimately 363
technologies.
modeling
Principle 5: Principle 5 is a general and broad anti-abuse principle.
It provides that actuaries are not to permit insurers to obtain
reductions in the CTEA through the use of assumptions, methods,
models, or derivative and other risk management transactions that
serve solely to reduce the CTEA without also reducing risk. In
other words, the insurer should not be permitted to "retrofit" its
business in any respect to achieve more favorable reserve amounts
under the CTE.364

The CTE vests considerable discretion in the company actuaries to direct
the reserve calculation exercise. While a detailed and technical explication of
the principles is outside the scope of this article, it should be readily apparent
that the CTE represents nothing short of a revolution in statutory reserve
accounting. Included in Principle 4 is a pithy distillation of the sea change in
regulatory technology: "[T]he actual statutory reserve needs of the company
365
arise from the risks to which the company is (or will be) exposed in reality."
The assumption underlying the VACARVM principles-based approach is that
statutory reserves should reflect the risk profile of an insurer's business.
Formerly, the statutory reserving formulae were said to be conservative and
their proponents touted their historic success as evidence of their soundness.
This regime functioned well while the life insurance industry was a relatively
staid business. As the industry embraced new business models with new risks,
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id.
Id. at 2-3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
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both regulators and industry perceived the statutory formulae as inadequate.
With VACARVM, insurance regulators attempted for the first time to tether the
solvency regulatory regime directly to the processes that propelled the modem
financial services business in the first place - by entrusting the reserve
calculation, albeit only partially, to the risk models firms had developed for use
internally. By setting a minimum floor, the standard scenario serves to
constrain some of the discretion granted to company actuaries and managers,
the standard scenario widely
but the reserve amounts calculated pursuant to
366
recognized to be insufficient in most scenarios.
B. PBR
In September 2009, the NAIC adopted a revised SVL that would provide
for a PBR approach for all life insurance (unlike VACARVM, which applies
only to variable annuities) under which prospective reserve requirements will
be determined by reference to an insurer's internally modeled assumptions and
methodologies. 367 In March 2010, the NAIC unveiled key draft components of
the so-called Valuation Manual, which will be incorporated by reference into
the SVL and will provide the backbone for the new PBR framework.3 68 While
the Valuation Manual is very much a work in progress, it is clear that the PBR
framework will not prescribe reserve formulae, mortality tables, interest rates,
or assumptions regarding policyholder behavior. Instead, the insurer will
perform extensive internal tests employing stochastic statistical modeling
techniques to test the impact of random changes in key variables - to be
determined by the insurer rather than public regulatory prescription - as the
basis for setting reserves. 369 Under the PBR approach, an insurer will account
for reserves on an aggregate, not cumulative seriatim, basis across all its
business and will take into account hedging strategies. 370 Importantly, as
presently drafted, the Valuation Manual, much like the standard scenario under
366. See Vaughn, supra note 208, at 8.
367. NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS, LIFE & HEALTH ACTUARIAL TASK FORCE, VALUATION MANUAL

- VM-00, at 5, available at http://www.naic.org/committeeslhatf.htm (2010) ("A principle-based
valuation is a reserve valuation that uses one or more methods or one of more assumptions determined
by the insurer pursuant to requirements of the SVL and the Valuation Manual. This is in contrast to
valuation approaches that use only prescribed assumptions and methods.") [hereinafter Valuation
Manual]. The revised SVL provides that the PBR approach will only apply to business written after the
operative date of the Valuation Manual. See STANDARD VALUATION LAW, supra note 98, §12.A.
368. See LIFE & HEALTH ACTUARIAL TASK FORCE, NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS, SPRING 2010
MEETING SUMMARY, available at http://www.naic.org/meetingsl 003/summary lhatf.htm

369. See Valuation Manual, supra note 367, VM-20: REQUIREMENTS FOR PRINCIPLES-BASED
RESERVES FOR LIFE PRODUCTS §§ 2-6; id., VM-21: REQUIREMENTS FOR PRINCIPLES-BASED RESERVES
FOR VARIABLE ANNUITIES § 2.D.

370. The aggregate calculation, based on internally modeled assumptions, is troublesomely similar
to the situation that gave rise to securitization of subprime mortgages. Rather than calculating reserves
on a policy-by-policy basis, insurers will be able to treat the composite of their contracts as a distinct
pool of contracts, much like underwriters of RMBSs and CDOs avoided meaningful risk assessments of
individual mortgagors by treating a pool of mortgages or bonds as a well-diversified composite.
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the VACARVM guideline, provides for a new formula-based reserve
calculation1 floor called the "aggregate net premium reserve" (ANPR)
amount.

37

The revised SVL will, when adopted by the states, cement the Valuation
Manual (and stochastic testing and internal models) in the realm of public law.
The Valuation Manual will provide for most of the details regarding the PBR
approach. Once a state adopts the SVL amendments, the reserving standards set
forth in the Valuation Manual will become binding on insurers subject to that
state's jurisdiction. 372 Importantly, the NAIC is expected to adjust the
Valuation Manual's standards periodically to adapt to evolving business
373
practices on a rolling basis without requiring iterative legislative approvals.
The PBR approach will only become legally binding on insurers domiciled or
writing business in a state that has adopted the NAIC's amendments to the
SVL, though the amendments are structured so as to ensure that the PBR
approach will only take formal effect after there is a broad legislative and
regulatory consensus as to its appropriateness. 374 As NAIC pronouncements,
the September 2009 amendments to the SVL do not themselves have legal
force, but they create a ready-made NAIC-sanctioned template that in modem
U.S. insurance regulation is usually a necessary first step to formal legal
adoption in the various status. 3 75 In the meantime, the NAIC's Life and Health
371. In addition to the discretion-limiting effects of setting a floor, there are tax reasons for
including a formula-based reserve calculation method as a floor. See Karen Rudolph, PBA Items from
NAIC Winter National Meeting, THE FIN. REPORTER 18, 19 (Mar. 2010).
372. See STANDARD VALUATION LAW, supra note 98, §1 IA ("For policies issued on or after the
operative date of the valuation manual, the standard prescribed in the valuation manual is the minimum
standard of valuation.").
373. See Valuation Manual, supra note 367, VM-00 at 4-5 (discussing how the Life and Health
Actuarial Task Force is "charged with the maintenance of the Valuation Manual").
374. Under the terms of the new SVL, the PBR approach will take effect on January 1 of the first
calendar year as of which all of the following have occurred: (1)the Valuation Manual is adopted by the
NAIC by a vote of the greater of 75% and 42 of the NAIC's member insurance commissioners; (2) the
new SVL, or substantially similar legislation, is enacted by states representing more than 75% of the
direct life and health premiums written in 2008; and (3) the new SVL, or substantially similar
legislation, is enacted in at least 42 U.S. states. Under the terms of the revised SVL, the PBR approach
would apply only on a prospective basis, and extant formula-based reserving methods would still apply
to in-force blocks of business.
375. In the September 2009 vote before the plenary NAIC membership, New York and Wisconsin
voted against the relevant amendments to the SVL. The New York State Insurance Department oversees
life insurers representing 36% of life insurance premiums. Fred Anderson, Chair of LHATF NMPBR
Experience Reporting Subgroup, Comments at National NAIC Meeting (Apr. 9, 2010). Historically,
New York was the largest life insurance market and its comparatively well-resourced regulators have
acted as leaders among the regulatory community. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 26, at 76 (describing the
effects of New York's insurance investment laws). New York's importance can be traced to the socalled Appleton Rule, named after insurance superintendent Henry Appleton, which in 1907 provided
that non-New York insurers were required to "comply substantially" with the New York insurance laws
and regulations as a condition to doing business in the state. See U.S. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 195 at 56. New York's objections to the SVL - chief
among which is a potential weakening of solvency requirements in light of the 2008-09 financial crisis are therefore particularly noteworthy. See N.Y.S. INS. DEP'T, 151ST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE

SUPERINTENDENT 33 (2009) ("The Life Bureau [of the N.Y. Insurance Department] has reservations
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Actuarial Task Force - the subcommittee charged with developing principlesbased reserve accounting standards - has circulated in exposure draft form
most of the key components of the Valuation Manual.
The draft Valuation Manual provides the following anodyne summation of
its purpose:
As insurance products have increased in their complexity, and as companies have
developed new and innovative product designs that change their risk profile, the
need to develop new valuation methodologies or revisions to existing requirements
376
to address these changes has led to the development of the Valuation Manual.

But the Valuation Manual and the PBR approach do much more than "address
these changes"; they fundamentally re-orient the statutory reserve calculation
exercise away from conservatism.
1. Mechanics of PBR
Section 12 of the revised SVL sets forth the conceptual framework for the
Valuation Manual. Section 12 provides, among other things, that PBR methods
should (1) quantify levels of benefits and funding and associated risks "at a
level of conservatism that reflects conditions that include unfavorable events
that have a reasonable probability of occurring" and (2) incorporate
assumptions, risk analysis methods, and financial models and management
techniques that are consistent with, but not necessarily identical to, those
utilized within the insurer's own internal risk management function. 377 Section
12 purports to pursue the conservatism objective by requiring consideration of
"unfavorable events." Nevertheless, the methodologies and assumptions
utilized pursuant to Section 12 will be "consistent with," but not necessarily
identical to, the firm's own internal risk management function. As noted in Part
I, however, shareholders and managers - particularly in today's equity capital
markets where short-term investors predominate - should have a very different
risk tolerance than regulators. Section 12 provides no guidance as to the
perspective by which conservatism is to be adjudged.
The Valuation Manual provides more specific guidance on how a firm is to
develop assumptions and methods for use in the PBR approach. For example,
when developing modeling assumptions for risk factors to which statistical
credibility may be appropriately applied (such as mortality), firms are to
combine firm-specific experience data and other applicable data in a378manner
that is consistent with statistical theory and accepted actuarial practice.
Like the VACARVM guideline, the Valuation Manual prescribes a CTE
about potentially weakening solvency requirements under a principles based approach in light of the
dramatic changes being experienced in the financial industry due to the economic crisis.").
376. Id., VM-00 at 3.
377. See STANDARD VALUATION LAW, supra note 98, § 12.A.
378. VALUATION MANUAL, supra note 368, VM-20: REQUIREMENTS FOR PRINCIPLES-BASED
RESERVES FOR LIFE PRODUCTS § 9.A.6.
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method based on the largest 30 percent of the model's outcomes. 3 79 Thus, the
conservatism in the PBR approach derives from the ambiguous provisions in
Section 12 and the CTE calibration, which is, as with VACARVM, stacked in
favor of high-reserve outcomes. While the CTE method will be conservative
vis-A-vis the insurers' internal models, whether it is conservative in the abstract
will be an empirical question to be resolved in light of future experience. The
stronger an insurer's commitment to reliability perspective to risk management,
the surer a regulator can be that the CTE method will not diverge wildly from a
true conservative valuation.
2. PBR and Corporate Governance
The PBR approach places responsibility on an insurer's management to
calculate reserves based on actuarial and financial assumptions of its own
choosing. To regulate this exercise of discretion, 38 Section 12 of the revised
SVL requires insurers to comply with new NAIC principles for corporate
governance and oversight of the actuarial function and to develop a "principle381
based valuation report" that complies with the Valuation Manual standards.
Furthermore, just as the SEC is considering limiting the effect of Section 404 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 382 the NAIC has created a Sarbanes-Oxley Section
404-inspired requirement that an insurer file with its board of directors and the
insurance commissioner an annual certification as to the effectiveness of the
383
internal controls with respect to PBR accounting.
The Valuation Manual itself includes guidance on corporate governance for
insurers. While the current draft is clear that the guidance does not expand the
existing legal duties of the board, senior management, and the appointed
actuaries - who have always had statutory responsibilities to oversee their
respective spheres of activity within an insurance enterprise - it does provide
specific guidance on what those responsibilities entail in connection with the
PBR framework.38 4 Board members are instructed to provide "general
oversight" over senior management's remediation of any material weakness in
the insurer's PBR internal controls, the infrastructure (consisting of policies,
procedures, controls, and resources) in place to implement PBR processes, and
379. Id. § 5.
380. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
381. See STANDARD VALUATION LAW, supra note 98, § 12

382. In July 2010, Congress exempted non-accelcrated filers from the requirements of Scction 404
of the Sarbanes-Oxlcy Act of 2002. See Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 2, § 989G. It also instructed the
SEC to conduct a study on how to reduce Section 404 compliance costs for issuers with market
capitalizations between $75,000,000 and $250,000,000. See id. § 989G(b).
383. Specifically, the internal controls must be designed to ensure that (I) all material risks are
included in the internally modeled valuation and (2) the valuation was conducted in accordance with the
Valuation Manual. See STANDARD VALUATION LAW, supra note 98, § 12.
384. Valuation Manual, supra note 367, VM-G: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDANCE FOR
PRINCIPLE-BASED RESERVES, passim (2009).
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385
the documentation of board consideration of such matters.
The Valuation Manual also provides guidance for senior management in its
exercise of responsibilities to build a PBR framework infrastructure, including
the adoption of internal controls and the review of modeling assumptions and
methodologies as well as risk tolerance levels. 386 In addition, the Valuation
Manual places on management the responsibility for adequately resourcing the
3 87
actuarial function to perform its enhanced modeling tasks.
Notwithstanding the extensive prescriptions set forth in the corporate
governance requirements, nowhere in the requirements does the NAIC insist
that the corporate governance infrastructure adopt a conservative reliabilitystyle perspective that focuses on the long-term viability of the enterprise. The
absence is indicative of a tonal shift in the expectations of the reserving
function. Just as Section 12 requires consistency between the assumptions and
methodologies used in the PBR valuation with those used in the internal risk
management function, the corporate governance guidance de-emphasizes the
former conservatism lodestar of statutory accounting. 388 For example,
management is instructed to

determin[e] that . . . [a] process exists that ensures that models and procedures

produce appropriate results relative to principle-based valuation objectives (such
process to provide reasonable assurance that the principle-based modeling does not
produce a bias toward underestimation of such reserves, and389
that principle-based
reserves are reasonable and adequate under the circumstances).

Though the parenthetical applies illustratively and not by way of limitation, it is
noteworthy that the two examples of valuation objectives are (1) avoiding
underestimation of reserves and (2) and "reasonable and adequate" provisions.
The focus is squarely on the economic value of reserves - a quantifiable,
observable optimization target - rather than intentional overstatement of
reserves for the sake of conservative financial reporting and the assurance of
prompt regulatory intervention.
3. PBR as New Governance andMeta-Risk Management
The PBR framework uses life insurers' risk management systems to
improve the quality of information used in the reserve calculation, but it falls
short of establishing a system of meta-risk management to regulate the exercise
of discretion because it (1) fails to promote a dynamic process of continuous
improvement and rolling best practices and (2) leaves the public regulatory
enforcement role curiously undefined and the entire framework vulnerable to a
385. Id. § 4.
386. Id. §§ 5-8.
387. Id. §§ 5(i) and 7.
388. See generallysupra Part I1.

389. Valuation Manual, supra note 367, VM-G: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GUIDANCE FOR
PRINCIPLE-BASED RESERVES §7(ii).
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legitimacy deficit. Accordingly, it requires either modification or abrogation if
regulators are committed to a conservative, reliability-focused solvency regime.
First, the decentralization of governance promises to be a first step in
bridging the information asymmetries between regulators and regulatees that
initially caused the dysfunction in the reserve accounting rules. Firms
themselves, with their superior access to and ability to process information,
have been enlisted to restore the logical relationship between the accounting
rules and the regulated business that, due to new product mix, had largely
disappeared. The potential for quality, up-to-date information is certainly
enhanced.
Moreover, by inviting regulated insurers to the governance table, the
reserve accounting exercise will now (1) capture risk factors that the former
formula-based regime did not take into account and (2) improve the quality and
quantity of the information based on which the reserve amounts will be
calculated. Two qualifications are in order here. First, a requirement that
insurers produce an assessment report of its own risk profiles, in narrative form,
might benefit the quality of the information. On the one hand, it will force selfreflection, which might counteract management tendencies to focus on price
and other optimization signals at the expense of weak, complex, multi-factor
signals. 39 On the other hand, it will provide a framework for discussions with
regulators, and might also consolidate disparate information flows and make
them more comprehensible to regulators. Regulators could even condition the
use of internal models on acceptance of such a report, as is done with the E.U.'s
new Solvency II insurance capital adequacy framework 39 1 as well as certain
environmental 392 and resource extraction 393 regulatory regimes. By requiring
periodic sunset reviews of the report, regulators would foster the reliability
norms of destabilization and continuous re-assessment. The second
394
qualification is more conceptual, and it recalls Baldwin and Black's position
that "really responsive" regulation responds not only to changing market
dynamics, but also to the institutional contexts within which regulation
operates: mere access to better information is insufficient to recoup the internal
logic of SAP accounting. A regime must aim to institutionalize responsibility
for risk management and internal model preparation. Though the PBR
framework advisedly addresses this as a corporate governance matter, the
390. See supra notes 240-241 and accompanying text.
391. The E.U. requires just such a report, called the Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (or
"ORSA") as part of its internal models-based Solvency II capital adequacy framework.
392. See David M. Trubek & Louise G. Trubek, New Governance and Legal Regulation:
Complementarity, Rivalry and Transformation, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 539, 542, 558 (2007) (discussing
Wisconsin's environmental "Green Tier" permitting process).
393. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, INCREASED SAFETY MEASURES FOR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ON
THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 27 (2010) (announcing intention to require "safety case" development
and pre-approval by regulators before oil companies arc permitted to drill).
394. See supra note 303.
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framework is curiously undeveloped along the new governance dimensions of
flexible lawmaking and risk-sensitive enforcement.
As regards flexible and reliability-focused lawmaking, consider that as
presently drafted, the PBR framework does not provide for a forum for
regulators to develop on a rolling basis a discussion regarding best practices in
risk management and internal modeling. The framework permits nimble
responses to market changes from the perspective of management's goals.395
But without a forum to identify best practices and share them with other
regulators, the framework risks devolving into separate supervisory silos with
no cross-learning and little revision of standards. This is especially troubling in
the context of U.S. insurance regulation, because the central justification for its
decentralized form of regulatory federalism is the multiplicity of perspectives it
enables. The problem of regulatory resources is one that this article has so far
go a long way to
elided, but lowering the cost of information gathering would
396
addressing structural regulatory staff and resource deficits.
The NAIC already has in place an infrastructure to create such a forum. For
example, the NAIC has developed a forum for multiple state regulators that
supervise different insurers within a holding company structure to coordinate
their examinations and reviews. 397 A "lead state" is designated and will serve as
coordinator to ensure that other regulators are adequately informed about the
affairs of the entire holding company group.398 The NAIC's Financial Analysis
Working Group (FAWG) serves as a forum for insurance regulators to share
information on insurers operating nationally or large insurance groups, and also
to identify emerging trends and financial issues in the sector.3 99 FAWG also
can review, provide input, and
serves as a peer review space, where regulators
400
methods.
states'
other
over
voice concerns
In this respect FAWG is analogous to the so-called Level 3 committees of
the E.U.'s Lamfalussy process for financial regulation rulemaking. The Level 3
committees are comprised of E.U. member state securities, bank, and insurance
regulators and they are responsible for implementation of E.U. financial
legislation and regulations. 40 1 The Level 3 committees conduct mandatory peer
review of member states' implementation efforts, and even create ad hoc

395. Thus, the reserving methodologies will be adjusted pursuant to the channels of corporate
authority without formal hearing and notice requirements typical of administrative law.
396. See Daniel Schwarcz, Regulating Insurance Sales or Selling Insurance Regulation?: Against
Regulatory Competition in Insurance,94 MINN. L. REV. 1707, 1768-69 (2010).
397. Michael T. McRaith, Ill. Dir. of Ins., Remarks before the U.S. H. R. Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters., 13 (June 16, 2009).
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Vaughan, supra note 208, at 10.
401. See Elliot Posner, The Lamfalussy Process: Polyarchic of Networked FinancialRule-Making
in the E.U., in EXPERIMENTALIST GOVERNANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 43, 47-54 (2010).
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402
In their composite, these peer
groups to address specific shortcomings.
review interactions permit the identification, on a rolling basis, of best practices
and create a forum to exert moral suasion on underperforming regulators. In the
PBR context, the NAIC should create a FAWG-like forum, but with mandatory
participation as contemplated by the Lamfalussy process, in order to ensure
constant learning at the regulator level, as well as dialogue with, and
dissemination of best practices to, industry. The October 2010 NAIC proposal
to create a regulatory "feedback loop" is a welcome first step in this direction
40 3
and the FAWG could serve as a model for how to formalize such a structure.
Proposals to centralize data collection (or, in NAIC parlance, "experience
reporting '' 04)at the NAIC or with an independent statistical agent, 40 5 while
certainly right-minded suggested solutions to the lack of horizontal (regulatorregulator) and vertical (regulator-regulatee) information flows, run contrary to
the decentralization norm and might in the long run prove sclerotic and prefer
standardization over diversity and destabilization. The recent track record 4 of6
0
rating agencies cautions against deputizing private industry statistical agents.
In addition to facilitating these horizontal and vertical information flows,
the PBR framework should be amended to encourage enhanced market
discipline and industry cross-learning through public disclosure. Large banks
subject to Basel II and its "market discipline"-based Pillar 3407 are funded to a
greater extent than life insurers by sophisticated financial institutions with
incentives and analytical capabilities to review their counterparties' statistical
models for information on their credit risk. As such, a life insurer's cost of
capital would likely be less responsive to public disclosure financial models
(and the governance implications of market discipline less pronounced) than a
large bank.40 8 Nevertheless, an expanded role for market disclosure would give
insurance groups better access to the models their competitors use, which could
facilitate greater cross-learning. Consumer interest groups, too, would be able
to test assumptions underlying the models and thus foster a "tripartite" model
involving industry, regulators, and affected constituents, which would bolster
the legitimacy of the PBR regime and improve its results by expanding the

402. See id.
403. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,LLP,

NAIC MEETING NOTES NAIC 2010 FALL NATIONAL

MEETING at 18, available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/insurance/assets/fallnaic201 0.pdf.
404. Valuation Manual, supra note 367, VM-50 EXPERIENCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, passim.

405. See Vaughan, supranote 208, at 21; Bruning, supra note 109 at 10-11.
406. See, e.g., Arthur E.Wilmarth, Jr., Reforming FinancialRegulation to Address the Too-Big-toFail Problem, 35 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 707, 722-26 (2010) (describing conflicts of interest in the
"issuer-pays" business model and cautioning against the dangers of stamping credit ratings with a
"regulatory imprimatur").
407. See supra notes 313 and 316.
408. Recent proposals to require financial institutions to issue hybrid debt that converts toequity to
serve as an in extremis capital buffer would subject these institutions to enhanced market discipline, but
are outside the scope of this article. See, e.g., Damian Paletta, The Idea to Prevent the Next Banking
Bust?, WALL ST. J.,Sept. 27, 2010, at A2.
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perspectives brought into the regulatory process. 409 As with Basel II, there are
competitive implications of this data sharing, but achieving the proper balance
of solvency protection is fundamentally a trade-off of short-term
competitiveness and long-term solidity. 4 10 As presently drafted, the Valuation
Manual will provide for public disclosure only for "aggregate industry report"
41
data, which reflects an undue emphasis on short-term competitive advantage. 1
Another factor that limits the flexibility and reliability focus of the PBR
regime is the absence of mandatory stress testing of the statistical models used
to calculate reserve amounts. By requiring firms to expose their statistical
models to controlled stress, even perhaps in regulator-organized industry-wide
dynamic stress tests, 4 12 regulators force firms to institutionalize the
destabilization norms and the preoccupation with failure that characterize
reliability-focused firs. 4 13 Stress tests should be mandated both on the basis of
internal scenarios and scenarios provided by regulators, and firms should be
required to conduct "reverse stress tests" that are designed to identify scenarios
that would cause financial distress.414 This latter set of stress tests would share
a common set of scenario assumptions and would accordingly be subject to
benchmarking at the FAWG-like regulators' forum. Firms should also be
required to address stress test results in regular reports the regulators. The
NAIC has recognized the importance of mandatory stress testing and
considered its adoption in other contexts, 4 15 but has so far not appreciated fully
its vital role in promoting a reliability perspective that will enhance the PBR
regime.
In addition to its failure to promote a flexible, reliability-focused approach
to lawmaking, the PBR regime as presently structured does not provide for a
risk-sensitive enforcement role for regulators acting as "benign big guns." In
the abstract, the challenge is to guide regulators in deploying risk-sensitive
enforcement threats designed to encourage a reliability perspective to risk
management. More concretely, regulators should possess the authority and
409. See generally AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 272, at 54-100.

410. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
411. Valuation Manual, supra note 367, VM-50 EXPERIENCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS § F.2.e.1.
412. See Haldane, supra note 249 at 15-16 (referring to such tests as "hybrid stress test-cum-war
game[s]"); CENTER FOR ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH, THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL
REGULATION 63 (2009) ("Completely new [stress testing] techniques, perhaps based on models and
endogenous risk spillover measures .
need to be devised to explore the implications of endogenous
risk for the system.").
413. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
414. See INT'L ASS'N INS. SUPERVISORS, GUIDANCE PAPER ON ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT
FOR

SOLVENCY

PURPOSES

37

(2010),

available

at

http://www.iaisweb.org/ temp/2 2_6 Guidanccpaper on enterprise risk management for capital a
dequacy and solvency_purposes.pdf
415. See, e.g., NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS, CONSULTATION PAPER ON REGULATORY CAPITAL
REQUIREMENTS AND OVERARCHING ACCOUNTING / VALUATION ISSUES FOR THE SOLVENCY
MODERNIZATION
INITIATIVE
(2009),
available
at

www.naic.org/documents/committees cx isfif 1003 capitalreq.doc.
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tools to intervene through appropriate actions to prevent a life insurer's
insolvency before it happens.41 6 Again the regulators' staff and resource deficit
becomes relevant: regulators will achieve their objectives more readily to the
extent they are able to institutionalize responsibility on the part of regulated
firms, rather than monitor and enforce compliance. Here as well the NAIC
currently has tools that can be coordinated with the PBR framework to improve
its utility as a meta-risk management governance tool. In particular, the NAIC's
Hazardous Condition Regulation, which has already been adopted in all states
and the District of Columbia, authorizes regulators to impose twelve prescribed
sanctions, along a sliding scale of severity, to address risky behaviors and
characteristics of insurers. 417 In conjunction with recent NAIC initiatives to
provide for risk-sensitive examination efforts focused on prospective risks, risk
management, and corporate governance, the Hazardous Condition Regulation
creates an enforcement regime with flexible sanctions and information
provision outside the context of the rigid capital adequacy regime."' The PBR
should incorporate similar regulatory flexibility so that insurance regulators (1)
are provided with authority to enforce best practice reliability-type risk
modeling where appropriate but (2) can also make discretionary judgments
concerning punishment and inducement. Thus, with respect to this latter goal,
the PBR framework should clarify that the regulator has discretion to provide
positive incentives for, e.g., smaller companies struggling to meet best practices
and deterrent punishment for, e.g., a large intransigent firm with a strong
commitment to managing risks in pursuit of short-term earnings optimization at
the expense of reliability. Given the wide discretion granted to life insurers in
setting their reserve requirements, the right to judicial review of agency orders
provided for in the Hazardous Condition Regulation should be relaxed under
419
this proposed PBR enforcement authority.
Given the limitations of the principles-based framework as currently
drafted, the inclusion of the ANPR formula-based floor 20 is well-advised.
Before transitioning to a full principles-based framework, regulators should be
satisfied that the internal models incorporated into the reserve accounting
exercise are using conservative assumptions and methodologies and are not
instead premised on short-term optimization metrics. However, the ANPR is
merely intended as a baseline floor that will be set much lower than the
416. Principle 4 of Basel 1I's Pillar 2 provides a framework model for such authority. See supra
notes 322, 330, and 331 and accompanying text.
417. NAT'L ASS'N INS. COMM'RS, MODEL REGULATION TO DEFINE STANDARDS AND
COMMISSIONER'S AUTHORITY FOR COMPANIES DEEMED TO BE IN HAZARDOUS FINANCIAL CONDITION
385-1 (2010).
418. Recall that under the RBC capital adequacy regime, regulators generally lack enforcement
flexibility; their actions are calibrated to trigger points such that as an insurer's RBC level declines,
regulators arc required to seize control of the insurer. See supra note 103.
419. See Hazardous Condition Regulation, supra note 417, § 5.
420. See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
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traditional formula-based methodologies that regulators have used for over a
century. Until insurance regulators (1) deploy risk-sensitive enforcement
threats to encourage an authentic reliability perspective to risk management and
(2) promote a more robust informational infrastructure among regulators,
regulatees, and affected third parties so that best practices can be identified
promptly and presented prospectively as standards, the ANPR standard
scenario should be designed to set a higher level in order to assure solidity.
CONCLUSION

This article presents the story of PBR as a case study of how regulatory
systems can drift from their initial objectives when market complexity outpaces
the capabilities of traditional regulatory tools to effectuate those objectives. It
has for some time been commonplace to note that the New Deal administrative
state is a relic and that regulatory strategies need to be re-conceptualized to
include private actors in the governance of complex and dynamic social
systems such as financial markets. Such reforms are unavoidable as regulators
struggle to manage information flow in light of product and investment
complexity. Of course, on the margins policymakers can and should utilize
command-and-control techniques to counteract instability in financial markets,
but the long-term trend of regulatory practice will likely be in the direction of
increased informational intensiveness. What have received less attention are the
channels through which private information is transmitted through a
governance framework to achieve public regulatory objectives.
In the case of life insurance and PBR - and, for that matter, financial safety
and soundness regulation more generally - until such time as the preconditions
for industrial morality are in place, the primary regulatory task must be to foster
a meta-risk management regime that institutionalizes responsibility on the part
of market participants. Otherwise, policymakers will replace arbitrary
regulatory regimes (such as the continuing application of 19th century
reserving methodologies with which Elizur Wright would be familiar) with
illegitimate ones that are designed to promote the short-term interests of
regulatees rather than public objectives. Ultimately, the PBR story sheds light
on the immanent instability of financial capitalism. Whether this instability
continues to wreak havoc on savings, investment, and fiscal health or is reinvented as responsible financial innovation that contributes to economic - and,
by implication, human - flourishing will depend in large part on the extent to
which public regulators are creative and committed enough to achieve this task.

